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THE AGE OF REVOLUTION

THE AGE OF REVOLUTION

A SURVEY OF EUROPEAN HISTORY SINCE 1815 (to 1939)

BY

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CONTENTS

DATES— <i>Political</i>	6
DATES— <i>Cultural</i>	7
INTRODUCTION	9

CHAPTER I.—LIBERAL ROMANTICISM

1. Aftermath of Revolution ✓	15
2. The Religious Revival	26
3. The Heyday of Romance	36
4. The Machine Age ✓	45
5. The Advent of Socialism ✓	54
6. The Reign of the Bourgeoisie ✓	65

CHAPTER II.—NATIONALIST DEMOCRACY

1. Race and Nation	75
2. From Metternich to Bismarck	86
3. Realism ousts Romance	102
4. Scientific Materialism	114
5. Marx and the New Socialism	126
6. Weltpolitik	138
7. Descent into the Maelstrom	150

CHAPTER III.—ARMAGEDDON AND AFTER

1. The Climax of Nationalism	161
2. Dictatorship of the Proletariat	172
3. The Passing of Liberalism	182
4. Today and Tomorrow	190
INDEX	192

DATES—POLITICAL

- 1776 American Declaration of Independence.
- 1787 American Constitution drawn up—first of the "Liberal" Constitutions.
- 1789 French Revolution.
- 1791 French democratic constitution proclaimed.
- 1792-94 Jacobin Reign of Terror.
- 1798 Military conscription first introduced (in France).
- 1804-14 Napoleon.
- 1815 Waterloo.
- 1819 Carlsbad Decrees suppress Liberalism in Germany.
- 1820 First year of revolution (Spain, Naples, Piedmont).
- 1821 Greek revolt against Turkey.
- 1823 French suppress Liberal revolution in Spain.
- 1825 "Decembrist" revolt in Russia.
- 1827 The word "Socialism" first used.
- 1830 Second year of revolution (France, Italy, Belgium, S. Germany, Poland). Orleans Monarchy replaces Bourbons in France. Mazzini founds "Young Italy."
- 1832 Reform Bill in England.
- 1833 Slavery abolished in the British Empire.
- 1835 Zollverein (customs union) in Germany.
- 1838 "People's Charter" drawn up in England.
- 1840 First Anglo-Chinese War—beginning of commercial imperialism in the Far East.
- 1846 England adopts free trade. Pius IX elected Pope, revival of Liberalism in Europe.
- 1848 Third year of revolution (France, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Prussia). Fall of Metternich. Second Republic in France.
- 1849 Failure of Liberal and Nationalist revolts in Germany and Italy (except in Piedmont).
- 1851 Coup d'état of Louis Napoleon.
- 1852-70 Napoleon III emperor.
- 1854-56 Crimean War.
- 1854 Japan opened to Western trade.
- 1859-70 Italian Risorgimento.
- 1860 Cobden free trade treaty between England and France.
- 1861 Emancipation of the serfs in Russia.
- 1862 Bismarck minister-president of Prussia.
- 1864 Marx founds first Workers' International.
- 1866 Austro-Prussian "seven weeks war"—Austria deprived of her leadership of Germany.
- 1867 Second Reform Bill in England gives vote to working class.
- 1869 Suez Canal opened.
- 1870-71 Franco-German War.
- 1871 German Empire (Second Reich) proclaimed at Versailles. Paris Commune.
- 1878 Berlin Congress—temporary settlement of Balkan question.
- 1880-89 Partition of Africa among the European Powers.
- 1881-89 Bismarck carries social insurance laws in Germany.
- 1889 Second (Socialist) International founded.
- 1890 Fall of Bismarck.
- 1899-1902 Boer War.
- 1900 Boxer Rising in China. German "big navy" programme laid down.
- 1904 Anglo-French entente.
- 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War.
- 1907 Anglo-Russian entente.
- 1912-13 Balkan Wars.
- 1914-18 First World War.
- 1917 Russian Revolution.
- 1919 Treaty of Versailles. Third (Communist) International founded.
- 1920 League of Nations established.

- 1922 Fascist revolution overthrows Liberalism in Italy.
- 1929-33 World economic crisis.
- 1933 National Socialist revolution establishes Third Reich in Germany.
- 1938 Germany annexes Austria.
- 1939-45 Second World War.

DATES—CULTURAL

- 1761 Rousseau's *Nouvelle Héloïse* launches Romantic Movement in Europe.
- 1764 Watt's steam-engine.
- 1776 Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*.
- 1785 Steam power-loom invented.
- 1798 Wordsworth's and Coleridge's *Lyrical Ballads*.
- 1802 Chateaubriand's *Génie du Christianisme*.
- 1808 Goethe's *Faust*.
- 1813 Madame de Staël's *De l'Allemagne*.
- 1817 Joseph du Maistre's *Du Pape*.
- 1819 Robert Owen's *New View of Society*.
- 1820-30 Factory system established in England.
- 1824 Death of Byron at Missolonghi.
- 1825 First railway opened (Stockton to Darlington). Saint Simon's *Nouveau Christianisme*.
- 1827 Victor Hugo's *Cromwell*. Death of Beethoven.
- 1830-42 Comte's *Course of Positive Philosophy*.
- 1831 Death of Hegel.
- 1833 Oxford Movement.
- 1835 Strauss's *Life of Jesus*.
- 1836 Morse invents the electric telegraph.
- 1840 Proudhon's *What is Property?*
- 1848 Marx's *Communist Manifesto*.
- 1853-55 Gobineau's *Essay on the Inequality of the Human Race* originates "Aryan" myth.
- 1856 Bessemer steel process invented.
- 1857 Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*. Baudelaire's *Fleurs du Mal*.
- 1859 Darwin's *Origin of Species*. Mill's *On Liberty*.
- 1862 Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons*. Speke discovers the source of the Nile.
- 1864 Pius IX's *Syllabus of Errors* condemns Liberalism.
- 1866 Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*.
- 1867 Japan adopts Western civilization. Marx's *Capital*.
- 1870 Vatican Council proclaims papal infallibility.
- 1871 Darwin's *Descent of Man*.
- 1876 Spencer's *First Principles*.
- 1877 Ibsen's *Pillars of Society*.
- 1883 Nietzsche's *Thus Spake Zarathustra*.
- 1891 Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum*—papal plea for social justice.
- 1895 Röntgen discovers X-rays, beginning of new era in physical science.
- 1899 Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe*. H. S. Chamberlain's *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* launches theory of Teutonic superiority.
- 1902 First wireless message sent across the Atlantic.
- 1905-15 Einstein's theory of relativity enunciated.
- 1907 Bergson's *Creative Evolution*.
- 1909 First aeroplane flight across the Channel.
- 1918-20 Spengler's *Decline of the West* prophesies downfall of European civilization.
- 1926 Hitler's *Mein Kampf*.
- 1932 Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*.

INTRODUCTION

LORD ACTON believed that the modern history of Europe was the history of a long and painful struggle for freedom, and the events of the past four or five centuries appeared to confirm his judgment. The civilization of Europe is derived from Greece and Rome. The Greek city-states stood for democratic liberty and free scientific inquiry: the Roman Empire for law, order and organization, a tradition that descended to its successor the Catholic Church. The Middle Ages were dominated by Rome: the modern world fixed upon Greece for its ideal, ever since Greek classical literature was rediscovered by the Italian Humanists of the 14th and 15th centuries. Hence the emphasis has tended to shift from Roman order to Greek freedom. The Humanists of the Renaissance strove to free philosophy and letters from ecclesiastical tutelage. The Protestant Reformers claimed to free the individual believer from dependence on priest and Pope. The Swiss, the Dutch and the English successively acquired freedom from absolute monarchy based on Roman law. The political philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries, from Locke to Kant, urged that the rights of the individual citizen should be placed beyond the reach of despotism. The merchant class, resentful of the restrictions of guild and corporation, demanded that capital and industry should be freed from State interference. The peasants were bidden to transform themselves from feudal serfs into free farmers. Men of science and of letters, particularly in 18th-century France, urged the abolition of clerical control over cultural life on the ground that the Church was hostile to, or at least obstructive of, scientific knowledge. The "Roman" elements in the European tradition came under increasingly heavy fire.

This far-reaching programme did not approach complete realization till the latter half of the 18th century, when the American Revolution of 1776 and its European counterpart, the French Revolution of 1789, suddenly declared war on kings, priests and aristocrats alike. In the North American colonies, where monarchy, aristocracy and established churches had never existed and were known only at a distance, the creation of a free democratic society presented few difficulties. The Declaration of Independence, in phrases borrowed from John Locke, asserted that all men are created equal and endowed with the inalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and the Constitution drawn up at Philadelphia in 1787 laid a solid foundation for democracy in the New World.

Transplanted to Europe, the doctrine of democratic liberty faced a more formidable challenge than had ever confronted Washington and Jefferson in the security of America. Long-established monarchies, aristocracies of proud and ancient lineage whose origins were lost in the Dark Ages, and a venerable Church organized with Roman efficiency and hallowed by age, were obstacles not lightly to be surmounted. The

leaders of the French Revolution made a brave show, and the Constitution of 1791, long an inspiration to the Liberals of Europe, followed closely the American model of 1787. But the French and the Americans possessed different cultural backgrounds; the latter went back to Locke and even to Magna Carta, the former were under the spell of Rousseau. Moreover, the opposition aroused among the princes and nobles of Europe drove the Revolution into a crusading war and necessitated the creation of a strong emergency government in which liberty (as is usual in severe crises) took second place. The Jacobin Reign of Terror of 1792-94 preserved the social and economic achievements of the Revolution (equality before the law, a free peasantry and the destruction of class privilege) at the price of a complete sacrifice of political, civil and religious freedom. The Terrorists, in fact, set up the first Totalitarian State in their efforts to beat back the attacks of the combined European Monarchies. Napoleon succeeded to their heritage; like them he made no attempt to restore genuine freedom but rather rationalized their despotism. Also like them he safeguarded the rest of the Revolutionary settlement, and the peasants fought for him to the end for fear lest, if he fell, the nobles should come back and demand the restitution of their lands.

Napoleon's conquests made the anti-feudal and anti-clerical character of the Revolution familiar to all Europe, and the Restoration of 1815 could not be a complete return to the past. But a vivid memory of the Terror survived; the very word "democrat" aroused fear and alarm in the minds of men of property, until De Tocqueville's famous study of *Democracy in America* (1835) restored it to respectability. The post-1815 reformers, therefore, tried to go back behind Napoleon and the Terror to pre-Jacobin constitutional Liberalism, carefully distinguished from radical democracy. Their aim was a *via media* between the despotism of the King and the despotism of the mob. It is perhaps significant that the leaders of early 19th century Liberalism, such as Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant and Guizot, were Protestants whose hostility to absolute monarchy may have been derived from the republican Calvinism which had created the Dutch Republic and overthrown the Stuarts. To the Catholic Church the movement was tainted with anti-clericalism, and despite the efforts of men like Montalembert and Acton to form a school of Liberal Catholicism, it was finally condemned in Pius IX's *Syllabus of Errors* in 1864.

Liberalism appealed to the prosperous middle classes eager to snatch industry from State control, to freethinkers anxious to be rid of ecclesiastical censors, and to intellectuals who accepted the more positive conception of liberty as defined by such thinkers as John Stuart Mill. In America it was never even challenged throughout the whole 19th century, because it was the very basis on which the Republic rested; in England it harmonized well with the traditions of civil and religious freedom and of parliamentary constitutionalism; in France the tremendous impetus generated by the Revolution was sufficient to keep it going against nobility, Church and Bonapartism, and even Napoleon III was compelled progressively to "liberalize" the Second Empire.

In Central Europe, however, Liberalism was weak, and in Eastern Europe it was never understood at all. The demand for a free constitution was confused with the demand for national unification in Germany or for national emancipation from foreign oppression in such countries as Italy, Hungary, Poland and Bohemia. In Italy the Liberal movement was strongest in Piedmont and Lombardy, perhaps because of the tradition of the medieval free cities and because of the close contact which had always been maintained with France. Thanks to the fact that Cavour, the architect of the Risorgimento, was a man of the North and a convinced Liberal, Italy was unified on a Liberal basis, though absolutist tendencies survived in the South, which in former days had looked to Spain and Austria. In Germany Liberalism took a firm hold on the Rhineland cities, which were open to French influence, but the real centre of German political life lay in Prussia beyond the Elbe where an old patriarchal feudalism lived on among the Junker class. The harshness of the Napoleonic régime deflected German thought into anti-French channels; Kant, the disciple of Rousseau and the champion of individual freedom, died in 1804, but his successors Fichte and Hegel, who were to shape German political thinking for a full century, lived through the humiliations of 1806 and the great national revival of 1813. Their hostility to France, to the Revolution, and to Liberalism may thus be partly ascribed to the memories of Jena and Leipzig. They demanded a strong, autocratic *Volkstaat*, capable of rooting out the particularist tendencies which had so long thwarted national unification and of bidding defiance to future Napoleons. In a country governed by professors their words were heeded and pondered; and Germany was unified, not like Italy by a Liberal, but by a bold and ruthless Conservative who preferred "blood and iron" to the votes of parliamentary majorities.

Liberalism, shaken by Bismarck's triumphs in Germany, was threatened also by the rise of Socialism. The governing class of the early 19th century was occupied almost exclusively with political problems, and the *laissez-faire* policy of Cobden and the Manchester School allowed the State only a restricted control over the life of the community. But after 1848 the emphasis shifted from politics to economics. The great industrial Revolution, which transformed England after 1800, France after 1830, and Germany and the United States after 1870, broke up the old economic foundations of society; it effected a change-over from a rural to an urban economy, from agriculture to industrial manufacture, swept the old independent domestic craftsman out of existence, destroyed the personal tie between master and men, herded together vast masses of workers in the mining villages and the factory towns where the new machinery had been installed, and produced such appalling social misery and dislocation that State intervention became an imperative necessity. Socialism originated in a demand that the State should repudiate *laissez-faire* and recover the control over the economic system that it had exercised in the old days of mercantilism. Before the end of the 19th century it was clear that individualist Liberalism, preoccupied as it was with votes and ballot-boxes and a free Press, was quite inadequate to deal with the urgent

problems of an unregulated financial and industrial capitalism and an overgrown and restless proletariat. Even in England, Liberals like Mill and T. H. Green moved in a socialistic direction. The difficulty was to reconcile the demands of social justice with the hard-won liberties of the Revolution.

The decline of Liberalism and the growing demand for a reorganization of society on socialistic lines, reinforced by the granting of universal manhood suffrage in almost all European countries, revived the power and prestige of the State, which appeared to be the only institution capable of carrying out the desired revolutionary changes. The State, which the Liberals had wished to restrict to the purely police functions of protecting life and property, was now expected to regulate hours of work, to inspect factories, to mediate between Capital and Labour, to educate children, to feed the poor, to safeguard the citizen's health, in short, to act as universal father. It reached out to control almost all departments of social life : the democratic State was transforming itself into the servile State, a Caesarian despotism. The peril was the greater in that various factors had combined, towards the close of the 19th century, to weaken the forces that might have acted as a counterweight to the State and to put fresh weapons in its hands. Of these factors we may briefly consider the decline of religion and the Churches, the rising influence of science and the worship of machinery and technique, and the growth of the cult of race.

1. Religion recovered only partially from the rationalist criticism of the 18th century ; it was valued by Napoleon for political, and by the Romantics for aesthetic reasons, but it failed to recover its hold over European culture, and in the course of the 19th century the development of historical criticism and biological science undermined the traditional view of the Hebrew Scriptures and promoted the growth of religious scepticism. The Protestant churches sought to place Christianity beyond the reach of rationalist assault by falling back, in effect, upon the teaching of Schleiermacher, that true religion is an inner experience of the soul, a way of life rather than mere faith in historic creeds. Catholicism defended itself by reorganizing its forces under an infallible Papacy and by reviving in 1879 the scholastic philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. A third alternative may possibly be provided by the fallen and persecuted Orthodox Church of Russia, so long mute and stagnant : the religious philosophy of Soloviev and Berdyaev may yet point out a way of escape for the 20th century. At present, the weakening of the Christian tradition has merely left the secular State without a serious rival.

2. As the prestige of religion fell, that of science rose. The extraordinary increase of scientific knowledge and mechanical invention gave 19th-century Europe and America the intellectual and material primacy of the world. Nature's secrets were wrested from her one by one ; new sources of power were discovered, distance was abolished, plagues and diseases destroyed, machinery supplanted human labour and the coloured peoples of Asia and Africa were tamed and subdued by the sheer superiority of the white man's technical equipment. To the uncritical

multitude, science was an oracle that answered all questions, the genie that produced marvels out of the air.. So long as its leaders professed to be able to solve the riddles of the universe, faith in its capacity was unquestioned, but towards the turn of the century a fresh series of discoveries in physics drove it to confess its ignorance of the ultimate reality. It was clear that science answered How rather than Why, that it possessed no philosophy or ethic of its own, and that it would serve good or evil impartially according to the will of its user. As a substitute for religion it was not a success, but it had mechanized human life to an astonishing degree and had placed weapons of destruction and control in the hands of the State more potent and terrifying than Kings and Emperors had dreamed of. Everything was organized scientifically : mass armies, mass production, mass workers, mass education, mass amusements, mass propaganda, until it seemed only one step to the scientific horrors of Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*. The "rugged individualism" of the Liberal era had indeed been left far behind.

3. The cult of race was the product, or rather the distortion, of philological and biological science. The discovery of the common origin of the "Aryan" group of languages and their clearly marked contrast with the Semitic and other groups, coincided with the demand for freedom and independence for self-conscious nationalities, with the temporary ascendancy of the European over the non-European world, with the close contact between white men and supposedly inferior brown, yellow and black peoples, and with the growing unpopularity of the economic power of the Jews, whom the Revolution had released from the ghettos. Theories claiming to prove the inherent superiority of white men over coloured, of "Aryans" over Jews, of Teutons over Latins, found ready acceptance and appealed to national pride. To a nation such as Germany, who had attained unity only after a hard struggle and who was geographically placed between "Latins" in the West and Slavs in the East, racialism became an almost necessary form of self-assertion. But combined with the grim and pitiless biological theories of the Darwinian age, according to which the whole history of Nature was nothing but a savage and merciless "struggle for existence," it produced a reign of militaristic violence which ruined the old Liberal hopes of universal peace and brotherhood and produced the World War of 1914-18.

Far from clearing the air, this last catastrophe only intensified political, social and national antipathies. The defeated and disappointed nations resented bitterly the resurgence, at their expense, of the smaller and despised nationalities. Economic life was wrecked by the piling up of tariffs and the demand for the payment of huge war debts and reparations. The threat of social revolution broke the brittle parliamentary régimes and forced the propertied classes to acquiesce in the one-man dictatorships which sprang up all over Europe. To solve the economic problem, to impose silence on the conflicting claims of Capital and Labour, to remove the danger of a hideous and ruinous class war, and to restore the shattered morale of society, the State, in the person of a dictator backed by a militarily organized mass-party, carried through a Totalitarian Revolution

which swept away the last relics of personal and political freedom and subordinated to itself almost all the activities of the community. All Central and Eastern Europe was engulfed in this revived and scientifically organized Jacobinism, and Liberal democracy was driven back to its last line of defence in England and France, its original home. According to Spengler a new age of Caesarism is dawning, since the Jacobins must be succeeded by a Napoleon, a Marius and a Sulla by a Julius and an Augustus. Greek democracy must again capitulate before Roman Imperial order. But prophecy is vain, nor is it yet certain that history unfolds itself in obedience to inexorable laws.

CHAPTER I

LIBERAL ROMANTICISM

I. AFTERMATH OF REVOLUTION

"A GREAT revolution," remarked Goethe, "is never the fault of the people but of the government."¹ To put it in another way, a régime that suffers violent overthrow must have been weakened by its own rottenness. An acute observer of our day, who stands in the same relationship to the Russian Revolution as Goethe did to the French, comes to a similar conclusion. "Everything pre-revolutionary," he says, "is only an internal element of the revolution, part of the revolutionary decomposition; 'pre-revolutionary' and 'revolutionary' are only the same entity seen at different times, and the revolution itself is the consummated dissolution of the old order."² He points out, moreover, that a counter revolution led by revengeful émigrés and dispossessed classes inevitably fails, because the contest is between the forces of revolution and the forces of *before* the revolution. "Real counter-revolution can be effected only by after revolutionary forces — by those developed in the womb of the revolution itself." In other words, the past is dead and buried, the world moves on, what was can never be restored.

So the French Revolution was due, not to the criticisms of the *philosophes* or the teaching of Rousseau, but to the decay of the positive and constructive elements of the old régime. What took the place of the old monarchy based on aristocratic privilege was something different but not necessarily something better or more permanent. The point is that the change, whether for better or for worse, could never be reversed. The fact of the Revolution had to be accepted. The days before 1789 had gone for ever; all that could be done was to salve as much of whatever possessed real and abiding value from the wreckage of the revolutionary hurricane, and to try and tame the monster that had been let loose. To act as if the Revolution had never happened, to attempt to rebuild the shattered structure of the past brick for brick was a manifest impossibility, yet there were people blind enough to do so.

The violence, unrest and civil strife of the 19th century, which forms so startling a contrast to the placid calm of the Age of Reason, resulted from the bitter conflict between the revolutionary forces and the defenders of European tradition and conservatism. The ideas behind the former may be summed up in the word "Liberalism," which itself may be described as the Revolution purged of Jacobinism. Its philosophic basis

¹ *Conversations with Eckermann*, Jan. 4, 1824.

² Berdyaev, *The End of Our Time* (Eng. trans. 1933), p. 130.

was the belief in the natural goodness of man and in unlimited material progress. It was a synthesis of the rationalism of the Encyclopedists and the sentimentalism of Rousseau. From the former were derived its notions of class equality and its anti-clericalism ; from the latter its faith in democracy and in individual freedom. Liberalism was the political revolt, as Protestantism had been the religious, against the solidarity and authoritarianism of the Middle Ages. As its name implies, its keynote was liberty. It professed to free man from the rigid yoke of Church and State, and it declaimed fiercely against restrictions on freedom of speech, of worship or of the press. It glorified the individual human being and defied the State to interfere with his liberty more than was absolutely necessary for his own protection. Still more violent was its hostility towards any Church which demanded unconditional obedience from its members. Its faith in legislation and education as forces capable of eradicating all social evils was unlimited. It believed with Rousseau that the people were the source of political authority and that parliamentary democracy is incomparably the best form of government.

That the Liberal ideal was in many ways a noble one cannot be denied. It stressed the sacredness of human personality, it tried to educate man to a belief in his own worth and dignity, and it claimed that man's fullest potentialities could be brought out only in an atmosphere of rational freedom. It set its face against tyranny and oppression and it fostered a broad humanitarianism that is with us still. Yet withal it possessed grave defects ; it represented but a transitory stage in European culture, and a brief century sufficed for it to flower and to die. Its outlook, especially in regard to religion, was deplorably narrow. It took over from the French Encyclopedists an inveterate antipathy towards theological dogma ; it tended to indentify the Church with the outworn institutions of feudalism with which it waged war, it dismissed religion as something reactionary, obscurantist and retrogressive, and it regarded Christianity in general and Catholicism in particular as a spent force. It was prepared to hear what philosophers and scientists had to say concerning the problems of the universe, but it considered theologians as beneath contempt. Wherever it gained the upper hand it drove religion out of public life and did all in its power to push it into the background. Secondly, it carried its hostility to authority to extremes and the radical individualism it preached left man naked and helpless before the forces of the new industrial capitalism. Thirdly, it was too exclusively a bourgeois creed, which appealed particularly to the rising middle classes who wanted chiefly opportunity to exploit without hindrance the new inventions that were revolutionizing industry. The peasantry to the last remained indifferent to it, and the working classes were soon to criticise it as tending to stabilize and stereotype a social order in which they were exposed to the severest sufferings and to the worst forms of economic slavery.

The history of European Liberalism falls naturally into three stages. In the first, which covers the early half of the century, it fights with revolutionary ardour a winning battle with the conservative and aristocratic

tradition of old Europe, represented mainly by the Austria of Metternich. From 1848 to 1870 it is generally triumphant : parliamentary democracy, free trade, individual freedom, religious toleration are accepted throughout Western and Central Europe, and liberal ideas penetrate even countries governed on principles of semi-oriental despotism. As the century draws to its close, however, the Liberal star begins to set ; the working classes are captured by socialism, and a reassertion of authoritarian principles becomes evident, especially in the Germany of Marx, Bismarck, and Nietzsche. Liberalism had secularised society and reduced mankind, as it were, to a number of isolated atoms ; the reaction to collectivism and to the " mass humanity " first of Comte and then of Marx led logically in the 20th century to the creation of the " Anti-Church " of Communism. ✓

The fall of Napoleon naturally involved a temporary setback to the Revolution which he represented. The autocratic monarchies of the East, in alliance with the reactionary Tory government of England, had crushed the monster of Jacobinism. Among the governing classes of Europe there was a disposition to get back as quickly as possible to pre-revolutionary conditions. They regarded the whole course of events from 1789 onwards as a monstrous wrenching of European civilization from its legitimate path, and saw in the Revolution one enormous *Jacquerie*, a terrible uprising of the people against their lawful rulers, an attack on the very foundations of the social order. Their one desire was to blot out the memory of this horrible nightmare and to pick up the threads where they had been broken off in 1789. But the more far-seeing among them realized that the Old Régime had passed for ever. The people had tasted power and would never be satisfied with being thrust back into their old position of inferiority and servitude. The days of aristocratic privilege were over, at least in the West. The émigrés who returned to France in 1814 found most of their estates broken up and sold to peasants or bourgeois speculators. The Church found most of its landed property in alien hands. And the desire of the nation for political liberty and representative institutions was so strong that a restoration of royal absolutism was out of the question. Even the allies insisted on Louis XVIII conceding a charter of liberties to the French people before they put him back in the Tuileries. ✍

The most ardent supporters of the old order were the nobles and clergy, the two classes which had suffered most from the revolutionary levelling spirit. They still considered themselves the natural rulers of the country and were unwilling to share their power with any other class. The passion for political freedom was strongest among the bourgeoisie, the merchants, shop-keepers and professional men who resented the grand airs of the noblesse and the petty interferences of a centralised autocracy in so many spheres of life. Where the bourgeois class was small and unimportant, as in Eastern Europe, Liberalism had little influence. The peasant, as a rule, desired to be left in peace ; where he had attained economic independence, he took little interest in politics, though the French Jacques Bonhomme retained a fond remembrance

of the military triumphs of the Little Corporal, whose portrait, it was said, hung on the walls of every cottage. In some countries peculiar circumstances turned the First and Second Estates into supporters of revolution. Thus the nobles opposed the established order in Russia (as witness the Decembrist revolt of 1825) and the clergy championed the cause of national freedom in Belgium, Ireland, and Poland, where the Catholics were oppressed by an alien minority. But elsewhere the union of Throne and Altar subsisted unbroken.

The political settlement of Europe effected by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 involved generally speaking a restoration of the *status quo ante*. Hence the dispossessed Kings were put back on their thrones and the old boundaries of 1789 were re-mapped, after making allowance for the "compensations" promised in the treaties of 1813-14 to such powers as Prussia, Sweden and Sardinia for their help against Napoleon. Thus Prussia received half Saxony and a large slice of territory on both banks of the Rhine, Sweden got Norway and Sardinia Genoa. Holland and Belgium were united in a large kingdom of the Netherlands as a barrier against French aggression in the Low Countries. Most of Poland went to Russia. Austria received Lombardy and Venetia and so reassumed preponderance in Italy which she had held since 1748. The claims of nationalism were ignored, to the intense indignation of the great patriots and liberals of the later 19th century, but it must be admitted that the congress arrangements had much justification. There was no great demand for national unity except in Germany, where the conflicting interests of Austria, Prussia and the smaller states made any such adjustment impossible without war. Italian nationalism had hardly been born, as the complete failure of Murat's last desperate appeal to it had shown. Nor was racial feeling particularly strong yet among the various nationalities which went to make up the Habsburg empire. The worst cases were those of the Belgians and the Poles. The statesmen at Vienna dared not offend Russia by re-establishing the ancient kingdom of Poland, but Alexander, to his credit, granted a liberal degree of autonomy to his Polish subjects, while the enforced union of the Belgians with the Dutch broke down within fifteen years. To an age like ours, disillusioned alike with Liberalism and nationalism, the once vilified Congress of Vienna appears in a much more favourable light than it did to its 19th century critics. The prophecies of men like Mazzini have proved false: the enormous doses of nationalism prescribed by the Peace Treaties of 1919-20 have not only failed to cure but are in danger of aggravating the diseases of Europe.

The restored monarchs having won the war against Napoleon with the help of their peoples, were in no mood to fulfil the pledges they had given while angling for popular support. Compelled to call in Satan to cast out Satan, many of them had won the patriotic loyalty of their subjects by promising political reforms and liberal institutions which owed their origin to the very Revolution they were fighting. Once peace and order were re-established, fear of the mob came uppermost. The Spanish Constitution of 1812 was abolished by Ferdinand VII

immediately on his return to Madrid. A similar constitution set up in Sicily was scrapped by the restored King of the Two Sicilies. The Prussian constitution promised by Frederick William IV failed to materialise at all. In France the liberties guaranteed by the Charter were imperilled by the vengeful émigrés, although Louis XVIII did his best to keep the wild men in check. In England the reactionary government of Tory aristocrats provoked violent outbursts of popular resentment. The Revolution was thrown definitely on the defensive.

Austria was the focal point of the anti-revolutionary movement, Vienna was the diplomatic centre of Europe in the years after 1815, and her Chancellor Metternich, who guided her destinies for forty years from 1809 to 1848, incomparably the ablest defender of the aristocratic and feudal Europe of the old régime. The principles of nationalism and Liberal democracy threatened the very existence of the Habsburg realm, whose stability depended on the continued dominance of the German aristocratic minority who ruled it from Vienna, and Austria had borne the brunt of the defence of the European monarchies against the revolutionaries and Napoleon from 1792 onwards. She had suffered and lost much, four times (at Campo-Formio, Luneville, Pressburg and Schönbrunn) she had had to sign away large territories to the French conqueror, but revenge came in 1813 and it was somewhat in the nature of a tribute to her dogged and courageous resistance that the peace-makers in the following year selected Vienna as their venue. For a moment the Habsburgs were again the defenders of European civilization against the forces of disruption and disintegration. The task of maintaining intact the settlement of 1815 and of damming back the revolutionary flood fell mainly on their great minister. He failed in the end, the collapse he long dreaded came about, but he at least gave Europe forty years' peace and enabled her to recuperate from the wars which had devastated the continent for a quarter of a century.

No statesman of modern times has been the subject of such bitter controversy as Metternich (1773-1859). The scion of a Catholic noble family of the Rhineland, he witnessed as a youth the Jacobin excesses at Strassburg, which confirmed his contempt for mob-democracies and his faith in "European society founded on Latin civilisation consecrated by Christian faith and embellished by time."¹ He grew up with a reverence for tradition as strong as Burke's. The Old Régime in its last days produced in him its ablest if not its noblest representative. He was the fine flower of an age that is now only a memory: a polished and courtly aristocrat, cool, urbane and imperturbable, a patron of the arts, a diplomat of first rank, a lover of beauty, order and tradition, something of a cynic perhaps, but ever polite and charming. Married to the daughter of old Kaunitz, he entered the Austrian diplomatic service and made his reputation by worsting Napoleon in the critical days of 1813 after the retreat from Moscow. After the Emperor's fall he reigned as "prime minister of Europe" until the long dreaded revolution overwhelmed him at last in 1848. No man diagnosed more clearly the conditions of his time.

¹ Algernon Cecil, *Metternich* (1933), p. 14.

He saw that he was living in an age of transition ; the old order, which had seemed so firm and secure, was everywhere dissolving and none could divine what was to take its place. Before a new equilibrium was attained, a period of anarchy and chaos must supervene. Metternich's life work was to stave off collapse as long as possible and maintain stability for the time at whatever cost. He was fully alive to the impermanent character of his achievements, remarking bitterly that he spent his days in propping up worm-eaten institutions, that he should have been born in 1700 or 1900, for he never fitted into the revolutionary Europe of the 19th century. The future was with democracy and nationalism, he frankly admitted it ; all that he held sacred — monarchy, Church, aristocracy, tradition — was doomed, but it was his duty to hold on, to retreat if need be to the very last line of defence before giving up. Perhaps his mind went back to that Habsburg Emperor of the past who had fought another revolution three centuries before. Did he, as the mob thundered beneath his windows in 1848, remember Charles V escaping through the Alpine passes from the armies of his Protestant foes ?

To the mid-19th century Liberal, who shared Rousseau's belief in the goodness of man, in the efficacy of legislation in curing all ills, and who went about demanding constitutions everywhere, Metternich was the incarnation of despotic tyranny, the enemy of freedom and liberty, the savage oppressor of human rights, "Mitternacht," the Prince of Darkness. We know now that he was no blind reactionary, but a man who rightly distrusted paper constitutions and governments which allowed the rabble to dictate to them. "The people," he said, "are everywhere good, but childish," and he would have echoed heartily Taine's celebrated dictum, "Ten million ignorances do not make up one knowledge." He admired the English constitution, because it was an organic growth, itself hallowed by tradition, he even admitted that democracy, though no good to Europe, was well suited to the United States, and he never denied the necessity of change and reform in every organism. The chief criticism to be brought against him is that he, who recognized the need for recasting the rusty administrative machinery of Austria and actually drew up plans for reform, allowed himself to be rebuffed again and again by the conservative obstinacy of old Kaiser Franz. "I have sometimes governed Europe," he remarked, "but I have never governed Austria." So the Habsburg monarchy was left to stagnate in the old rut, and Prussia climbed to the leadership of Germany and of Europe.

Yet Metternich rendered valuable service to Europe for he taught her statesmen the importance of international co-operation. Constant vigilance and united action was needed to preserve the 1815 settlement and combat the dangerous forces that threatened the existing social and political order. A return to 18th century conditions of "international anarchy" and rival alliances would be fatal to the principle of stability and would play straight into the hands of the Revolution. Metternich, ever a realist, made no attempt to resuscitate the defunct Holy Roman Empire ; instead he substituted for Central Europe the Germanic Confederation and for the Continent as a whole the Congress System,

which lasted from 1815 to 1823. All the States of Europe were to meet at frequent intervals to discuss matters affecting their common interests. The struggle against Napoleon had taught the Allied statesmen the value of personal contact and concerted action. The Abbé de St. Pierre had advocated such a system after the Utrecht-Rastadt settlement of 1713-14. Now a big step forward was taken towards the establishment of a League of Nations such as the World War of 1914-18 produced. After Vienna international congresses assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, at Laibach in 1821, and at Troppau and Verona in 1822. Then the system broke down owing to the refusal of Canning to sanction its continued use in the interests of absolutism.

The repressive measures of the restored despots had the effect of drawing the revolutionary movement underground. Its propaganda was carried on by stealth, its plans of action hatched at meetings of the secret societies now springing up all over Europe. Such societies had not been unknown in the 18th century but the political convulsions of the post-revolutionary period multiplied them. The best known were the Freemasons, who originated in England and spread rapidly over the continent, despite papal condemnation, from 1730 onwards. The occult influence of Freemasonry, like that of the Jesuits, has probably been exaggerated, but there can be no doubt that many lodges did act as rendezvous for political conspirators against established governments and that the French and Italian Liberals especially were strongly impregnated by Masonry. Less secretive but not less influential were the Carbonari (charcoal-burners) of Italy, whose nocturnal meetings on the hillsides of the Apennines appealed to romantic and excitement-seeking youths. Their avowed aim was the unification of Italy, but they spread into France and became mixed up with other Liberal organizations. What degree of co-operation and understanding existed between these various secret associations is doubtful, though fanciful writers have depicted them as engaged in a common gigantic conspiracy against civilisation.

Metternich was fully aware of the dark waters which swirled beneath the outwardly calm surface of European society. The first ominous ripples appeared as early as 1817. In that year the celebrations in Germany in honour of the tercentenary of the Reformation were turned into a great Liberal demonstration by the university students whose patriotic emotions, stimulated by the War of Liberation, were now seeking an outlet, since the restored sovereigns had failed to fulfil their promises by granting constitutions. In 1819 one of these hot-headed youths murdered a man named Kotzebue, who combined the functions of playwright with those of a secret service agent. Metternich replied to these juvenile ebullitions by getting the German Diet to pass the famous Carlsbad Decrees, imposing a strict press censorship and suppressing the student's political clubs. The situation was complicated by the attitude of the Tsar Alexander, a mystical dreamer who had imbibed Rousseauist ideas from his Swiss tutor, and after persuading his fellow-sovereigns to subscribe to the celebrated "Holy Alliance", proceeded to make himself a nuisance to them by sending Russian agents to conduct a vaguely Liberal propaganda

in Germany and Italy. Metternich's fears and warnings of the revolutionary peril were confirmed by the universal outbreaks of 1820. Events succeeded one another with startling swiftness. First Spain rose in revolt, then the Duke of Berry was assassinated in Paris, then a plot to kill the English ministers was unearthed in London; then Naples broke out in insurrection, and finally revolution flared up in Piedmont. The Spanish and Italian outbreaks began as military mutinies, because many of the European States had followed Napoleon's example and opened the higher ranks of the army to men of bourgeois origin. When the army had given the signal, the middle classes speedily secured the restoration of the constitutions at Madrid and Naples. The sudden resurrection of the revolutionary monster terrified the sovereigns of the continent and effectively cured the Tsar's Liberalism. Metternich was most anxious lest the example of Naples should spread to Austria's dominions in North Italy, and the Congress of Troppau, after solemnly asserting the rights of the Powers to suppress revolution wherever it should rear its head, gave him what he asked for — a free hand for Austria to restore royal absolutism in Naples. The rapid accomplishment of this programme was a striking proof of the weakness of the Italian Liberal movement, unsupported as yet by more than a fraction of the population. Austrian troops crushed the Piedmont rising with equal facility.

There remained but to deal with Spain, a more serious problem, since a country broken by so many mountain ridges was difficult to campaign in, and the lesson of Napoleon's failure was still strongly impressed on the popular mind. The Tsar offered to march 100,000 Cossacks across the Alps and the Pyrenees to crush "Jacobinism," but the Congress of Verona, chiefly at the instance of Chateaubriand, adjudged the task to France. A military expedition to Spain would gratify the French passion for glory, do something to efface the humiliations of 1812-15, and strengthen the rickety throne of Louis XVIII by demonstrating that the Bourbons had succeeded where Napoleon failed. The plan was accomplished with surprising ease; a single campaign brought the French arms from the Pyrenees to Cadiz, and the discredited remnants of Spanish Liberalism, which had no popular support and had antagonized the mass of the nation by its violent anti-clerical policy, were scattered like chaff. The value of European solidarity in face of the danger from below had been strikingly proved.

Metternich might congratulate himself on the triumph of the principle of order and on winning back the Tsar after his straying into the paths of Liberalism. But in truth 1823 was the last unqualified success of the Reaction. The Concert of Europe had been irreparably broken by England's refusal to countenance the principle of intervention. Castlereagh, who figured at home as a reactionary of as dark a hue as Metternich himself, had indeed no objection to governments suppressing Liberalism in their own domains, but he declined to admit the legality of armed intervention in the internal affairs of independent states. Here, it seemed to him, the Reaction was itself becoming revolutionary. This was the first blow. The refusal of England and the United States,

represented respectively by Canning and President Monroe, to permit European intervention to crush the rebellion of Spain's American colonies was the second. British trade had benefited enormously by the opening of the South American market and the new republics were quickly recognized. By 1826 the last vestiges of Spanish sovereignty had disappeared from the American mainland. The final blow was the rupture of the Holy Alliance itself over the Greek question. The Greek revolt against Turkey, which started in 1821, was viewed by Metternich as another uprising of peoples against their lawful sovereign. But Russia saw in it the fruition of Catherine II's policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and as a step towards the dissolution of Turkey which would give Constantinople to the Tsar. Austria had no wish to see Russia dominant in the Balkans and the Danubian provinces. In the West the Romantics, who had passed from the medieval to the Hellenic stage, hailed with a tempest of enthusiasm, quickened by Byron's death at Missolonghi (1824), the re-awakening as they thought, of the spirit of ancient Hellas. Hence the autocratic Tsardom and the constitutional monarchies of France and England found themselves on common ground, and their combined fleets destroyed the Sultan's naval power at Navarino (1827). The independence of Greece was assured and the first success of the nationalist movement had been won. The rift in the Holy Alliance produced by the Greek revolt made possible the Liberal victories of 1830.

The first of these victories was won in the old home of revolution. The Bourbon Restoration in France had always been a risky experiment, owing to the legacy of hate and bitterness left over by the Revolution and the unbridgeable gulf between the ultra-royalists and the irreconcilable republicans. The government of the Restoration has not perhaps had full justice done to it by historians ; with all its faults, it was one of the ablest and most honest France had known. It made a sincere attempt to work a constitutional monarchy on the English model, its financial achievements were worthy of high praise and most of its ministers, such as Richelieu, Décazès and Villèle, were men of patriotism and integrity. A Parliament based on a broader franchise than that of England was set up, the revolutionary land settlement was not interfered with, and a certain amount of liberty of press and speech was guaranteed. But it was difficult for the political leaders to steer a moderate course. The "ultras" derided them for truckling to the principles of popular sovereignty and hankered after the return of their lands and their feudal privileges, and the radicals kept up a constant agitation against the Charter and declared that the liberties it granted were a mere sham. The anti-clericals were infuriated at the favour shown to the Church, the return of the religious orders and the rash eagerness with which the Catholic bishops identified the cause of religion with that of extreme royalism. The pursuance of a thoroughly Liberal policy was rendered hopeless after the Duke of Berry's murder in 1820 : nevertheless even Charles X tried to play a constitutional part down to 1829. But the Bourbons were never able to re-establish themselves in the popular favour : they were absolutists at heart, and behind them always stood the implacable and unrelenting émigrés.

Charles and Polignac were foolish and tactless and allowed themselves to be trapped by the violence of the Left and the savage invective of the popular journalists into violating the spirit if not the letter of the Charter. It was not surprising that their blundering attempt to circumvent the opposition of the Chambers was interpreted as an attack on the whole Revolutionary settlement.

The 1830 revolution was the work of Paris and like the Jacobin *coup d'état* of 1792 was tamely accepted by the country. The days of the railway and the telegraph were not yet, and the capital still exercised a supremacy over the rest of France. The final victory of France over Paris did not come till the Commune of 1871. As it was, a handful of students, journalists and workmen easily overturned the Bourbon monarchy while everyone else looked on apathetically. The revolutionary mob wanted a republic, but the bourgeois leaders under Thiers, who feared intervention from an outraged Europe if there were a Jacobin revival, strove successfully for a popular monarchy with strict Parliamentary limitations, under Louis Philippe, the head of the Orleans family who had fought in the Revolutionary armies and was considered a safe Liberal. The principle of popular sovereignty triumphed at the barricades: Louis Philippe became King of the French "by the grace of God and the will of the people".

The rising in Paris gave the signal for a Liberal nationalist revolt in Belgium, where the successful stand against Joseph II in 1789 was well remembered. Nobles, clergy and populace joined forces to throw off the oppressive Dutch suzerainty and establish national independence. In Italy the Carbonari rose again. Metternich and his henchmen, seriously perturbed, prepared for a new campaign against the revolution, but their activities were suddenly paralysed by an uprising of the Poles, who drove the Russians out of Warsaw and proclaimed their freedom. The Tsar, who had planned to march his troops into the West to put down the French and Belgian revolutionaries, found himself confronted with a formidable outbreak at home which absorbed all his attention. Thus the Polish rebellion saved the Orleans settlement and sealed the fate of the Bourbons. The fever of revolution having again gripped France, Louis Philippe was expected, like the Conventionnels of 1792, to declare war on Europe and to rescue Belgium, Italy and Poland from the grasp of the despots. Such a course would have been suicidal and the *roi bourgeois* knew it. He did intervene in Belgium, where he had only the weak Dutch to contend with, and he sent an expedition to Italy to prevent the Austrians gaining full control over the peninsula. Poland he could not help: she had to be left to be trampled down once more by the Russian hordes. Belgium he tried to filch for himself, only to be checked by the wary diplomacy of Palmerston, who got a safe German princeling made king in place of a member of the Orleans family. Belgian independence was reluctantly acknowledged by the Eastern Powers, and thus was effected the first serious breach in the 1815 settlement.

The popular outbreaks of 1830 were a definite triumph for Liberalism. They failed only in Italy and Poland, where Austria and Russia were too

strongly entrenched to be vanquished. They put the middle classes in power again in France, and in England hastened the passage of the Reform Act of 1832, which broke at last the long domination of the Tory landed aristocracy in Parliament. In Germany Liberal constitutions had already been granted in the Southern states. France and England saw to it that the new kingdom of Belgium was made safe for Liberalism. In 1834 the two Western Powers intervened in Spain and Portugal to suppress the Carlists and the Miguelists, who championed absolutism and had the majority of the people on their sides, in order that the Liberal minority might govern in the name of the two infant queens. Greece also was made a constitutional monarchy under a Bavarian prince. Only in Central and Eastern Europe was the old régime left to maintain an obstinate resistance to the forces of democratic change: even Metternich feared that the universal triumph of the Revolution was not far distant.

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2. THE RELIGIOUS REVIVAL

The 18th century philosophers had directed their campaign not only against the political but also against the religious institutions of the Old Régime. They attacked fiercely the powers and pretensions of the Church, and they assaulted no less violently the intellectual basis and the moral teaching of Christianity.* They inveighed alike against tithes and miracles, against the divinity of Christ and the indissolubility of the marriage tie. Their weapons were borrowed largely from Montaigne, Hobbes and the English Deists, and they claimed to have found in the matchless regularity of the Newtonian universe the strongest argument against the supernatural. "Mystery" was a word not in their vocabulary. Everything in the world was capable of explanation. Voltaire advised the historical investigator to reject everything which seemed even slightly repugnant to his common-sense. The "common-sense of the rational man" became a sort of touch-stone upon which all narratives, histories, reports, legends and myths, sacred or profane, were to be tested. Hence the miracles and prodigies recorded in the Bible or in hagiology constituted a perpetual source of mirth to the rationalists, who exhausted their powers of sarcastic wit upon them. They troubled not to investigate the evidence for such occurrences. They assumed, as an article of faith, that the supernatural did not exist, and that miracles not only did not, but could not take place. Christian morality was likewise subjected to fierce criticism. The ethics of the *philosophes* were strictly utilitarian and devoid of all divine sanction. They used the travellers' tales which then flooded Europe to prove that morality was merely custom sanctioned by time and expediency and differed with race, country and climate. Polygamy, for example, was quite natural and permissive where women outnumbered men: monogamy equally rational where the two sexes were evenly distributed. Marriage they held to be a mere contract, terminable by mutual consent. Celibacy was unnatural and harmful and tended to diminish the population: hence the State should prohibit it and dissolve the convents and monasteries. The anti-religious criticisms of the rationalists sprang naturally from their materialist and utilitarian philosophy: they were not based, as were those of the later 19th century, upon an objective study of facts.

— The Revolution witnessed the first concerted attack on the Christian Church since the days of Diocletian. The early revolutionary fury was directed, it is true, against the privileged aristocracy, but it was soon felt that Monarchy and Church were somehow committed to the preservation of the old order and that neither of them had much sympathy for the new liberal-democratic State. An attempt was made at first at a State-controlled Church, after its landed property had been seized and the religious orders dissolved, thus following the precedent set by Joseph II and his fellow monarchs. But the Jacobins were fanatical enemies of religion, and the Convention decreed the formal abolition of Christianity and shut up the churches. Not only did Catholicism lose its privileged position in the State, but it was cast out of public life and reduced to the

level of a persecuted sect — a striking proof of the extent to which the "Enlightenment" had secularised European society. The triumph of Reason was celebrated by a fantastic ceremony in a desecrated Notre Dame. At this stage, however, the Rousseauists, led by Robespierre, secured control of the Republic, and a new State religion, modelled on the Savoyard Vicar's profession of faith, was introduced. Nothing illustrates more vividly the clash between the old rationalism and the new romanticism than the religious quarrels of the Jacobin Republic. The Romantics could not live without some sort of religion and its attendant ceremonies to aid communion with the God of Nature. The result was the Festival of the Supreme Being which David staged in the gardens of the Tuileries and at which Robespierre officiated as high priest. After Thermidor the Directory tried another religion — Theophilanthropy — and allowed its devotees to take over many of the disused churches. But it failed to take root despite government encouragement, and a reaction in favour of the old traditional religion became more and more manifest.

✓ The excesses of the revolutionaries, and especially the hideous cruelties of the Terror, naturally produced a revulsion of feeling. "The persecution Catholicism suffered purged it of many undesirable elements. The priests who came back to France after Napoleon had signed the Concordat with Pius VII were a higher type than their predecessors. The sceptical, rakish abbé of the 18th century was no longer in evidence. Religion found a strange, and not always a very welcome, ally in the Romantic revival. Rousseau had begun the de-intellectualisation of society by providing nourishment, sometimes of an adulterated kind, for the starved emotions of the bored habitués of the salons. By the turn of the century Romanticism was well on its way to the conquest of the literary world, and with it came a new sense of feeling, a fuller realisation of the grandeur, beauty and mystery of Nature and her God. Chateaubriand's *Génie du Christianisme* (1802) appeared at the right moment. Into that remarkable work the author poured all his Breton passion and fervour and sense of natural beauty. He acclaimed Christianity as the creator and vivifier of European culture, the patron of the arts, the religion of loveliness, the enemy of all that is mean and sordid. He painted in glowing colours the sublime symbolism of its ritual, especially the ceremonies of Holy Week. He made no serious attempt to justify and defend the intellectual claims of Catholicism, but his splendid imagery and striking metaphors dazzled the social and literary world and was a powerful influence in the religious revival in France. The success of his book is a measure of the distance the world had travelled since the palmy days of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists. The *Génie du Christianisme* would never have been understood by the Age of Reason, which would have laughed contemptuously at its florid rhetoric and sneered at the "superstition" of its author. The Romantic worship of Nature had wrought the transformation. ✓

A far more solid defence of the Catholic tradition came from Joseph du Maistre (1754-1821), a native of Savoy, who became the sworn foe of the Revolution that made him an exile from his fatherland. His religious convictions were intensely Catholic: his views on society almost

Hobbesian. In the political world he saw nothing but revolutionary anarchy and a crude nationalism, everywhere growing in strength, which must lead to the suicide of civilization. His fear and hatred of the blind, destroying mob, which only kills and loots like a pack of savage beasts, inspired his famous panegyric on the executioner as the saviour of society, yet Du Maistre had no sympathy with the French émigrés, whom he regarded as ignorant fools unable even to realise why their countrymen had risen against them and cast them out, and no desire whatever to restore the pre-1789 system. What was needed, in his view, was not absolute monarchy but absolute theocracy. Order is the first necessity of civilized life : a single visible authority should exist to whom all disputes should be referred. In his best-known work *Du Pape* he pleaded that the Pope should be restored to his medieval position of supreme arbiter of Europe, since he represented the last remaining tradition of spiritual unity and no temporal head of Christendom now existed even in name. Unless some such central authority were invested with unlimited power and jurisdiction, racial and class hatreds would soon make a shambles of Europe. Du Maistre, who was also a merciless critic of Locke and Voltaire, was the most brilliant figure of the Catholic revival in France, and his views are by no means out-of-date today.

The effect of Du Maistre's writings was to give a powerful impetus to ultramontanism, which was to reach its climax with the definition of papal infallibility in 1870. During the 18th century the prestige of the Papacy was at its lowest ebb. The Bourbon bullying of the Pope over the Jesuit question, Joseph II's efforts to create a national Austrian Church independent of Rome, the reforming demands of the Synod of Pistoia, the revolutionary settlement of the French Church embodied in the Civil Constitution which virtually extinguished papal authority in France, were so many proofs of the supine helplessness of the Vatican. The Revolution indirectly redounded to the advantage of the Church and its head. The conservative-minded, terrified at the bog of Jacobinism, were convinced that a strong, authoritarian religion was the only antidote to political and social anarchy. National churches and semi-independent episcopates were seen to possess serious weaknesses. Gallicanism, Febronianism and Josephism lost their appeal. The grim, unbending attitude of the ultramontanes, who claimed for the Papacy absolute control over the Church, captured the imagination of the greater part of the Catholic world. Du Maistre's powerful plea may be said to have fairly launched 19th century ultramontanism on its path. "There is no public morality or national character without religion," declared this eloquent champion of the Papacy, "no European religion without Christianity, no Christianity without Catholicism, no Catholicism without the Pope, no Pope without the supremacy which belongs to him." The stage was set for the great clash between Catholic conservatism and revolutionary Liberalism which forms so important a chapter of 19th century history.

✓ Thus the church found herself in a much more favourable position in 1814 than in 1789. The defenders of the old order looked upon her

as their most valuable ally. The nobles who in the old pre-revolutionary days had professed a fashionable deism or atheism, and had regarded it as a point of honour to sneer at religion in the salons, were now to be seen in regular attendance at Mass. The Pope was regarded with respect and veneration because of his quiet and dignified endurance of Napoleon's bullying. The Jesuit order was restored in 1814. The religious communities returned to France. Divorce, which had been introduced by the revolutionaries and had led to the most appalling licence under the Directory, was abolished by the Bourbon government in 1816. Even the Inquisition came back in Spain. Education was placed again under clerical control : a priest was appointed Rector of Napoleon's University of France in 1822. The new Catholic University of Munich became the centre for the propagation of ultramontanism in Germany. A dispute between the Prussian Government which had acquired large slices of territory in the Catholic Rhineland, and the new aggressive Catholicism over the question of mixed marriages, ended in a victory for the latter. Distinguished German converts, such as Brentano and the younger Schlegel, passed over from Protestantism to Rome. Möhler, in his book *Symbolik*, delivered one of the most trenchant philosophical attacks on the Reformation ever made. In Spain Balmes, with much learning and eloquence, endeavoured to show that Catholicism had always been the closest friend of whatever was best in European civilization. The Society for the Propagation of the Faith was founded at Lyons in 1822 and quickly spread over Europe. In Ireland, Belgium, and Poland the clergy figured as leaders of the great national movements.

Nevertheless, the intimate union between Throne and Altar, which was so marked a feature of the Restoration period, aroused anxiety among a section of Catholic thinkers. They feared, with justice, that the identification of Catholicism with political absolutism would weaken the hold of the Church on the middle and lower classes. So loudly did the restored despots proclaim their devotion to religion and the ecclesiastical leaders the duty of submission to royal authority, that the danger existed that the Liberal-minded would in disgust desert the Church altogether. In fact, when Metternich visited France in 1824 he found Paris practically a pagan city. Nine-tenths of its inhabitants professed no religious creed and never went near a church, while in the slums and poorer quarters men and women lived together in complete promiscuity, regular marriage being almost unknown. Hence there arose in France a school of Liberal Catholicism which aimed at capturing democracy for the Church and thus making sure of the future. Led by Montalembert, Lacordaire and Lamennais, they claimed that the Church should identify herself with liberty of education, of the press and of religious worship, and should cease to be bound up with a political system. They practically admitted that Catholics had now become one group among many and that far from attempting to control or dominate the State they should cut adrift from it and ask only liberty to pursue their own aims unhindered by the secular authority. By such a profession of Liberal sentiments they believed that the Church could win over the masses and they pointed,

as example, to the Catholic democracies of Belgium and Ireland. Their warnings were more heeded after the anti-clerical riots in Paris which followed the fall of Charles X, and which expressed the popular hatred of a Church only too closely bound up with a reactionary régime. Lamennais immediately launched "L'Avenir" with its motto "For God and the People," in order to emphasise that the Church had broken with divine-right monarchy and would henceforth identify herself with the interests of the rising democracies.

To get the consent of the Holy See to such a programme was another matter. Only with many qualms had the Vatican accorded recognition to Louis Philippe, the revolutionary king of the barricades. The austere Dominican, who became Pope as Gregory XVI in 1831, was devoid of all sympathy for Liberalism. If anything were needed to convince him of the righteousness of his attitude, the outbreak of the Carbonari revolt in the Romagna would have supplied it. Here Liberalism had shown itself definitely hostile to the Temporal Power. The revolutions of 1830-31 confirmed Gregory in his conviction that Liberalism was the sworn foe of Christian civilisation. Montalembert, Lacordaire and Lamennais arrived in Rome at an unfortunate time. Gregory listened in silence to their representations, and the bull "Mirari vos" sounded the knell of their hopes. Liberty of conscience was dismissed as "an absurd and erroneous opinion," and liberty of the press "could never be sufficiently condemned". The Polish clergy were ordered to submit to their legitimate sovereign the Russian Tsar. Montalembert and Lacordaire quietly accepted the papal decree, but the fiery and passionate Breton soul of Lamennais (an individualist who would never have deferred to any authority) revolted at what he regarded as the ruin of his life's hope, and having published the wild and bitter *Paroles d'un croyant*, in 1834 he left the Church for ever.

The secession of Lamennais did not, however, arrest a movement which conformed so closely to the spirit of the age. The separation of Church and State decreed by the Orleans monarchy and the policy of strict neutrality in religious matters pursued after 1830 almost compelled French Catholics to seek a compromise with the dominant Liberalism. At times, indeed, Louis Philippe's government became frankly anti-clerical. The University of Paris was made strictly "lay" and the hostility of many of its professors towards the Church called forth Montalembert's condemnation of it as an atheistic institution. Michelet and Quinet, two of France's most prominent historians, were allowed to deliver a series of bitterly anti-clerical lectures at the Collège de France, the latter distinguishing himself by a violent antipathy to the Jesuits. French Catholicism was forced to plead for liberty of education and of the press to save its own schools and journals, and hence it found itself in strange alliance with the forces which overturned Louis Philippe in 1848—a fact which explains why the revolution of that year was much less hostile to the Church than that of 1830.

The religious revival of the early 19th century was not confined to Catholic countries: it had its counterpart in Protestant Europe, especially

in England. Here indeed it may be said to date back to the Methodist movement of the mid-18th century. The Wesley brothers and Whitefield succeeded in working up an astonishing religious emotionalism in an age which deprecated "enthusiasm" and fed on the ethical platitudes of Bishop Hoadley and the Latitudinarian school, and their passionate appeals to an inner, living experience did much to rouse both the Anglican Church and the Dissenting sects from the torpor in which they had sunk. Christianity had been all but emptied of dogma and reduced to a mere system of morality; religion had been stripped of its mystery and its nobility, and little was left save the cold metaphysics of Paley and his "watchmaker" arguments. John Wesley (1703-91) did not despise reason, but for the Methodists the heart counted more than the intellect, spiritual experience and "conversion" more than abstract arguments. Their success was won chiefly among the middle and lower classes and they made a surprisingly complete conquest of the dreamy and imaginative Celtic souls of the Welsh and Cornish. Wesley himself died in 1791 in the Anglican communion, but Methodism had always been regarded with disfavour by the Church authorities because of its tendencies to religious subjectivism and revivalist hysteria, and his followers broke with the Establishment and founded an independent communion. Their example, however, inspired a revival within the church itself. The Evangelical movement, as it was called, was a resuscitation of Puritanism, in that it asserted a thorough-going supernaturalism in opposition to the rationalising tendencies of the old "high and dry" school, an austere simplicity of life and worship and a harsh and narrow ethical code which saw grievous sin in most worldly pleasures. The Evangelicals were caught in the current of the new humanitarianism, which they directed into religious channels and which found expression mainly in the vigorous and successful campaign they waged under Wilberforce's brilliant leadership against negro slavery. The two movements effected a complete transformation of English life and manners in the 19th century, and in the opinion of M. Halévy saved England from the revolutionary storms which swept over the continent. The jolly, hard-drinking, fox-hunting parson who figures so gaily in the pages of Fielding and Smollett, gave place to the severe and sombre evangelical clergyman who exclaimed in horror at alcohol, theatres, card-playing and Sunday games and was ever ready to expose the iniquities of the papal Antichrist. After the gay days of the Regency and the rakish bucks and macaroni who took their cue from Carlton House, the sun seemed to set on Merrie England, and with the advent of the Evangelical and Methodist bourgeoisie to power after 1832 the metamorphosis was complete. The new Puritanism reigned triumphant. A strict Sabbatarianism became the order of the day. An invisible censorship of public opinion for years precluded authors from depicting passionate love scenes in their novels, and the classics were expurgated for the use of bourgeois families by Bowdler and his kin. Public men no longer dared avow the possession of a mistress. Bible societies were formed to propagate the Scriptures among papists and heathen: the earnest, narrow and aggressive Protestantism of the

missionaries is evident in the writings of the most celebrated of them, George Borrow. Below the surface profligacy may have been as rampant as ever, but outwardly there flourished what a later age was to dismiss contemptuously as "Victorian respectability".

Oxford, the original home of Methodism, gave birth nearly a century later, to another remarkable movement, to which its name has always been applied. Beginning with Keble's sermon on "national apostasy" in 1833, it took the form of a revolt against Liberalism in Church and State provoked by the anti-clerical policy of the Erastian Whigs of the Reformed Parliament, who had carried through a series of acts which tended to subordinate the Anglican Church still further to an omnipotent State. Catholics and Dissenters had been relieved of their civil disabilities, State courts were made supreme over ecclesiastical tribunals, civil marriage was introduced, the civil court in 1850 even presumed to decide on doctrinal questions in judging the theological fitness of a clergyman to a post to which a bishop had refused to institute him, and in 1858 divorce was legalised. The Oxford Movement was a re-affirmation of the spiritual independence of the Church from secular control, it opposed divine authority to the anti-dogmatic standpoint of Liberalism, and following the 17th century tradition of Andrewes and Laud, it stressed the Catholic heritage of the Church of England and the latter's continuity with the pre-Reformation Church. Some of its leaders in their search for an authoritative centre in Christianity, from which they might bid defiance to Erastian legislators, found themselves attracted by the logical and uncompromising claims of Catholicism. The secession of Newman to Rome in 1845 created a sensation in England and involved the whole movement in the suspicion that Catholicism was indeed its logical goal and that it was itself fundamentally un-Protestant. Probably on this account its influence was circumscribed: it never affected the nation at large, though it acted as a powerful leaven within the Church of England. Like Chateaubriand, the Tractarians were struck by the importance of beauty and colour in public worship and their stand for a more elaborate ritual, clashing as it did with the puritan simplicity of the Evangelicals, was productive of no little discord within the Anglican fold.

The neo-Catholic revival was helped by the remarkable idealisation of the Middle Ages which Romanticism brought into fashion. The 18th century had dismissed with supreme contempt the whole medieval period as a barren and stationary tract lying between classical antiquity and the Renaissance. "Medieval" was synonymous with all that was debased, ignorant, backward and superstitious. "I have described," said Gibbon, "the triumph of barbarism and religion." But the Romantics, in their eagerness to escape from the modern world and its sordid drabness, found in the Middle Ages the glowing beauty and pulsating life which they craved. They waxed lyrical in their praises of "the ages of faith and chivalry," peopled, so they imagined, by benèvolent kings, gallant and courtly knights, jovial monks, and honest and devoted servitors. They also discovered, what was nearer the truth, a social and religious unity, a community of aim and purpose, almost entirely absent

from the Europe of their own time. None the less, the rosy and romantic view of the medieval past, as set out for instance in Scott's novels, is as fantastic a caricature as the black pictures painted of it by the 18th century rationalists. There was much that was admirable about the Middle Ages : there was also a darker and uglier side of it which no one would wish restored. But the Romantics, for all their bias, did administer an antidote to the crude depreciation of medievalism so characteristic of the Age of Reason, and they helped to foster a sympathetic interest in the Church which did so much to make the Middle Ages what they were.

The strength of the religious revival of the first half of the 19th century was counterbalanced by the influence of free-thought in the intellectual centres of France and Germany. The anti-Christians were not so powerful as they had been in pre-revolutionary days, but they were busy laying the foundations of the great assault on orthodoxy which was to characterise the latter half of the century. Biblical criticism had been assiduously taken up in Germany and the example of Niebuhr, who exposed so convincingly the mythical character of early Roman history, was applied to the Old and New Testaments, which were regarded no longer as the inspired and infallible word of God, but as ordinary Jewish literature to be judged by the usual canons of criticism. As far back as 1780 Eichhorn had begun a diligent inquiry into the authorship and date of the documents which went to make up the Old Testament, and his unrivalled linguistic knowledge enabled to assert the late origin of Ecclesiastes, parts of Daniel and Canticles, the composite character of Isaiah, and though he still accepted the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, he noted the distinctive character of its various books. De Wette, not content with mere literary analysis, investigated the value of the Old Testament as an historical record, and in a book published in 1806 claimed that Chronicles was an unreliable narrative and that Deuteronomy was written in the 7th century B.C. Nor was the New Testament safe from the iconoclasts. Paulus rationalised the Gospels by rejecting the miraculous entirely, and Strauss created an immense furore with his *Life of Jesus*, in which he maintained, to the scandal of his contemporaries, that the figure of Christ had been buried beneath a mass of mythological lore and that the miracles and fulfilled prophecies as set forth by the Evangelists were simply the result of self-deception on the part of the early Christians due to their Messianic expectations. Baur, professor of theology at Tübingen from 1826 till his death in 1860, originated the theory, not quite abandoned yet, that the Church of the first century was split into two great parties, the Petrinists and the Paulinists, the former wishing to retain the Jewish element in Christianity, whereas St. Paul and his followers, dreaming of a universal Church of the Gentiles, were prepared for a complete breach with Judaism. Meanwhile Ewald attempted to synthesise the new knowledge in his *History of the People of Israel*, which began to appear in 1843, and which exercised a profound influence on Biblical study, and Reuss insisted that the priestly code was post-exilic and was not the work of Moses.

If the German critics were hostile to revealed religion the German philosophers were sometimes more friendly. The Transcendental Idealists were rationalists, it is true, but of a very different kind from the French Encyclopedists of the previous generation. To Kant and Hegel reason was the foundation of reality, but it was possible, by an act of intuition, to pass beyond the world of sensible experience: to Hegel indeed, and to Fichte and Schelling, mind was the only reality ("the real is rational and the rational is real") and the apparent contradictions of thought on the phenomenal level are welded into a complete synthesis in the Absolute. The Germans, in fact, held an almost mystical view of reason, which seemed to the French, with their love of clear-cut definitions, intolerably cloudy and vague. Yet it provided a more spiritual and, one may say, a nobler idea of the universe than that contained in the materialism of Diderot and La Mettrie. Even the notion of Progress, so crudely utilitarian in the hands of the Abbé de St. Pierre and his friends, was transformed by the German Idealist philosophers, especially by Schelling, into a splendid vision of the gradual rise and ultimate union of the human race with God the Absolute. In these circumstances it was not surprising that even Catholic theologians were attracted by the current metaphysics when religion was once more spoken of respectfully in the philosophical schools.

Nevertheless the general outlook of the 19th century was essentially secular. The old order of semi-divine monarchy, established churches and hereditary aristocracy was dead or dying, and Christianity itself was increasingly under fire. The Hegelian left under Feuerbach became definitely hostile to religion and culminated in the dialectic materialism of Karl Marx. Far-seeing observers like Comte and Renan, though themselves sceptics, were seriously perturbed lest the abandonment of the old religious tradition and the disappearance alike of a unifying spiritual force and of an intellectual synthesis should lead to social and moral anarchy. Comte in his *Course of Positive Philosophy*, issued between 1830 and 1842, set himself to provide a new religion of Humanity in the place of a theology and metaphysics which he rejected as things of the past, and sought to invest science with the same awe and reverence as had formerly surrounded supernatural revelation. Positivism was a kind of inverted Catholicism with Comte as its Pope, intended as a breakwater against the dreaded forces of democracy and social revolution. Comte's "scientific" religion could hardly be taken seriously, yet the danger he saw confronting European civilization was real enough. But the typical Liberal bourgeois of the mid-19th century, intent only on amassing wealth from the new industries, never noticed it until the world he had regarded as so safe and secure began to rock ominously beneath his feet.

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3. THE HEYDAY OF ROMANCE

The controversy between Classicism and Romanticism occupies considerable space in all histories of literature, for the rivals contended for the mastery of the world of letters for many centuries. There is a danger in using such distinctive labels, and some writers have made themselves ridiculous by their clumsy attempts to force almost every great literary figure of the past into one or other category. Still, no one can deny that two contrasting movements can be observed in literature and that now one and now the other has gained the ascendancy. Romanticism first made its appearance in Provence in the 12th century under Arab influences from Moorish Spain. The Renaissance produced a classical reaction which may be said to have triumphed by the middle of the 17th century and to have submerged its rival entirely during the age of Dryden and Pope, of Racine and Boileau. Largely under the spell of Rousseau, the wheel again came full circle and the beginning of the 19th century witnessed the great Romantic Revival.

To define the two terms is not difficult. Classicism inherited the literary traditions of Greece and Rome; it stood, as Walter Pater said, for order in beauty, and resembled the cold perfection of a Doric column. The 18th century, or perhaps it would be better to say the century after 1660, is generally taken as its golden age. France was its acknowledged home: the civilised world accepted the standards of Versailles, and the courtiers of Louis XIV spoke a language which for clarity and polish has rarely been equalled. The literature of that time possesses certain unmistakable characteristics, such as a hatred of mystery and enthusiasm, the repression of emotion and imagination, obedience to supposed Aristotelian rules, the conscious imitation of Greek and Latin models, especially the odes of Pindar and Horace and the satires of Juvenal, and a passion for clearness and regularity. The dramatist was haunted by the fear of violating the sacred "unities," and the poet was bound by rules as stiff as the etiquette of the drawing room. It mattered not so much what was said as how it was said. Correct style was everything, form was exalted over matter. The classicist aimed at "clearness rather than force, raiment rather than body, brilliancy rather than depth." He was expected to be amusing, elegant and pleasing; anything grotesque or extravagant would have put him out of court instantly. Everything had to conform to the taste of the stately, unemotional and classically-educated aristocrat: nothing "barbarous" was permitted. Only the 18th century would have dared to "improve" Shakespeare, and to deplore, as Voltaire did, his "monstrous irregularities". Literature had become urbanized: it rarely stirred outside the salon, the theatre or the coffee-house, and the man of letters spent his time hanging round the mansions of the great on the look-out for a noble patron in return for whose favours he celebrated the pleasures of the town in faultless couplets. Poetry became a vehicle for little else but wit and satire directed not against sin but against dullness and unconventionality: the lyric was no longer cultivated, and in England at least the sonnet practically

disappeared between Milton and Wordsworth. A sense of natural beauty was completely absent : the traveller abroad went to see the towns and hurried across the countryside as quickly as possible. Of the thousands who undertook the Grand Tour it would be difficult to find more than one or two who displayed any appreciation of Alpine scenery. Something of a sensation was caused when Dr. Johnson allowed Boswell to persuade him into a trip to the wild and remote islands of the outer Hebrides, where nothing was to be seen but dirty, half-savage peasants and bleak moors reached by painful journeyings along vile tracks full of ruts and holes.

Romanticism arose in the Middle Ages but it did not spring from Christian or even from Teutonic sources : it entered Europe through Moslem Spain and developed rapidly in the strange, exotic, orientalist culture of Provence, which after flourishing for over a century, was finally ruined in the Albigensian crusade. The songs of the troubadours strike an entirely new chord in European literature, for they introduced into Western civilisation the ideals of chivalry and courtliness and the cult of womanhood and frustrated love. We have only to compare their delicate and sensuous muse, with its stock refrain of the melancholy lover who sacrifices all to gain the affection of his mistress, with the harsh and strident note of the great Northern epics, the Song of Roland and the Chansons de Geste, where the warrior hero, amid the roar of battle and the clash of arms, fights and dies for his tribe or for his religion, to realize that these are two entirely different worlds. The one is redolent of the palace, the courtyard and the scented garden, where the notes of the lover's plaintive lyre alone are heard : the other reeks of the noise and conflict and hurly-burly of the battlefield, and if women are mentioned at all it is not as objects of adoration but as the mere sport of the brutalized and masterful male. The Arab-Provencal view of life—its carefree paganism, its joyful abandon, its frank carnality and women-worship—conquered the West, though the Christian religion purged it of some of its grosser elements and transformed the troubadour who sang of his love beneath his mistress's window into the chivalrous knight who swore before the altar of the Madonna to consecrate his sword to the defence of women and the faith.

So Romanticism was absorbed into the medieval tradition and continued to flourish until it was eclipsed by the classical revival inaugurated by the Renaissance. When it re-emerged, at the close of the 18th century, its character had changed. It was restored only to artificial life, it had no roots in the culture of the new age, the dead forms of the past could never be properly resuscitated, it was forced to draw what vitality it could from sources which were alien to the older tradition and within less than two generations it was dead. Yet this temporary revival, so productive in the field of art and letters, was not without its influence on the social, political and religious life of Europe. If the Romanticism of the 19th century was a somewhat spurious copy of the original, it at any rate drew attention to much that was of permanent value in the past and stressed an important aspect of reality which had long been overlooked.

The Romantic revival was a natural reply to a decadent classicism which had exhausted its vitality, and it therefore emphasized the points its predecessor had despised and ignored. It is often asserted that it was Rousseau who led the return to Nature and to the past. It is true that the tortured soul of Jean Jacques rebelled against the rules, conventions and artifices of a stilted and pompous society whose atmosphere choked and poisoned him. The solitary dreamer who paced the woods of Montmorency and exclaimed in ecstasy to be alone with Nature, far away from the world of men in which he felt himself a misfit, and who described in the "Nouvelle Héloïse" how gladly he would have burst the barriers of convention which thwarted the gratification of his natural desires, was certainly the spiritual father of the revolt against the prosaic Age of Reason. But the revolutionary naturalism of Rousseau must be distinguished from the return to the Middle Ages. The one looked to the future, the other harked back to the past. There are points of contact, but not complete identity. Rousseau brought people out of the drawing room and showed them the beauty of lake and mountain, but he was not the precursor of Scott and Victor Hugo.

The essential contrast between the aims and ideas of the Romantics and those of the men of the 18th century could not be better put than in the words of the French historian Weill: "The epoch of Voltaire loved clear and precise prose; the Romantics preferred verse or poetic prose. The 18th century glorified reason and logic; they gave predominance to intuition and passion. The *philosophes* were absorbed by the social man, with the desire of bettering society; the Romantics celebrated the isolated individual, the sad and noble soul, who rebels against social rules and the oppression of the inept and mediocre crowd. The Encyclopedists had only disdain for the past; firmly persuaded that humanity obeys the laws of progress, they were interested in the present and thought to prepare well for a better future. The Romantics, shocked by the vulgarities of the present, sought refuge in the past which they idealised. The Voltairians fought the Church and at most preserved a natural religion, above all simplified and desiccated; the Romantics, penetrated by a religious spirit, had a marked sympathy for Catholicism because the art and poetry of countless generations had embellished it. Finally, in the strict domain of literature, the Romantics declared useless and obsolete the methods and rules of classical literature; they opposed the drama to the tragedy, substituted for the noble genre a richer and more varied style and completely remodelled versification."¹

Rousseau contributed to the Romantic movement its imaginative sensibility, its cult of wild nature, of the strange, the exotic, and the grotesque, its passionate individualism and craving for freedom, and its often morbid introspection. Medievalism, the new forms of lyric poetry, and the historical novel and drama, were later elements which developed first in England and Germany, were introduced into France by Madame de Staël and others, and were absorbed into the already dominant naturalism and sensibility. Romanticism as a fully developed philosophy

¹ G. Weill: *L'Ève des Nationalités et le Mouvement Libéral* (Paris, 1930).

of art and life made a stronger appeal to the Teutonic nations than to the Latin. The classicists maintained an obstinate resistance to it in France, and it never acquired a firm hold on Spain or Italy. Nonetheless, it penetrated fairly deeply into European culture, occupying, as it were, the void left by the decay of the old positive religious tradition. Its gravest weaknesses—its irrational emotionalism, its unhealthy morbidity, its glorification of instinct and its failure to work out a new scale of values to replace the abandoned ideals of the past—are to be traced to Rousseau, its saner and healthier elements are those which were contributed by others.

Germany and England led the way : the *Lyrical Ballads* of Wordsworth and Coleridge appeared in 1798, the same year in which Tieck and the Schlegel brothers launched the *Athenæum* in Berlin. Their common aim was to emancipate poetry from the tyranny of classicism by the invention of new literary forms or the revival of old ones in which the new sense of beauty and especially the appreciation of natural scenery could be best expressed. The English Romantics found in Nature, wild and untamed, the inspiration they were seeking, and they experimented with the lyric, the sonnet, blank verse, the stanza, the ballad and other forms into which to pour a poetic fervour which the old heroic couplet could no longer sustain. They turned men's attention from the cities, the artificial creation of human hands, to the countryside, where the handiwork of the Creator luxuriated in its natural loveliness. Burns taught his readers the attractions of the broad Scottish lowlands ; the Lake poets worshipped Nature with such an intensity that they insensibly slipped into a pantheism which saw God in every created thing, the all-pervading spirit of the universe. Wordsworth conveys to us the loneliness and stark grandeur of the mountain, Shelley the furious energy of the wind, Keats the delightful awe of dusky woods and mossy banks. The child and the peasant are extolled ; their simplicity and contact with Nature exempt them from the vices of civilization. The traveller is exhorted to recognise the sublimity of hill and valley, of lake and waterfall, and to see in the rustic cottage, a ruined abbey, a field-mouse or the daffodils by the river-bank an intrinsic beauty which might for a moment link one to the Infinite. The classicists had never bothered about such things : to them they were trivial, vulgar, and unworthy of serious attention. The Romantics opened up a new world of pleasure and delight : their lyric song charmed a generation which had been shut up in salons and coffee-houses. It was perhaps fortunate that an appreciation of natural beauty should have been aroused among the peoples of the West just before the quiet and peaceful countryside was given over to the voracious grasp of industrialism and blackened and ruined by the smoke of furnaces. Paradoxical as it may seem, the same generation that claimed to have rediscovered the beauties of nature built the hideous slums and factories of the modern industrial towns.

The return to nature and the re-creation of lyrical poetry marked the first breach with the classical tradition. The second was the revival of the romantic novel, in a form considerably different, however, from the

stilted and long-winded pastoral tales of early 17th century France. Beginning in England as a sort of "ghost-thriller" with Horace Walpole's *Castle of Otranto* (1764) and the "Gothic" stories of Mrs. Radcliffe and "Monk" Lewis, with their haunted castles, earthy vaults, spectres and demons, and torturing inquisitors, it gradually developed into the historical novel of which Sir Walter Scott (1771-1832) became the acknowledged master. The "mystery" element was relegated to the background, and the novelist concentrated on reproducing the atmosphere of the past with as close a fidelity to historical fact as circumstances permitted. The scene of Scott's early books was laid in 18th century Scotland, which he knew best; then he went back to the Middle Ages and the 16th and 17th centuries, and shifted the scene to England or even to the Continent, as in *Quentin Durward*. The novel received entirely new treatment at his hands. Florid and fantastic romances there had been in abundance; psychological studies of character were well known, and the novel of manners, which attained almost perfection with Scott's contemporary, Jane Austen, had been brilliantly developed during the 18th century, but to take an historical event—the Porteous riots, the Crusade of Cœur-de-Lion, Louis XI's struggle with Charles the Bold—and to weave round it a tale which was given an increased illusion of reality by reason of its historical setting and its wonderfully descriptive "local colour" was a new and highly successful departure. Scott's works won an enormous popularity throughout Europe, and especially in France, where De Vigny's *Cinq Mars* (1826), Merimée's *Chronique du règne de Charles IX* (1829) and Victor Hugo's *Notre-Dame de Paris* (1831), to say nothing of the rollicking, swashbuckling tales of Alexandre Dumas, clearly proclaim their debt to the Wizard of the North.

German Romanticism followed the path traced out for it by Herder under whose inspiration poets and dramatists shook themselves free from dependence on foreign models and began to draw upon the inexhaustible riches of the popular literature of the Teutonic past—the Volkslieder, the Northern epics, medieval legends, local folklore, myths and fairy tales. The lachrymose novel of sensibility was not absent: Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister* provoked a host of imitations, the most successful being the sentimental romances of Jean Paul Richter (1763-1825), whose deep spirituality and vivid sense of the unseen appealed not only to his own countrymen but also to English critics like Carlyle and De Quincey. But sensibility is only one aspect of Romanticism. The return to the past was heralded by Tieck (1773-1853), whose poems, dramas, novels and short stories reveal the influence of medieval literature and whose play *Kaiser Octavianus* (1804) is a long glorification of the Middle Ages in which knights and shepherds, pilgrims and wanderers, princes and peasants, move across the stage. The Schlegels delved into the literature of all nations in their quest for romantic elements and new forms and scenes: August translated Shakespeare into German with such fidelity as almost to make him a national poet, while his brother Friedrich may almost be regarded as the founder of modern philology by the treatise he published in 1808 on the Sanskrit language. Between them they put German literary

criticism on a sound basis ; they aimed to reconcile the critic and the criticised, and laid it down that the former's duty is not to censure but to understand and to interpret. August's lectures on dramatic art and literature, which he delivered at Vienna in 1809-11, directly instigated Madame de Staël to compose her famous book *De l'Allemagne* (1813), which introduced German culture to her countrymen and launched the Romantic movement in France. Meanwhile the "Heidelberg school," of which Brentano and Von Arnim were the leading members, were busy collecting the old German folk songs with an assiduity only equalled by Scott's care in preserving the Border lays and ballads, and the brothers Grimm varied their philological studies by writing the charming fairy tales in which the spirit of the old "märchen" is admirably preserved. Though the great Goethe held aloof and maintained a standpoint of sane and level humanism, Romanticism received a tremendous impetus after the patriotic hysteria of 1813, when the stirring martial songs its leaders composed were chanted all over Germany.

Even contemporary philosophy received a Romantic impress. The individualism of Kant, who held that the lowest human consciousness constitutes what is real and that the most degraded man can thus attain to true "freedom", was developed by Fichte, whose philosophy is based on the Ego, of which the moral world is the conscious creation. He preached self-denial and renunciation with the fervour of a medieval ascetic, and insisted that every man must carve out his own destiny—an unbridled individualism that was partially responsible for the excesses into which so many of the Romantics fell. Following Fichte a comprehensive theory of aesthetic was formulated by Schelling (1775-1854), who regarded Nature and Spirit as two aspects of the "world soul" (*Weltseele*). "Nature is Spirit visible, Spirit is Nature invisible." The two are blended in art, which reveals to us not only the thing as it is, but enables us to understand the Spirit of which the natural object is but the outward form. Art thus appears superior both to nature and to philosophy, and "art for art's sake" soon became the watchword of the Romantics.

French Romanticism was an importation from Germany and England and proved a short-lived phenomenon. According to Sainte-Beuve, Rousseau was its grandfather and Chateaubriand its father. The author of *Atala* and *Réné* undoubtedly restored a sense of artistic composition to French literature : the cold and hard glitter, which a dry, unimaginative and somewhat shallow rationalism had imparted to it had grown wearisome and unsatisfying. Chateaubriand's warm and sensitive prose, rising at times to an almost poetic eloquence, was never so effective as when describing Red Indian life in the forests of North America before the white man had penetrated the "backwoods" and had slaughtered or driven away its primitive inhabitants, and his description of Niagara Falls by moonlight is a perfect gem of its kind. Unlike Rousseau, Chateaubriand is more interested in scenery for its own sake than for the emotions which it excites. A fully-fledged Romanticism did not appear until Madame de Staël's account of Germany and the new literary movement in vogue there was published in 1813, and Scott's novels and Byron's poems began

to attract attention in France. Lamertine's *Meditations* (1820), which the dry and unemotional Talleyrand sat up half the night reading, proclaimed the conversion of France's younger generation of writers. Throughout the 1820's, Hugo, De Vigny, Merimée, Sainte-Beuve and other youthful rebels against the classical tradition fought a furious battle against the strongly-entrenched Academy and all it stood for, the struggle being strangely allied to the Liberal political attack on the Bourbon régime. Hugo indeed defined Romanticism as "liberalism in literature," for was it not part of the universal fight for freedom and self-expression against decadent and tyrannical orthodoxies? Historical novels à la Scott, lyrical poetry, and romantic drama were all taken up with passionate enthusiasm. When an English company played Shakespeare in Paris in 1827, Dumas declared in ecstasy, "Only then did I realise what drama could be—this was the first time I had seen real passions on the stage," and immediately set to work writing *Henri III et sa Cour*, which the young bloods cheered to the echo when it was acted in 1829. Hugo in the preface to *Cromwell* (1828), delivered a violent attack on the whole classic theatre of Corneille and Racine, and asserted that tragedy, far from being a restrained work of art, should depict real life naturally and that the comic and grotesque element must not be excluded. To the classicist the grave-diggers' scene in *Hamlet* was intolerable and disgusting in the extreme; to the Romantic it brought one face to face with reality and was an essential part of the drama.

The Revolution of 1830 was hailed by Hugo and his circle as a Romantic triumph. In theatre, in café, in newspaper they had branded kings and nobles as enemies of the human race, and hailed the dawn of liberty. The hysterical ardour which was willing to push France into a war with half Europe for the liberation of the struggling Poles and Italians, had its counterpart in England in the revolutionary fury of Shelley, whose esoteric drama *Prometheus Unbound*, depicts the human race bursting the shackles of conventions and traditional orthodoxies, the mysticism of Blake and his dreams of the new Jerusalem "in England's green and pleasant land," and the quixotic sacrifice of Byron, who ended his Childe Harold's pilgrimage at Missolonghi (1824), dying in the cause of Greek independence. The Romantics' dissatisfaction with the present produced not only an idealisation of the past but the fervent hope of remodelling the world in the future.

The revolution in literature left its mark on nearly all departments of culture. The awakening of interest in the past led naturally to a closer investigation into the antiquities of nations and peoples. The historical novelist was quickly followed by the romantic historian, and a public stimulated by the novels of Scott and Bulwer Lytton, of Hugo and Dumas, turned for confirmation of the picturesque and remote life therein described to the vivid and absorbing narratives of Thierry and Michelet, of Carlyle and Lamartine. In his anxiety to rival the romancer, the historian was too often tempted to sacrifice truth and accuracy to colour and effect, and the scientific study of documents and sources was not inaugurated till later in the 19th century. Nonetheless, the conviction

that the roots of the present lie deep in the past and that history is an invaluable clue to the complexities of social, religious and political phenomena, did undoubtedly lead to a quickening of the historic sense and aided the development of the new sciences of archæology and philology. The discovery of the Rosetta stone, during Napoleon's expedition to Egypt (1799), facilitated the deciphering of the hieroglyphics and the work of uncovering the remains of ancient civilizations received a tremendous impetus. After the French savant Champollion had laid the foundations of Egyptology, Botta began excavations in ancient Assyria and was soon followed by Layard, whose discoveries on the sites of Nineveh and Babylon after 1845 aroused universal interest. Greece was opened up to Western investigators when she became independent; the legends of ancient Rome embodied in the pages of Livy were destroyed by Niebuhr's criticism, and the excavations at Pompeii, begun in the 18th century but renewed more thoroughly in 1808, revealed as nothing else could have done the intimate life of a Roman town of the second century. Philology was placed on a firm footing by the life-long labours of the brothers Grimm, who were stimulated by an intense interest in their country's past to a study of the varying German dialects and by Bopp, who first offered convincing proofs of the common origin of Sanskrit, Latin, Greek and the Germanic languages which developed from a primitive Indo-European tongue. Even among the less advanced Slavonic nations there was a kind of cultural renaissance; their scholars brought to light half-forgotten myths, tales and legends of their heroic age, and so helped to kindle in them an ardent longing to emulate the glorious deeds of their primitive ancestors. Romanticism was not a little responsible for the nationalist outbreaks of 1848.

Romanticism even invaded the domain of law. In Germany Savigny (1779-1861) severely criticised the theory of Natural Law as embodied in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Napoleonic Code which the revolutionary conquerors had imposed upon all countries subjugated by their arms. Man as an isolated individual is a fiction, according to Savigny, for it is impossible to divorce him from his tribe, family, class or nation. Natural law does not exist. Only to historic law rooted in a people's past, and changed, modified and adapted to suit particular conditions, can reality be applied. If such were the cause, it were folly to ignore local customs and usages, however irrational they might appear, for they were probably founded on the peculiar necessity of the place and time had proved their utility and value. The influence of Herder is clearly traceable here. The defenders of Natural Law attacked Savigny and his school as die-hard traditionalists and upholders of ancient prejudices and out-worn superstitions, but they found little support in Germany after the anti-French reaction that followed the War of Liberation.

In the field of art the Romantics triumphed after a long struggle. Rejecting the classical theory of absolute beauty, the same in all ages and places, they held that æsthetic standards varied according to circumstances, and that the imitation of antique models, the expressions of a

long dead culture, was no true art. Instead of exquisite nudes modelled on classical sculpture and used to illustrate scenes of ancient mythology, the Romantics, following the example of the 17th century Dutch artists, sought to portray the simple and humble scenes of real life and the beauties of land and seascape. The human figure ceased to occupy the centre of the canvas, and the dethronement of man was succeeded by the elevation of wild nature as the chief subject of the painter's inspiration. In place of Venuses and Dianas, of lords and ladies, the salons exhibited pictures of forest and river bank, of ships at sea and peasants in the field. The landscapes of Turner and Constable in England, of Delacroix and the Barbizon school, led by Corot and Millet, in France, were significant of the "dehumanizing" tendencies of the "return to nature" school. Medievalism in art was represented by the Pre-Raphærites, who, attracted by the freshness and simplicity of the Christian art of the later Middle Ages, went back behind the Renaissance and modelled their work on the frescoes of Cimabue, Giotto and Fra Angelico. The early members of the group were chiefly Germans who had studied in Rome: the English "pre-Raphælite brotherhood" was founded in 1848 by Burne-Jones, Rossetti and Holman Hunt. Architecture followed the same path; neo-Gothic churches and public buildings sprang up which contrasted strangely with the stark ugliness of the new factories of industrialism.

Romanticism was destined to a short life. It was vitiated by grave defects and many of its leaders discredited the movement by the excesses into which they plunged. Like Rousseau, it was self-conscious, neurotic and unbalanced. The restraint, the decorum, the order which had characterised classicism was thrown to the winds, and the freedom of the Romantics speedily degenerated into licence, a quest for mere novelty, an outrageous flouting of accepted conventions, a determination to be different from other men, combined with a spiritual and ethical indolence which precluded them from erecting new standards of life and conduct. Their eccentricities grew intolerable. The men of the old régime sought to conform to a set pattern, and utterly disdained the unusual and the grotesque; the Romantic gloried in his uniqueness. The first page of the *Confessions* proclaims Rousseau's conviction that he stands alone in the annals of humanity, and both he and his successors sought to advertise their individuality by every extravagance that suggested itself. The Armenian costume of Jean-Jacques, "the diabolical glint and corpse-like complexion" of Byron and the flamboyant youth of 1830, and the blue china and green carnations of Oscar Wilde, are trivial externalities which nonetheless throw much light on the Romantic mentality. The acute sensibility and morbidly quivering introspection, illustrated by Rousseau's tears, Wordsworth's dejection of melancholy, Shelley's almost feminine lamentations, and the general nostalgia which afflicts the poets of this age, drew forth Goethe's contemptuous remark that the Romantics wrote "as though they were ill, and as though the whole world were a hospital." Their failure to establish a satisfactory criterion of moral values in place of the old Christian tradition left them with no secure anchor in life. After having proclaimed, with Rousseau, that man is naturally good and

sin therefore an illusion, and having shifted the burden of guilt from the individual to society and reduced the moral conscience to a mere sentiment, happiness still eluded the rebels. Actions counted for less than feelings. "Her conduct was reprehensible but her heart was pure," says Rousseau, describing the strange amours of Madame de Warens, and the Romantics drifted helplessly along the current of emotion, only too often perishing among the rocks and shoals. Romanticism, disillusioned and dispirited, gave way before the middle of the century to the hard and bitter Realism which was to culminate in the horrible neurasthenia of the "fin de siècle."

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4. THE MACHINE AGE

While the Continent of Europe was witnessing the birth-pangs of modern democracy, while the aristocratic régime which had flourished since the Renaissance was collapsing in the welter of revolution, and while the armies of the new France were carrying far and wide the message of personal freedom and popular sovereignty, a silent and at first imperceptible change was being effected in the social and economic life of England which was ultimately to spread throughout the world and to alter the entire direction and outlook of our culture. In brief, the Machine had entered history, with consequences for humanity the full significance of which can hardly yet be appreciated. So startling a transformation did it work in the structure of human society that as early as 1837 Auguste

substitution of a money economy for a system of barter, led to the feverish pursuit of wealth for its own sake and the eager adoption of every means of multiplying it. That the origins of modern capitalism are to be sought in the Middle Ages seems now hardly to admit of doubt ; Sombart indeed claims to trace them to the Florence of the 14th century, and Max Weber's contention that Calvinistic Protestantism was the spiritual father of the stock-jobber and the industrial magnate is no longer accepted without drastic modifications, though it may be admitted that the Protestant "gospel of work" and the creation of an "intramundane asceticism" (*innerweltliche askese*), as Troeltsch calls it, considerably hastened a process already in being. Thirdly, the rise of modern science in the 17th century, the separation by Descartes of the world of matter from the world of spirit, and Newton's picture of the universe as one vast machine with God the Eternal Clockmaker, prepared mankind to accept more readily in their daily lives a mechanical order they had long been taught to recognize in the heavens. Fourthly, the discipline and regimentation of the factory had been anticipated by the miner in the coal-pits and the soldier in the barracks. Mining had become increasingly important from the 16th century onwards, largely owing to the demand for artillery in warfare, while the old disorderly levies of feudal times had given place in Louis XIV's France to the efficiently organized national army of well-trained, well-drilled professionals. Finally, the weakening of the old religious tradition and the propagation in the 18th century of an anti-Christian rationalist utilitarianism, with its emphasis on happiness in this world rather than in the world to come, created a "belief in the good life as the *goods* life," since the prosperity of a nation was to be measured in terms of the quantity of goods it produced and the standards of luxury set by the royal courts were, with the growth of the democratic spirit, being aimed at by a widening circle of social classes. It is significant that Diderot's *Encyclopédie* devoted considerable space to technics and that its illustrations consisted mainly of diagrams of machinery, and that the Abbé de St. Pierre, one of the earliest exponents of the doctrine of progress, declared roundly that the builder of a bridge was a greater benefactor to humanity than the architect of the most magnificent of cathedrals.

Thus by the middle of the 18th century the stage was set for the introduction of large-scale machinery. We should not forget, however, that technics had been developing steadily and slowly since the Middle Ages. The clock, the glass-lens, the steering-rudder, the windmill, the blast-furnace and the printing-press were all medieval inventions, while the principle of many familiar mechanical devices of our day was perfectly well known centuries before the necessary improvements were thought of which rendered a machine practically useful and commercially profitable. A steam-engine was described by Hero of Alexandria in the 1st century ; the Marquis of Worcester constructed one in Charles II's reign : John Newcomen devised in 1705 an engine capable of pumping water out of mines, and it was while repairing a Newcomen engine that Watt, in a flash of inspiration, saw that a few modifications would

enormously increase its efficiency. Until Watt's time England had been deplorably backward in inventive genius. Of her philosophers and scientists, from Bacon to Newton, she might justly be proud; but in technics she was indebted to Italian ship-builders, German mining-engineers, Flemish silk-weavers and Dutch fen-drainers. Even her system of communications was inferior to that of many Continental countries. Her roads were often badly surfaced tracks full of ruts and holes, in contrast to the straight, smooth highways of France, and she possessed no inland waterways until Brindley cut the Manchester-Worsley canal in 1755. Yet in the last thirty or forty years of the 18th century she produced in rapid succession a series of mechanical inventions which revolutionized her social and economic life and whose influence in the end was felt in almost every country of the globe.

This sudden flowering of inventive talent is not to be explained on any simple formula. Far from having created industrial capitalism, it is likely that the inventions supplied a demand. England in the 18th century was a wealthy and prosperous nation. Since the Revolution of 1688 her moneyed class had enjoyed a monopoly of political power. The founding of the Bank of England in 1694 and the rapid development of the credit system, which enabled notes, cheques and bills of exchange to be used instead of actual coin, facilitated the launching of commercial enterprises. State interference in economic affairs was less than in any country in Europe; guilds and internal customs barriers were unknown. By 1760 England's former trade rivals—Holland, Spain, France—had been laid low; India and Canada were in British hands, and the Navy was mistress of the seas. Trade was expanding, money plentiful, new sources of investment were being sought—was it merely a coincidence that at this particular juncture should take place those mechanical inventions which were to change the commercial capitalism of the merchant into the industrial capitalism of the producer?

When George III came to the throne in 1760 there were few indications that the nation was on the eve of a radical transformation. England was still an agricultural country. The mass of her people worked on the farms, in the fields and in the small market towns. The greater part of her population of six or seven millions was concentrated in the south, the port of Bristol being the second largest city. Every year there was a surplus of corn for export. Of manufactures, that of wool was the oldest and the most important, and had been considered the basis of England's prosperity since the Middle Ages. The iron industry came next in importance: coal and coke were coming into use for smelting purposes, since charcoal smelting had steadily exhausted the timber supply. Cotton manufacture was then so insignificant that Adam Smith hardly gives more than a passing reference to it in the *Wealth of Nations*. Businesses employing a large number of hands were not unknown, but speaking generally the term "manufacturer" then bore its literal meaning, a hand-worker, and almost all spinners and weavers worked in their own cottages and themselves brought the finished products to market and sold them to travelling merchants. Many combined handicrafts with farming

and so were completely independent and self-sufficing. Life flowed on at an even tempo : coaches lumbered awkwardly along rutty roads at a pace no greater than that the Romans had been used to. The quiet valleys and green fields of Lancashire and Yorkshire, where men tended their flocks and women spun flax by the cottage door, were not yet polluted by the smoke and stench of factories, did not yet echo to the shrieking clang of machinery.

But even before the steam-engine and the power-loom had begun to exercise their influence upon the economic life of the nation, the English countryside had changed its character. Before the industrial revolution came an agrarian revolution : before modern scientific methods were applied to coal-mining and cotton-spinning, they had already been applied to agriculture. The old practice of sowing crops for two years in succession and letting the exhausted land lie fallow during the third year was rendered unnecessary and uneconomic by the discovery that the cultivation of turnips, cloves and certain grasses restored to the soil exactly those elements which the ordinary crops, including wheat, extracted from it. Early in the 18th century a scientific system of the rotation of crops had thus become possible, while the improved implements for sowing and hoeing and the successful experiments made by Bakewell and others in the breeding of live-stock rendered farming more productive and profitable. But the ordinary small yeoman-farmer could not afford the improvements with which rich landowners were adding to their income and increasing the fertility and output of their soil, and even had he possessed the necessary capital and been devoid of the rustic's contempt for new fangled methods, the medieval common-field system, which prevailed in the greater part of England, would have thwarted him. The arable land of each parish was divided into three great strips and most farmers would own a piece of land in each strip. One strip was left fallow each year : on the other two, barley and wheat were grown. The meadows were also held in common : each year the shares of the villagers were apportioned by lot, and after the hay-harvest everyone had the right to graze cattle there. Obviously no radical improvement in agriculture would be possible until the common field was broken up, and the local squire, if he had adopted the new methods, desired further land to experiment on and turned his eye to the village strips. The result was that the enclosure of common land in the interest of the neighbouring landowner became a general rule. Enclosures had been a familiar feature in Tudor times, and legislation had been enacted to check it. But since the Revolution the landowning class had dominated Parliament and run the government : they were thus able to legislate in their own interests. Enclosure acts were passed rapidly after 1710, but the pace quickened after 1760. Between these two dates 335,000 acres were enclosed, but between 1760 and 1840 no less than 7,000,000 acres passed out of the possession of the villagers. From a materialist standpoint, the result was a gain, since the new owners, with a plentiful supply of capital and possessed of the most up-to-date agricultural machinery, were able enormously to increase the yield of the land. Humanly speaking, it was a

colossal tragedy. The English yeoman, long regarded as the backbone of the nation, was wiped out of existence. In 1700 it was estimated that there were 180,000 freeholders—small, independent farmers—in the country: in 1787 Arthur Young reported that the men “who really kept up the independence of the nation” had practically disappeared, “and their lands were now in the hands of monopolizing lords.” The amount of misery and suffering occasioned by this social revolution must have been appalling. Villagers, seeing the lands they and their fathers had used for generations gradually eaten up and their livelihood gone, were forced to sell their homes and hire themselves out as agricultural labourers or enter the new factory towns and swell the ranks of the landless proletariat. While in France the Revolution was to break up the huge estates of the nobles and distribute much of the land to the peasants, in England the exact reverse took place—the land was taken from the peasant to swell the overgrown estates of the nobility. The English yeoman had had his praises sung when he fought at Crécy or Agincourt, but no one was found to defend him when he was driven brutally from his land and his cottage, a propertyless outcast.

Thus the industrial changes of the late 18th century found English rural life disorganized and broken up and a landless class, already losing their independence and self-respect, often drawn towards the towns when the village had nothing to offer but servile and ill-paid labour. Unhappily, the fall of the yeoman was quickly followed by the fall of the domestic worker, and a huge wage-earning proletariat was created both in town and country.

The beginnings of the industrial revolution in England are usually connected with the series of mechanical inventions in the textile industries. The commercial expansion of the 18th century had opened up fresh markets and stimulated the demand for cloth. This in turn led to a search for devices that would facilitate the processes of spinning and weaving the yarn. John Kay had patented in 1733, a “flying-shuttle” which enabled the weaver to draw the woof through the warp or lengthwise threads in half the time. This meant that the weaver was now kept waiting for yarn from the spinners, who could not work so fast. Some means had to be found to speed up the spinning process. Hargreaves patented a spinning jenny in 1770, which was a wheel with multiple spindles driven by a belt, and thenceforth development was rapid. A new machine, called a “water-frame,” because water power was needed to turn it, appeared almost simultaneously: Crompton’s “mule,” produced in 1779, enabled cloth of a much finer texture to be spun, and Cartwright in 1785 devised a loom worked by steam-power. Equally important was the invention in America in 1792 of Eli Whitney’s cotton-gin, a machine for separating the seeds from the cotton-fibre, which increased the production of fibre to such an extent that the export of raw cotton from the United States to Lancashire tripled in ten years.

Thus the cotton industry suddenly leapt into prosperity and enormous fortunes were made by those who sunk their money in it. At first the domestic workers shared this good fortune. They used the earliest

inventions—the jenny, the mule and the water-frame—increased their output, and made money. The factory only made its appearance with the power-loom, and the power-loom was slow in coming into use. In 1813 only 2,400 were employed in the mills, but by 1833 the number had risen to 100,000. It was then that the domestic worker realized he could not compete with steam-driven machinery : his resistance was broken and he was driven willy-nilly into the factory. Like the corresponding movement on the land, it was for him a change from independence to dependence. Formerly he had spun his cloth in his own cottage, sold the finished product to the buyer, and pocketed the proceeds. Now he was summoned by the whistle to the factory, where, lost in a crowd of hundreds of his fellow-workers, he tended the great power-looms for hours on end, and in return received wages from a master. His freedom was gone : he was but a wage-slave, the goods he made were not his but the owner's. The essential difference between the old and the new is summed up in a phrase from the report of a contemporary Parliamentary commission : "the work is now done by persons who have no property in the goods they manufacture." The worker had nothing to sell but his labour, and as the supply in the early 19th century was plentiful, he received for it a mere pittance. The decade 1820-30 saw the triumph of the factory system and with it of industrial capitalism. Industry dominated commerce. It was not the man who marketed the finished product who made money now, but the man who supervised the earlier processes of spinning and manufacture.

Although the textile machinery attracted most attention at the time, we can see now that without the application of steam-power its influence would have been considerably circumscribed. The coal-mine was the real basis of the new machine age of the 19th century. The original purpose of the steam-engine was to pump water out of mines : it was not until later that the new invention was installed in flour-mills, breweries and cotton-mills. Coal had long been growing in importance, since wood was not to be had in sufficient quantity for smelting iron—a French mine employed 1,000 workmen as early as 1756—but with the demand for fuel for steam-power engines and the demand for iron for machinery, it became king of the economic world and only in our own day does it seem on the point of abdicating in favour of electricity.

Indirectly also the mine was responsible for the introduction of railways. As early as the 16th century trucks drawn on rails had been used to cart the ore about the surface of the mine : not until Stephenson's day did it occur to anyone to invent a steam-driven locomotive for the conveyance of human passengers. The first railroad engine was successfully tried out in 1814 ; the Stockton to Darlington line, originally intended for horse traffic, was opened in 1825, the Liverpool to Manchester line being completed in 1830. Thenceforth the steam locomotive was supreme ; the old stage-coaches disappeared from the roads, while their mechanical successors screeched and clanked across the countryside at ever-increasing speeds. Within fifty years the railway had

conquered the world : the first Continental line, that between Brussels and Malines, was opened in 1835, by 1876 trains could be seen running in China and Japan. No invention ever revolutionized so rapidly methods of communication : more than anything else perhaps the railway was responsible for the increasing "tempo" of 19th century civilization, for had not early critics declared that its speed was greater than the human frame would stand ? The most effective means of opening up barren or backward countries was to run railways through them—the Trans-Siberian and the Canadian Pacific are obvious examples—thus did Stephenson's genius facilitate that Europeanization of the world, that subordination of whole continents and civilizations to the white man's will, an achievement the Romans might have envied.

When Queen Victoria came to the throne in 1837 the Industrial Revolution was thus well under way in England, now fast becoming "the workshop of the world." For thanks to the genius of her inventors and technicians, to her abundance of coal and iron, to the preoccupation of Continental countries in revolutionary strife and war, England had stolen a march on all her competitors. After the peace of 1815 her textiles, her hardware and her cheap manufactured goods began to pour into foreign countries : her production steadily rose, her factories hummed with activity, her wealth and prosperity grew enormously, and as late as 1851 the Great Exhibition proclaimed to an envious world that her rivals were still far behind. Well might the mid-Victorians, prosperous and comfortable, sing their paeans to patriotism and progress :

"Forward, forward let us range,
Let the great world spin for ever down the ringing grooves of change !"

and jubilant optimists like Macaulay contrast the sloth and ignorance and backwardness of bygone ages with the boundless energy, expanding knowledge and progressive enlightenment of their own. Was not the output of our workshops and factories increasing year by year, were we not selling more goods to foreign countries, were not railways and electric telegraphs and ocean cables reducing distance and facilitating communication, was not medical science steadily destroying disease and promoting the health and happiness of mankind ?

But there was a reverse to the medal. The Machine was born amid scenes of horror and misery which shock us today but to which most contemporaries were strangely blind. No nation paid a more terrible price for material prosperity than did 19th century England : no deity but the "bitch-goddess" Worldly Success, as Aldous Huxley calls her, ever demanded such savage sacrifices. The change-over from an agricultural to an industrial economy represented, we are told, "the lowest point in social development Europe had known since the Dark Ages"¹ a veritable New Barbarism. Uncontrolled, unorganized, unplanned the new industrial society grew up haphazard—for was not this the age of Adam Smith and Bentham and *laissez-faire* ? The State must not interfere ; industry must be free and unshackled—let things

alone ! Mills and factories spring up near the coal-mines of Lancashire, Yorkshire, South Wales and the Black Country ; the landless proletariat is drawn thither, sucked into the voracious maw. Machinery drives down wages, labour is cheap and plentiful, the population rising fast, paupers and women and children are brought in to tend the looms—they cost less in wages ! Steam-power is expensive, so lengthen hours and cut down wages to the barest minimum. The power-driven mills in the gas-lit factories can work for twenty-four hours : why not the worker also ? In the mill-towns of Lancashire a sixteen-hour day is nothing unusual. Flog the child labourers into wakefulness if they sleep at their machines—no matter if they die, there are plenty more. In the coal-shafts women and children cannot, it is true, wield the pick, but at least they can drag trucks about, crawling on their hands and knees. Round the ugly black mining or factory town the air is polluted by poisonous fumes, a thick fall of black fog shuts out the sunlight, miles of drab paved streets keep the meadows and fields of the green countryside well out of sight, the rivers and streams are made a dumping-ground for refuse and waste-products, in the dirty slums and alleys, dark and verminous, the workers pass their usually short lives in toil and wretchedness till typhoid or tuberculosis caught in the foul, disease-ridden atmosphere makes an end of them. Over all these cities of Dreadful Night hangs a foetid air of foggy drabness. But the millowner and the ironmaster care little ; their workmen are mere abstractions, hardly more than machines themselves, we must work more furiously, increase production, increase profits. Truly the Machine had done little but make employer and worker alike slaves to the Empire of Mammon.

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¹ Mumford, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

5. THE ADVENT OF SOCIALISM

Every great stage of imperial expansion or swift economic development is accompanied by social dislocation, unrest and disorder, on a scale commensurate with the movement which has given birth to it. The growth of new industries necessitates the accumulation within restricted areas of large bodies of workers who are exposed in the main to two dangers: exploitation at the hands of avaricious employers, which usually takes the form of low wages, long hours and bad housing and working conditions, and periodic depressions in the economic world, leading to sudden and unpredictable unemployment. No means has been found of escaping the latter, but the former can be combated by collective action, culminating in strikes, on the part of the workers. Strikes and trade unions were not unknown in the ancient world: even in the Roman Republic workers, peasants and slaves were roused to revolutionary action by agitators like Spartacus and Catiline. The economic changes in Western Europe in the 14th century led to risings of the weavers and spinners of Flanders, to popular revolutions in the city-states of North Italy, to jacqueries in France and to the Peasants' Revolt in England. The development of the new money economy in the 16th century, following the geographical discoveries of the Spaniards and Portuguese and the opening up of fresh mines and markets, was marked by the Peasants' War in Germany, the revolt of the *comueneros* in Spain, and the agitation in England against the "enclosure" of common land by wealthy squires and nobles. Similarly the birth of modern industrialism, consequent on the remarkable improvement in technics in the later 18th century, was accompanied by socialist and revolutionary unrest of which the end is not yet.

The introduction of machinery and large-scale industry did not, of course, create poverty, but it undoubtedly increased it to an appalling extent and left the world with a social problem as yet unsolved. Material prosperity increased; the volume of trade attained astonishing proportions; factories poured out their cheap mass-produced goods, and successive scientific inventions not only perfected machinery and increased output but conquered distance and soon brought the whole world within the orbit of the new industrialism. Never perhaps had so colossal a transformation taken place within so short a time. In some respects an ancient Roman would have been more at home in the quiet and leisurely world of the 18th century than a man of the 18th century would have been in the rapid, bustling, machine-ridden world of the 19th. But it soon became obvious that all this increase in wealth and trade was benefiting only a small fraction of the community. The iron-master and the cotton manufacturer reaped fabulous fortunes: their employees, housed in dark hovels in the slums that rose higgledy-piggledy in all the big cities, toiled in abject wretchedness, underfed, underpaid, uncared for. The handworker could not compete with power-driven machinery: he had to enter the factory or

starve. The yeoman had been driven off the land : he could either sink to be an agricultural labourer or migrate to the towns and find work perhaps as a millhand. The employer paid as much or as little as he pleased : the labour market was choked and a supply was always to be obtained. To combine to force up wages or shorten hours was illegal. There seemed no alternative to economic slavery.

It was under these conditions, with the rich getting richer and the poor poorer and with the inequality of wealth becoming more and more glaring, that the Socialist movement was born. It was not surprising that the suffering humanity of the ill-built, disease-ridden factory towns, when it at last became articulate and found leaders to organize it, should have been filled with a bitter hatred towards the society that permitted such horrors while mouthing fine ideals of liberty and justice and should have come to envisage a revolution that should not only effect social reforms but destroy completely the old civilization and build a New Jerusalem where oppression, poverty and inhumanity should no longer find place. The critics of industrialism—most of themselves members of the propertied class—were agreed in demanding a better distribution of wealth, a lessening of the gulf between the haves and the have-nots, but their positive proposals as a rule varied between State ownerships of the means of production and the creation of small self-governing and self-supporting communes.

The Socialist movement passed through four distinct phases. The formative period lasts from the beginning of the century down to 1848, the year of the Communist Manifesto and the national workshops in Paris. It is marked by the vaguely Utopian schemes of Owen in England and Saint Simon and Fourier in France, and by Louis Blanc's more definite State Socialism. From 1848 to 1870 there was a decided lull in revolutionary agitation, largely due to the failures of 1848 and to steadily mounting prosperity both in England and France, in which the working class to some extent shared. But Socialism is now being organized and provided with a definite policy, a clear goal, or a philosophic creed by Karl Marx, who publishes *Das Kapital* and founds the first International in 1864. After 1870 it begins to spread rapidly all over Europe. This may be called the period of "Parliamentary Socialism," when Jaurès and Bebel attempted to fit the movement into the Liberal democratic State. Their attempt to reach a compromise with the bourgeoisie and to introduce socialistic changes slowly and gradually through parliamentary action is denounced by the strict Marxists and by the anarchists and syndicalists as sheer treachery and cowardice. Nevertheless down to the War of 1914 the bulk of working class opinion supports the moderate policy. The war, however, finally splits the movement : the Parliamentary socialists everywhere back up their respective governments, while the extreme Left declare the war to be a mere capitalist imperialist struggle in which the workers have no interest except to use it to promote world revolution. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 and the founding of the Third International in Moscow in 1919 mark the return to genuine Marxian Communism,

the class war, violence and terrorism, and the "liquidation" of the exploiters. Socialists and communists struggle for the soul of the working-class, and so give Fascism (largely, but not entirely, a bourgeois movement) an easy victory in many parts of Europe.

The origins of Socialism are to be sought in the writings of the Enlightenment: it is significant that Saint-Simon was a pupil of D'Alembert, that Owen's *New View of Society* is largely a restatement of Rousseauist principles. In fact, Socialism and Liberalism have much in common—belief in the essential goodness of human nature, faith in progress and hostility to religion and the supernatural. Both derived from the anti-Christian rationalism of the 18th century. They differed on the function to be assigned to the State and to the individual. The Liberal, usually a middle-class man of property, wished to restrict the State's power and allow free play to economic interests: the socialist, realizing that Liberal "freedom" meant freedom for the employers to exploit the workers, tended to demand an enormous extension of the State's authority and ultimately the seizure of the State by the workers themselves. The materialism and anti-clericalism of the modern communist is really an inheritance from Liberalism. And, as Berdyaev has remarked, for all the violent communist diatribes against "bourgeois" society, the average workman desires nothing so much as to become a "bourgeois" himself, as indeed he is becoming in Soviet Russia.

Criticism of the new economic order was voiced in England almost as soon as it came into being. Before 1800 it was obvious that the freedom of the agricultural and the town workers alike was being destroyed. Everywhere the yeoman was being dispossessed and the land regrouped into huge estates: everywhere the independent craftsman was putting up a losing fight against the machine. The ruin of the old village community attracted attention first, and the early social reformers concentrated on the agrarian problem. Men like Spence, Ogilvie and Paine, who all died between 1809 and 1814, were indignant at the sight of yeoman's farms being swallowed up by a powerful landed aristocracy. It seemed to them lamentable that at the very moment when the European serf was freeing himself from the trammels of feudalism and becoming a free peasant, the English agriculturist was sinking into dependence on the rich proprietor. Land, they held, should be common and not concentrated in the hands of the wealthy few. Every man was entitled to a share of it: an independent economic position was essential for the fullest realization of human potentialities. As early as 1775 Spence put forward a proposal that all lands should be owned by the parishes, which would let it out in farms, the rent forming the only tax—an idea which bears some resemblance to the scheme launched by Henry George a hundred years later. Thomas Paine, in the *Rights of Man* (1791), his famous reply to Burke, demanded the public ownership of land, a heavy death-duty on estates and old age pensions and maternity benefits for the workers and their families. The radicalism of Paine and the curious communistic-anarchism of William Godwin

(1793), whose *Political Justice* violently assailed both government and private property, prepared the way to some extent for the socialism of Robert Owen.

The appalling distress of the early decades of the century, the period of the Napoleonic blockade, the Luddite riots, the Corn Laws, the Peterloo massacre, the Bonnymuir rising, the six Acts and the Cato Street conspiracy, brought England to the verge of revolution. Poets and journalists united in denouncing the callousness of the government and the oppression of the poor. Reformers were already pointing out that the wealth of the country was produced by the working masses who receive only a pittance, the greater part going to those who produce nothing. As the revolutionary poet Shelley, Godwin's son-in-law, declared :—

“ The seed ye sow, another reaps ;
The wealth ye find, another keeps ;
The robes ye weave, another wears ;
The arms ye forge, another bears.”

When the Swiss historian Sismondi visited England in 1818 he was shocked at the sight of so much poverty and destitution in what was alleged to be the richest and most prosperous country in the world. Years later another foreigner, Friedrich Engels, was to pen so appalling an indictment of the industrial system in *The Condition of the English Working Classes* in 1844 as to provide his friend and countryman Karl Marx with his most powerful arguments against capitalism.

But the most vigorous influence of these early years was undoubtedly the Welshman, Robert Owen (1771-1858), himself a factory owner and a man of remarkable business acumen. At twenty he was manager of one of the biggest factories in Manchester ; later he controlled the great cotton mills at New Lanark, where in contrast to his fellow-employers he paid as much attention to the health and education of his workmen as to his profits. A man of warm human sympathies, he carried over from the 18th century a firm belief in the all-sufficiency of reason, which, if it led him at times into a naive optimism akin to that of the French Encyclopaedists, was nevertheless responsible for the great humanitarian experiment that name New Lanark a model for all centres of industry. The workmen were better fed and better housed, child labour was abolished, drunkenness was put down, and stores were opened where commodities could be bought at little more than cost price. The workmen's cottages were whitewashed once a year, special pickets patrolled the streets at night to quell disorders, and “silent monitors,” consisting of different coloured blocks of wood, were hung up before each operative in the factory according as his work was good or bad. The fame of New Lanark spread ; visitors, including foreigners like the Grand Duke Nicholas of Russia (afterwards Tsar Nicholas I), flocked to view this strange community which appeared to prove that high wages and good working conditions were not incompatible with large profits. Encouraged by his success, Owen launched

more ambitious enterprises. In *A New View of Society* (1819), he develops the very old theory that environment is the key to happiness, that misery and suffering are not unavoidable but the result of ignorance and error and lack of a sound education. Condemning violence and revolution, he pleaded for co-operation among all classes, for the elimination of competition and of a capitalism based on private gain. Society should be organized as small self-supporting communities of from 500 to 3,000 persons, possessing the best machinery and engaged in various forms of work, mostly of an agricultural nature. Owen's propaganda, at first directed towards the humanizing of labour conditions and the destruction of the abominable exploitation of women and children, may have hastened the passage of the Factory Act of 1819. His influence was at its height in the early 1820's, and then declined in consequence of his attacks on religion (for he rejected Christianity because it made men morally responsible for their acts) and of the failure of the Owenite communities at New Harmony and elsewhere. Though his utopian schemes remained unrealized, his writings and his example may be said to have founded both socialism and secularism in England.

The movement that arose in the 1820's was co-operative socialism (the word was first used about 1827); it accepted in the main Owen's position and renounced violence in favour of reform by constitutional means. In the struggle over Parliamentary reform the workers' leaders ranged themselves with the middle classes against the Tory landed aristocracy who dominated the government. That they were persuaded to adopt peaceful means of agitation was due mainly to the influence of William Cobbett, that honest old John Bull who saw his Merrie England of country cottages and village greens disappearing before the hated power-loom and steam-engine of the new industrialism and looked to a reform of the franchise to put back the clock and drive out the landlords and cotton magnates and stockjobbers who were responsible for the evils of the time. The combined pressure of workers and bourgeoisie forced through the Reform Bill of 1832 in the teeth of Tory opposition, but the bourgeoisie were the only gainers. The middle classes secured a footing in the House of Commons and used their power to further their own ends. The Whig Poor Law of 1834, which made poverty a crime and created the Bumbledom which Dickens satirized so mercilessly in *Oliver Twist*, the triumph of Benthamite *laissez-faire*, and the savage sentences on the Tolpuddle labourers, who were transported for life to the penal colonies of Australia for attempting to found an agricultural trade union, opened the eyes of the working classes. Bitterly disillusioned, they turned to revolutionary activity, to the class war and the general strike (this last idea was born about 1832), and finally to Chartism.

Chartism was a strangely vague and chaotic movement which produced no first-rate leader. Though some of the Chartistes favoured "physical force", especially those from Wales, Scotland and the Midlands (there were serious riots in Birmingham and actually armed insurrection at Newport in 1839), the majority believed that social

reform could be carried through peacefully if only working class representatives were admitted to Parliament. This was the idea behind the "People's Charter" which they drew up in 1838; it demanded purely political changes such as universal suffrage, the secret ballot, and payment of members, the inference being that once these were granted Labour would have some hold on Parliament and the abuses of industrial capitalism would be remedied. The whole agitation had the effect of drawing public attention to the "condition of England" question, especially during the "hungry forties". Carlyle's *Chartism* (1839) was a fierce attack on the complacent *laissez-faire* policy of Liberalism, while *Past and Present* (1843) contrasted the benign charity of the Middle Ages with the pitiless exploitation practised by the modern industrialist. Disraeli, already dreaming of that "Tory democracy" in which the gentry should unite with the masses against the selfish and vulgar bourgeoisie, painted in *Sybil* (1845) a startling contrast between the "two nations," the rich and the poor, into which the economic revolution had divided England.

Yet Chartism failed. Its leaders lacked organizing talent and were easily intimidated, and owing to the lack of a dominating personality it split up into small sects of groups and exhausted its energies in futile internal squabbles. The continental revolutions of 1848, and especially Louis Blanc's socialistic experiments in the Paris of the Second Republic, galvanized it into a last display of vigour, but the Kennington Common demonstration, though it seriously alarmed the government, petered out in ridicule. The truth was conditions were changing for the better: the worst horrors of industrialism were past. Since 1833 there had been effective State inspection of factories, since 1842 the coal mines had been brought under strict supervision, child labour was done away with, hours of work were regulated. Cobden had persuaded the workmen that the Corn Laws, which kept up the price of bread, were the main source of their low standard of living: their repeal in 1846, together with Peel's free-trade budgets, did increase prosperity. The long campaign against slums was inaugurated in 1848 with the passing of a model-housing act. The phenomenal growth of trade in the fifties brought higher wages and a gradual improvement in labour conditions. The period from 1850 to 1875 was the golden age of "mid-Victorian prosperity". The working man actually began to save money. Agitation died down. Walter Bagehot, writing in 1866, asserted that a man could hardly get an audience if he wished to complain of anything. Not until the 1880's, when agriculture had collapsed and the industrial competition of Germany and the United States began to be felt, did socialism return to England.

Meanwhile socialist activity in France had run a similar course, though here it was accompanied by more violence and class hatred because of the revolutionary tradition. The great Revolution of 1789 had been mainly a bourgeois affair which redounded to the advantage of the professional classes and the peasants: even Robespierre and the Jacobins of 1792-94 made no direct attack on private property. Under

the Directory, indeed, the rich financiers and stockbrokers were all powerful, and the miseries of the disillusioned workers found expression in Babeuf's attempt to set up a communistic régime in 1795. Babeuf and his followers were guillotined, but their influence survived, and when industrial enterprise began to revive after the peace of 1815 and the new machinery was imported from England, the depressed condition of the proletariat attracted attention. Doubts were expressed whether the system of private property, well suited to an agricultural society in which the peasants formed the vast majority of the population, could be carried over into a society that was being rapidly industrialized. As early as 1819 Sismondi pointed out that, although wealth brought leisure, "it is not the same man who works and then rests : it is because one is working that the other is able to rest".¹ and he urged the State to step in and regulate hours and conditions of labour in the interests of the working class.

The real founder of French socialism was an aristocrat, Count Saint-Simon (1760-1825), a member of the same family as the famous memoir-writer of the name. From his youth he employed himself in elaborating schemes for social improvement ; at the Revolution he renounced his title, became an ardent Republican, ruined himself by his costly experiments, and died in poverty. His importance lies more in his personality than in his writings, of which *The New Christianity* (1825) contains the most striking expression of his views. He was a mystic and a visionary, a social evangelist with a message for the world who deeply impressed a wide circle of followers, including the Positivist philosopher Comte. He had no faith in orthodox religion, but plenty in science, the "new Christianity" of the future. Society must be reorganized on scientific lines and controlled by the chiefs of industry, the status of the worker must be raised, competition eliminated, and production carefully regulated and not left in the hands of a few irresponsible plutocrats. Saint-Simon's thought bears some affinity to that of the Encyclopedists, whose spiritual heir he was : like them he had a lively faith in progress, believed that Christianity had outlived its usefulness, and that a new and better religion that should "strive for the amelioration of the moral and physical existence of the poorest class" was needed to save mankind from exploitation. Saint-Simonism suddenly leapt into prominence at the 1830 Revolution and just as speedily collapsed through the extravagances of its leaders, who attempted to practise community of goods and of women. But it left its mark on political thought. It was the first challenge to cut-throat competition as the base of industrial society, it exposed the woeful inadequacy of the Liberal philosophy, which merely offered the vote to the starving workmen, and its thorough-going criticism of the new bourgeois order provided succeeding socialist writers with plentiful hints. Its insistence on the need for strong government and rejection of individualism as giving freedom to the powerful and enslaving the poor, was partly responsible for the revival of authoritarianism at the close of the 19th

¹ Quoted by R. Soltau, *French Political Thought in the 19th Century* (1931), p.131.

century which has culminated in our day in the rival systems of communism and fascism.

Criticism of the existing social order, which was the strongest point of Saint-Simonism, was followed by the planning of a new one. This was the work of Charles Fourier (1772-1837), a clerk in a merchant's office at Lyons, whose Utopian schemes, for all their absurd extravagances, exercised a profound influence on European thought. He was a disciple of Rousseau rather than of the Encyclopaedists: one of his pet theories was that all human desires are naturally good and that no restraints should be placed on the gratification of our passions and appetites. A somewhat unbalanced visionary, who foretold that men would one day live to be 140, average seven or eight feet in height, breathe water as well as air and communicate with the inhabitants of the planets, he was at the same time an acute critic of a wasteful and unplanned economy under which millions starved while the fruits of the earth were burnt or thrown into the sea or left to rot because they could not be distributed where they were needed. The remedy, said Fourier, was to set up small groups each of about 1,600 persons, who should own all in common and share out another's goods and therefore be independent of the fluctuations of markets, falls in currency, slumps and booms, and all the other evil effects of the capitalist system. These communistic groups Fourier called "Phalanges"; they were actually tried out in parts of France and the United States, notably at Brook Farm in Massachusetts, but broke down owing to financial difficulties and quarrels among the members. The world was not ripe for such rash experiments: it was plain that the solution of the social problem must be looked for elsewhere.

The Utopian socialism of Saint-Simon, Fourier and Robert Owen may have partaken of some of the misty optimism of the prevalent Romantic philosophy. Its appeal was made to the intelligentsia rather than to the proletariat whom it was designed to benefit. With the collapse of Saint-Simonism after 1832 and the failure of the Fourierist phalanges, the way was open for more practical projects which should directly appeal to the workers. The leader of the second generation of socialists was Louis Blanc (1813-1882), who believed that the evil lot of the masses was due to the false philosophy of Liberalism, with its individualism and free competition, which meant that the weakest went to the wall. The Liberals had reduced the State's powers to a minimum: the remedy was for the workers to seize the State and work it in their own interests. Employment should be guaranteed to everyone: "social workshops" should be set up to supply tools and machines for those who could not afford them, and so large-scale capitalism should be forced out of existence. Blanc's teachings, embodied in his *Organization of Labour* (1839), made rapid headway in the France of Louis Philippe, where the victorious bourgeoisie of 1830 showed themselves totally indifferent to social reform and were encouraged by Guizot and the "no change" school to get rich quick at anybody's expense. By this time the factory system had taken root in Paris, Lyons, and the mining, metal and woollen districts of the

North-East: the government made a few feeble attempts at State supervision, but did not venture to interfere very much with the manufacturers, stockjobbers and commercial magnates who had put them in power. The revolution of 1848 was the protest of the workers against the complacency of the new "financial feudalism"; Louis Blanc unexpectedly found himself a member of the Provisional Government charged with the task of economic reform, but the "ateliers nationaux" which he set up in Paris for the relief of the unemployed were run on quite different lines from those he had planned and proved total failures. The bourgeoisie, at first terrified and bewildered, rapidly recovered from the shock; their alliance with the conservative peasants was renewed, and the bloody "June days" of 1848, when Cavaignac's troops shot the "Reds" down in hundreds in the streets of Paris, restored their supremacy. Disillusioned and defeated, the labouring masses understood that they had nothing to expect from the Liberal bourgeois State: it was not surprising that their attention was turned to the revolutionaries and anarchists, who urged that only by violence and terror could the "exploiters" be overthrown. Meanwhile the frightened propertied classes sought protection from the strong man who offered himself as saviour of society: it was their votes which in 1851 legalized the *coup d'état* of Louis Napoleon and in 1852 placed him in the Imperial throne.

The chief service rendered by the early writers and theorists of socialism was their deadly exposure of the inadequacy of "the ideas of 1789." The criticism which the Liberals had once directed against the "ancient régime" was now turned against the Liberal bourgeois State itself. The working class were taught that parliamentary democracy was little more than a device for protecting the system of predatory, overgrown capitalism. Parliaments, political parties and elections were everywhere run by the rich commercial classes, who, having ousted the king and the noble, had no intention of handing over the State to the "people." On the contrary, their aim was to limit severely the functions of the State, which was expected to abstain from interference in the economic sphere, though its police and soldiers might be called in occasionally to shoot down workmen who went on strike and organized demonstrations against their employers. The Liberal politician rhapsodized over republican liberty, the beauties of democracy, free speech, free press, religious toleration, secret ballot, but factory acts and statutory limitations of hours of work were frowned upon as violations of the sacred principle of *laissez-faire*. The bourgeoisie accepted the alliance of Labour in the campaign against privileged aristocracy, but in France in 1789 and in 1830, and in England in 1832, the workmen who fought at the barricades were quietly put in their places when the business of revolution was over. Of what use then, to toilers in mine and factory, were these Revolutions and Reform Bills? Little apparently; but what was the real solution? Owen and Fourier and Saint-Simon proposed to cut adrift from the bourgeois State and to organize Labour into artificial, co-operative units, presumably in the hope that these would spread throughout society and finally become the only form of political and economic organization. These projects

were soon shown to be chimerical and premature : moreover, Socialism could not come into its own until parliamentarism had been given its run and the weaknesses and limitations of the Liberal Democratic State had been revealed. Nor had industrial capitalism spread much beyond England and France before 1850 : until its field of operations was extended, no international association of Labour could be founded. It was Louis Blanc who first pointed out the path which socialism should pursue : render your enemies powerless by seizing the machinery of government and then you may organize your new society in safety. On these lines his successor Marx planned the proletarian revolution.

Unfortunately, socialism though offering an acute and justifiable criticism of the Liberal ideal of free competition and economic individualism inherited many of the defects of its rival. It was born into the world with a materialistic and anti-supernatural bias : it believed firmly that men live by bread alone. Religion it either ignored entirely or, as with Saint-Simon and Comte, dismissed as a moribund survivor from the age of feudalism and divine right monarchy destined to perish in the coming "scientific" age. When it failed to die as rapidly as was expected, it had to be fiercely assailed as one of the main pillars of the capitalist system. The Churches themselves were partly to blame for the hostility with which they were regarded by the socialist leaders, for they failed to grasp the significance of the economic changes and fearing revolution, were inclined to condone rather than to condemn the anti-Christian features of bourgeois civilisation. An Anglican bishop of the early 19th century made the historic remark that "the people had nothing to do with the laws except to obey them"; the "Christian Socialism" sponsored by Kingsley and Maurice around 1848 disappeared after a very short life, nor did the Catholic Church offer much guidance till Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* was published in 1891. ✓ *Why Rel. 1. on*

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6. THE REIGN OF THE BOURGEOISIE

The advent of the bourgeoisie to political power and social supremacy is one of the most striking features of 19th century history. The existence of a bourgeois class, devoted to trade and commerce, was of course no new thing. Ever since the cessation of the barbarian invasions of the Dark Ages and the revival of city life from the 11th century onwards, the so-called "middle classes" had taken an increasing share in the life of Western Europe. Their original appearance implied that society had emerged from the primitive and stationary stage of local self-sufficiency and that the peoples who comprised that society had become dependent on one another for the satisfaction of their needs. An agricultural peasant community will grow its own food, and live of its own in total disregard of the outside world: in such a middle class has no place. But if the standard of culture rises and an added sense of security enables large masses of men to settle in towns where life is more complex and tastes more expensive, a group of middle men will inevitably arise who will undertake to supply at a profit the citizen's requirements in exchange for money or other commodities. Such conditions developed in the West at the time of the Crusades and even before, and the merchant and trader, the shipowner and money-dealer, duly arrived.

They were viewed at first with dislike and contempt. A society consisting mainly of priests and nobles and peasant serfs not unnaturally despised a man who worked solely for money, and tolerated him only as a necessary evil. Theologians gravely doubted his capacity for attaining salvation, and Church Councils legislated against usury. Yet the merchant, though universally condemned, made his way successfully, since the advance of civilization, the growth of trade and the discovery of fresh markets increased the demand for his services. The fine old Gothic guildhalls, cloth-halls, hôtels de ville and the market-places of the great medieval cities attest his rising influence; the feudal lord gradually lost control over the towns which had grown up as part of his estate or manor, and municipal charters of liberty, granted by or extorted from kings and barons, allowed the "men of business" to manage their own affairs within the city walls. Some towns in the busiest and wealthiest countries like Flanders and North Italy took violently to politics and defied for a time the authority of prince and noble. But these precocious movements of urban republicanism were in the main ill-organized and doomed to failure; the wealthy burghesses themselves grew alarmed at the growing class-consciousness of the peasants and artisans as expressed in the French Jacquerie, the Peasant's Revolt in England, the risings of the Flemish democrats and the popular revolutions in the Italian city states, and were willing to make common cause with king and noble against the servile class. In the 15th century merchants like William Cannyng in England, financiers like Jacques Coeur in France and the Fuggers in Germany, are in close alliance with the new national monarchies, and the great geographical discoveries of the 16th century, which open up a vast field for

profitable trade and enormously increase the supply of liquid capital, leave the bourgeoisie little leisure for politics. If the State is reasonably well administered, they are not disposed to criticise it.

Nevertheless, from the 17th century onwards, feudal and aristocratic ideals perceptibly weaken in face of the bourgeois advance and the way is prepared for the ultimate conquest of the State by the middle classes. The victory of the Dutch commercial oligarchy over the "baroque" culture of Catholic Spain marks the turn of the tide, for through the Dutch, bourgeois ideals began to penetrate the inner life of north-western Europe. The wealth of the Dutch Republic, its naval power, its success in the colonial sphere, the striking contrast between the poverty of an exhausted Spain and the parvenu prosperity of its rebel provinces, attracted universal attention to the methods whereby Holland's merchants and traders had acquired their riches. Amsterdam succeeded Antwerp as the commercial entrepôt of Europe. The Bank of Amsterdam, the prototype of all modern financial houses, was established in 1604: the credit system perfected by the Dutch was introduced into England in the reign of Dutch William, when the Bank of England was founded in 1694 by a group of rich London merchants who agreed to lend money to the government at a high rate of interest on the security of the national revenue. A few years later John Law started a similar bank in France, which attempted to work with notes and paper securities but was ruined by the orgy of speculation it provoked. The discovery of the method of book-keeping by double entry gave added scope to financial transactions. The welcome which Holland gave to the Jews expelled from Spain and Portugal goes far, in Sombart's opinion, to explain the prosperity of the Republic, for the Jews had had centuries' experience as money-dealers and they soon obtained admittance to the stock exchange, where they had a free hand to try out methods hitherto practised in the obscurity of the ghetto. It is noteworthy that the Jews were re-admitted into England by Cromwell, and that the influence of the City of London, which fought the Stuarts and supported William of Orange and the Hanoverians, dates from the later 17th century. The Calvinists of Holland, the Puritans of England and the American colonies, and the Huguenots of France showed a special aptitude for business, a fact which Weber explains on the ground that they did not share the Catholic medieval distrust of riches but based their economic ethics on the Old Testament where industry, thrift and frugality are extolled and wealth, far from being something to be ashamed of, is often regarded as a sure sign of divine approval and a reward of piety and virtue.

Whatever might be the share of Jews and Calvinists in the creation of modern capitalism, there is no doubt that the bourgeois spirit waxed strong throughout the 18th century. Trade ceased to be regarded as a profession unworthy of a gentleman. In countries where the national life was still dominated by Catholic ideals, such as Spain and Italy, the old suspicion of the banker and entrepreneur survived, but in France, already partly secularized by the free-thinking philosophy of the Enlightenment, and in the Protestant North new economic ideas gained a wide hearing.

Was this not the age of Adam Smith and Benjamin Franklin? In England one great political party—the Whigs—maintained a close intimacy with the commercial and financial interests, and the landed gentry made little demur at admitting colonial planters and India merchants to their ranks. In France, class distinctions were more rigid and the bourgeois was frequently spurned as an inferior by a haughty duke: nonetheless, high posts in the civil service were held by men of non-aristocratic origin, the writings of the *philosophes* were studied more attentively by the middle classes than by the nobility, and the economic rationalism of the Physiocrats made a special appeal to those who were already irritated at the confused and wasteful inefficiency, from the point of view of a city business man, of a decadent feudal society. Adam Smith had already announced that the true wealth of nations consists not of money but of manufactures, and that industry could flourish only if free from government restrictions. If the State persisted in its interference with the economic life of the nation, it must be remodelled on bourgeois lines.

The Revolution destroyed for ever the monarchical and aristocratic tradition that had descended from the Middle Ages, and gave to the Third Estate power to direct politics and society to their liking. The "bourgeoisization" of European culture proceeded apace. All distinction between noble and bourgeois was abolished: the feudal system of clearly marked class divisions was at an end. The guilds and corporations disappeared. The enormous transfer of landed property from Crown, nobility and Church strengthened the economic hold of the bourgeoisie over society. Serfdom was abolished with the result that labour was set free to gravitate from the country to the towns: the ex-serf in many cases speedily became a factory slave, a wage-earner, a proletarian. The Jews were emancipated from the ghetto and granted full civil rights: their emergence into freedom was speedily followed by the establishment all over Europe of the financial dictatorship of the Rothschilds, who internationalized the stock exchange and enormously expanded the share-market by the lavish issue of bonds on behalf both of governments and private companies. The money power was now king: princes and statesmen from Napoleon to Bismarck were compelled to accept its terms, and it was remarked as a significant innovation when in 1818 at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle a conference of bankers appeared side by side with the sovereigns and diplomats. The rapid development of industry in England after 1800 and in France after 1830 placed a further weapon in the hands of the financiers, for they alone had access to the capital necessary to finance the new enterprises made possible by the mechanical inventions of the later 18th century.

The bourgeois conquest of the State took place first in England and France and may be said to have been almost completed there by 1850. In the United States the Northern industrialists did not acquire predominance until the overthrow of the planter aristocracy of the South in the Civil War of 1861-65; in Germany the middle classes had little influence until after 1870, and in the agricultural and backward countries of Eastern Europe the bourgeoisie had made little impression on a semi-feudal

society of landowners and peasants even by 1900. But the aristocracy was throughout the 19th century fighting a losing battle against the once despised merchant and money-dealer, and bourgeois standards of life and conduct were spreading steadily in Europe and America until in the 20th century they seemed likely to become universal. The priest and the noble, the poet and the artist, strove in vain against the irresistible tide: a way of life that had once been confined to the narrow walls of a medieval town was in process of being adopted, consciously or unconsciously, by almost every race and class of mankind. So rapid and complete a social revolution would seem to be unparalleled in the history of the world.

England and France led the way in the transition from an aristocratic to a bourgeois social order, but the tempo of the change was different in the two countries. In France a violent revolution had overthrown the feudalism of the old régime and brought the inexperienced Third Estate to sudden and unlimited power. The danger of further revolution from below, of an uprising of the propertyless masses, though not entirely averted, was neutralized after some difficulty, and Napoleon's despotism was to some extent accepted as a guarantee against either the restoration of the old order or an egalitarian communism of the type preached by Babeuf. When the Emperor's fall became inevitable, the bourgeoisie demanded a solemn and legal assurance that the privileges they had won by the Revolution should not be revoked, and on their demands being satisfied in Louis XVIII's Charter, they accepted, though distrustfully and without enthusiasm, the return of the Bourbons. So long as the king and the émigré priests and nobles accepted the position and made no effort to recover their former powers, the Restoration was safe. But at the first sign of a tampering with the Charter and a threatened return to pre-1789 conditions, the middle classes revolted and the result was the revolution of 1830, which drove the Bourbons from France for ever and expelled clergy and aristocracy from political life. After 1830 the bourgeoisie were masters of France, and except for a few brief periods, such as in 1848 and 1871, the government never passed from their hands. During the reign of Louis Philippe the financiers and industrialists turned the State into a kind of gigantic company run for their especial benefit. Karl Marx declared bitterly that the July Monarchy was "a stock company for the exploitation of France's national wealth, whose dividends were divided among ministers, chambers, 240,000 electors and their following and Louis Philippe was their director".¹ The fury of the starving workmen and factory hands at this state of affairs produced the democratic revolution of 1848 and the socialistic experiments of the Second Republic, but the *coup d'état* of Louis Napoleon in 1851 permitted the return of the speculators and stockjobbers, and the Second Empire was, on the economic side, little but an orgy of money-making. A second and more savage protest of the masses was made in the Commune of 1871, but the Third Republic was finally established on lines not differing very materially from those of the Orleans Monarchy, and the succession of

¹ Quoted by B. Croce, *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century* (Eng. tr. 1934), p.162.

financial scandals that marked its course indicated only too clearly who were the real directors of French policy.

England experienced a more peaceful and unexciting solution. Her social institutions were more flexible ; her aristocracy, unlike the French, never formed a closed caste and possessed an immense fund of political talent and experience, and the middle classes were admitted only by slow degrees to share in political life, so that by the time the process was completed something like a fusion of the classes had been accomplished and the peerage contained a large proportion of men of bourgeois origin. Between 1688 and 1832 England possessed a purely aristocratic constitution ; the king's powers were severely curtailed, the mass of the nation was disfranchised, and the government was conducted by a small group of wealthy families. The democratic propaganda of the late 18th century, the anti-aristocratic sentiment diffused by the French Revolution, the increasing wealth and influence of the manufacturing classes in the cotton towns of the North, combined to produce after the peace of 1815 an insistent demand for Parliamentary reform and the extension of the franchise. When that demand had become too strong to be ignored, it was grudgingly granted, and the Reform Act of 1832, passed in the midst of intense popular excitement and threatening revolution, removed the anomalies of the old system and gave the vote to the richer middle classes. Yet it would be a great error to imagine that the landed aristocracy which had so long monopolized political power thereby received its death-blow. Though Lord Brougham in 1831 might declare that " the people," whom he significantly defined as " the middle classes, the wealth and intelligence of the country, the glory of the British name," had now come into their own, and though Major Pendennis about 1850 might lament the passing of " the breed " and its supersession by " a crowd of damned cotton spinners and utilitarians," the fact remains that the old aristocracy retained a surprising vigour down to the end of the century. The pictures of rural life in mid-Victorian England preserved for us in the novels of Trollope and Surtees, with their fox-hunting peers and squires, show very clearly that " the breed " was far from being extinct. Down to 1900 the majority of Cabinet Ministers were members of the House of Lords, no matter which party was in power. It was not until 1911 that the Upper House was deprived of the right of vetoing bills passed by the people's representatives in the Commons, and not until 1923 was a peerage considered a disqualification for the premiership.

Thus it may be said that the bourgeoisie won a less complete victory in England than in France. Intermarriage between the rich industrialist families and the holders of ancient titles blurred to a large extent the distinction of classes. It is true that this distinction was frequently supposed to be reflected in the party divisions of Conservatives and Liberals, as the Tories and Whigs renamed themselves after 1832. Yet the leader of the defeated Tory aristocracy in the Reformed Parliament was Sir Robert Peel, the son of a wealthy cotton manufacturer from Lancashire, who, taught by the lessons of 1832, made it clear in his Tamworth manifesto of 1835 that his party would not oppose reasonable

change and would "conserve" existing institutions provided only they were free from serious abuse. Twice Peel carried the Tories much further than they were prepared to go, once in 1829, when he forced through Catholic emancipation in face of the opposition of the Established Church in order to prevent a rebellion in Ireland, and again in 1846, when he repealed the Corn Laws, passed in 1815 in the interests of the Tory landowners, at the behest of those two typical representatives of the English bourgeoisie, Cobden and Bright. On both occasions he split his party, but his successor Disraeli, a Jew of plebeian origin, pursued a still more daring policy by urging a union of the gentry and "the people" against the Liberal middle classes—"Tory democracy". In no other country would a manufacturer and a Jew have become successively leader of the party of the landed aristocracy.

Yet whether the transitions from feudalism to industrialism was slow or rapid, whether the old nobility were abruptly deprived of their influence as in France, or yielded only gradually to bourgeois pressure as in England, a new spirit entered Western civilisation and was destined to transform it almost out of recognition. Not only was there a shifting of the economic basis of society from agriculture to industry; there was also a radical change in the political, social and cultural life of Europe which is responsible for most of the unrest of our contemporary civilization. The typical 19th century bourgeois believed in a good many things which the men of the old régime would have considered fantastic and pernicious: he believed in political democracy and representative government, in free trade and *laissez-faire*, in popular education and equal opportunity for all. His creed, in fact, is simply that of Liberalism, and the whole history of the age shows that Liberal politics go hand in hand with a capitalist economy. The bourgeois distrusted governments because the State had long been controlled by his aristocratic opponents; he believed that State interference hampered industry and reduced profits, and that the business of the law was merely to protect property. He gave a qualified approval to democracy because it destroyed the arbitrary intervention of despotic monarchs and levelled class barriers to the detriment of the nobility. He disliked tariffs (if he was an Englishman) because they prevented him selling his goods to foreign countries. He wanted increased facilities for education because he felt it was right that his sons should have the same cultural training as the sons of the nobility. He had little use for religion except on Sundays, when it was necessary to set an example to the lower classes. He despised poets and mystics because they seemed hopelessly irrational and unpractical and lived perpetually in the clouds, and works of art were incomprehensible to him unless translated into terms of money. He was the complete philistine—the type so mercilessly flayed in Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* (1869), and satirized by the intellectuals ever since.

The political and economic background of the new urban industrial scene had been painted in by Adam Smith and the "Philosophical Radicals" led by Bentham and the Mills. The former had shown to

the satisfaction of his contemporaries that national prosperity depended upon the removal of all government restrictions on trade, upon "the free play of economic forces," and since most men are actuated by motives of "enlightened self-interest," the manufacturing classes, when left at liberty to do as they pleased, would naturally follow the course most advantageous to themselves, and this course would also be that most advantageous to the community as a whole. Smith, a complacent and common-sense man of the 18th century, inherited to the full that age's belief in the rationality of the average man: his propositions seemed at the time self-evident. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the political philosopher of Liberalism, was a man of similar cast of thought. A true son of the Enlightenment—as a young man he had lived some time in France and frequented the salons of the *philosophes*—he was persuaded that men are everywhere fundamentally the same, are invariably guided by rational considerations, always seek pleasure and avoid pain, and can be transformed into perfect citizens by education and good laws. In the light of these principles he waged a lifelong war on *class* privilege, State absolutism, and all social, religious and legal restrictions on the individual, and may be said to have laid the practical, as Rousseau laid the spiritual, foundations of modern democracy. To a large extent he borrowed from the Whig defenders of the principles of 1688. The insistence on individual liberty—freedom of the press, religious toleration, security against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment—was of course derived from Locke. But in place of the old assumptions of "natural rights", Bentham introduced the "pleasure-pain" calculus, which he took chiefly from Helvétius and which was crystallized in the famous formula "The greatest happiness of the greatest number". Bentham's hedonism was neither original nor philosophically sound: the idea that every man before committing an action, carefully estimates the relative amount of pleasure or pain that he will derive from it and acts accordingly, is simply fatuous. The man who could deny that there was any difference in the quality of pleasure experienced and could roundly declare that "push-pin was as good as poetry" laid himself open to the obvious retort made by his own disciple John Stuart Mill: "Better be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied." But though his psychology was pitiable, his schemes of practical reform were sometimes admirable, and to his influence may be ascribed the gradual abolition of the cruel, barbarous and class-ridden code of 18th century England by the Radicals and Liberals of the Victorian age who revered him as their master.

If Bentham was concerned mainly with law reform, his friend and fellow radical James Mill was interested chiefly in educational reform. Since the days of Diderot and Condorcet the education of the people had been one of the main planks in the Liberal programme: with the Encyclopedists the main object was to get the young out of the control of the hated Church, to which end they insisted that priests should be deprived of the right to teach in schools and that secular subjects alone should figure in the curriculum. The French Revolution did indeed suppress the old academies and schools and introduce secularised edu-

cation, and though the Bourbon Restoration did much to restore clerical influence, the Liberal and anti-clerical ideal of free, compulsory and lay schooling gained ascendancy on the Continent. Religion disappeared from the State schools, and the teaching establishments of the religious orders, though usually tolerated, led rather a precarious existence. In England the same tendency, though in a less crude form, was at work; Bentham and Mill secured the founding in 1825 of the "godless" University of London, the Reformed Parliament in 1833 undertook the State control of elementary education by founding a number of "undenominational" schools where no definite creed was to be taught, and Gladstone in 1870 established a national system of elementary instruction and abolished religious tests at the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, hitherto strongholds of Anglicanism. The 19th century Radical was obsessed with the idea that popular education would rapidly destroy ignorance and superstition, and that when everyone had been taught to read and write, democracy, liberty, and enlightenment would be safe against all attack. No one held this belief with more childlike faith than James Mill, who taught his own son Greek at three and took him through a course of psychology and political economy at eight. When man was regarded essentially as a rational being there was something to hope for: but, as Bertrand Russell remarks, this was before the days of Freud and advertising propaganda.

Yet when we have done full justice to the Philosophical Radicals and their Continental counterparts, when we have acknowledged the services they rendered to liberty and to the individual we must admit that they shared the weaknesses of the bourgeois class from which they sprang: its narrow outlook, its cold rationalism, its lack of culture, its worship of material prosperity and worldly success, its contempt for so many of the finer values of human existence. Bourgeois civilization, for all its outward glitter, lacked the vitality, the rich savour, and even perhaps the spirituality of the old culture it had overthrown. It had vulgarized society. It created a new aristocracy of wealth in place of the old aristocracy of birth and erected money into an absolute value. A man of the bourgeois age no longer valued a thing for its intrinsic worth: he saw everything in terms of its exchange value only. Quantity meant more to him than quality. To compare the bourgeois society with the aristocratic society which preceded it is to realise that something vital has gone out. There was often something noble about the knight and the monk: there is nothing noble about the banker and the stockbroker. Even the very fashions in dress tell the difference: to compare the powdered wig, the cloak and knee-breeches with the stove-pipe hat, black frock-coat and neatly folded umbrella, is to measure the distance we have travelled. The bourgeois had no eye or ear for beauty: in Victorian England art and architecture suffered a decline so serious that it has been said "that from 1830 to 1890 there is not a book, a piece of furniture, a pattern in textiles, a cup or saucer of new design which deserves a place, except as a historical curiosity, in a museum of art".¹

¹ Lewis Mumford in *Whither Mankind?* (ed. C. Beard, 1928), p.290.

The satirist did not exaggerate much when he made the Utilitarian ask "What is the use of a nightingale unless roasted? What profit is there in the fragrance of a rose, unless you can distil from it an otto at ten shillings a drop?" Nor was justice altogether lacking in Treitschke's malicious jibe at Cobden as "a man who thought that the cheap production of cotton and quick journeys for commercial travellers were the supreme aims of civilization".¹ The smoky factories surrounded by the inevitable slums, the vain protests of Ruskin and William Morris, the popularity of writers like Samuel Smiles and Martin Tupper, the feverish excitement of the stock exchange or the wheat-pit, the development of a brutalized urban proletariat side by side of the rich plutocracy—all these distinctive features of bourgeois civilization have their peculiar significance.

The bourgeois, says Nicholas Berdyaev, is a man of peculiar soullessness: everything he touches is deadened. His victory is the victory of mediocrity: his passion for organization means the transition from the organic to the organized life, with the necessary result that culture is arrested, paralyzed, as it were embalmed and rendered incapable of further development. "Is it not dreadful and humiliating," cried the Russian poet Leontiev, "to think that Moses went up to Sinai, the Greeks built their lovely temples, the Romans waged their Punic wars, Alexander, that handsome genius in a plumed helmet, fought his battles, apostles preached, martyrs suffered, poets sang, artists painted, knights shone at tournaments—only that some French, German or Russian bourgeois garbed in unsightly and absurd clothes should enjoy life 'individually' or 'collectively' on the ruins of all this vanished splendour?"² We may dismiss such lamentations as the unimportant outpourings of reactionary dreamers, striving vainly against the spirit of the age, but the question remains whether the rejection of eternity and the concentration on earthly comforts, the spurning of asceticism and the pursuit of riches, is a gain or a loss to our civilization.

¹ When Cobden visited Rome, he is said to have remarked that the only things worth preserving of its ancient monuments were the aqueducts.

² Quoted by Berdyaev, *The Bourgeois Mind* (Eng. tr. 1934), p. 12.

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NATIONALIST DEMOCRACY

I. RACE AND NATION

THE bourgeois civilization of 19th century Europe and America repels us by its blatant materialism and its avaricious selfishness. It would seem to stand self-condemned as fundamentally ignoble. But no age is altogether destitute of ideals and spiritual aspirations ; the human soul is ever seeking nourishment, and if the ancient religions which have long provided that nourishment are undermined and weakened by hostile influences, it will be forced to turn elsewhere to satisfy its craving. The ideals embodied by the French Revolution captured the emotions of millions : for a time it seemed that Liberalism, with its worship of liberty and democracy, would become the religion of the 19th century. But its ideas were too abstract, its defects too obvious, its appeal too limited, and it never obtained a thorough grasp on the popular imagination. Its place was steadily usurped by what may be called its bastard child—Nationalism. As Liberalism receded, Nationalism advanced. Almost every victory won by Liberalism in the end played into the hands of its offspring and rival. At last Nationalism, triumphant in one contest after the other, captured the loyalty of the masses, was accepted as the new god, and repudiated and slew its own parent.

Nationalism is a purely modern phenomenon, which has no real counterpart in ancient or medieval tribes. Loyalty to the tribe or clan was doubtless a prominent feature of prehistoric society, as indeed it is of backward peoples today : but the tribe is not a nation. The earliest conscious " patriotism " of which we have historical record would seem to have been civic and purely local : the feeling which animated the men of Ur and Lagash, of Athens and Sparta, of Tyre and Carthage. The conquest of many different tribes and people in varying stages of civilization, effected by the great military empires of Assyria, Persia, Macedon and Rome, created that broad and tolerant cosmopolitanism that reached its fullest development under the world-rule of the Caesars. All races, all creeds, all philosophies, were placed on an equal footing, and a freeman anywhere between Scotland and the Persian Gulf could claim the rights and privileges of a Roman citizen. The Hellenistic and the Roman Empires were held together largely by a religious bond ; Alexander had first introduced into Europe the conception of sacred monarchy, which he borrowed from the vanquished Persian " King of Kings", and for some six centuries (300 B.C.—300 A.D.) the deified Emperor was the living embodiment of the World State. The destruction of the Roman power in the West by the Teutonic peoples from beyond the Rhine and Danube meant the end of political unity, but the Church preserved the spiritual and cultural homogeneity of Latin Christendom,

and throughout the medieval period Europe was united by a common religious organization and a common fund of ideas. Sometime after 1000 A.D. we notice signs of disruption. Christianity had introduced into the world a sharp distinction between the spiritual and the temporal, unknown to antiquity, where the king was both secular ruler and high priest, and the perpetual clashes between Pope and Emperor compelled men to attempt to demarcate the limits of Church and State. The various dialects of Latin for geographical and other reasons, crystallized into Italian, French, Provençal, Castilian, Portuguese, etc., and the development of vernacular languages helped to intensify the self-consciousness of the groups that used them. As feudalism, having served its purpose in providing a political and social system when society was threatened with universal breakdown in the Dark Ages, began to decline, the authority of the king increased; he was enabled to check the process of decentralisation and to present effective challenges to the power of the Church and the baronage. From the 15th century onwards strongly unified States are in existence in England, France, Spain and elsewhere, but they have been created by the king and his servants, the people have been his passive instruments. The Reformation shattered the single-Church organization which had come down through the Middle Ages: the revolt from Rome gave birth to "national" churches dependent on the king or prince. There is no longer one dominant church in Western Europe, but there is still a dominant class—the aristocracy—which possesses a common education and outlook and level of culture and which sets the tone of society, so that a certain measure of unity is still preserved. The 18th century is, in fact, remarkably cosmopolitan and free from national prejudices: Voltaire and Montesquieu, Herder and Goethe, Hume and Gibbon, are all "good Europeans" who moved freely from country to country, citizens of an invisible republic embracing the gentlemen and men of letters of the whole Continent. French fashions are eagerly adopted in Madrid and Moscow, English customs are imitated in Paris, and the greatest German ruler of the age spends much of his leisure time composing French verse. Then came 1789: the aristocratic supremacy vanished at a blow, and with it that happy and peaceful cosmopolitanism which now appears in retrospect one of the best features of the pre-revolutionary era.

Nationalism, as we understand it, was born of the French Revolution: this explains its long connection with the Liberal democratic movement. Patriotism had long existed, but not nationalism. There had been the Italian patriotism of Machiavelli, the Spanish patriotism of the conquistadors and the heroes of Lepanto, the patriotism of the French peasants who in 1709 responded so nobly to Louis XIV's appeal for a last desperate effort to drive the foreign invader off the sacred soil of France, the patriotism of the London mob of George II's day who expressed its hatred of the French enemy by shouting against "popery and wooden shoes", vaunting the liberty of "the freeborn Englishman", and singing the recently composed "Rule Britannia!" But though there was much talk throughout the 17th century of France's right to

her "natural frontiers" of the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees, and though an intense loyalty to the king or prince as the very personification of the State Louis XIV's "*L'Etat c'est moi*" was common to almost every country in Europe, two elements were wanting for the creation of the full national ideal: first, the belief that the people themselves were the depository of sovereign authority and the source of all law, and secondly, the belief that all self-conscious social groups, which could with any show of reason describe themselves as "nations," had a right to self-government. These two elements were supplied by the Revolution.

This brings us to the intensely difficult question of what constitutes a nation. The error that "nation" can be equated with "race" was exposed more than fifty years ago by men like Renan and Max Muller, yet it persists today and is being continually propagated by politicians and publicists. It is surely clear, that with the possible exception of the Eskimos of the Arctic Circle, no pure race exists anywhere in the world. Every nation has been formed from different racial stocks. The British people, for instance, are a blend of a primitive "Mediterranean race", upon which were superimposed three successive layers of Celtic-speaking Nordics (Goidels, Brythons and Belgae) and three successive layers of Teutonic-speaking Nordics (Saxons, Danes and Normans). Nor can community of language or religion be accepted as a criterion. A conquered people will often adopt the language of their conquerors—the Gauls learnt to speak Latin, the Irish learnt to speak English—and will yet preserve their individuality. A nation like Switzerland, where three, if not four, languages are spoken, and where two religions (Catholic and Protestant) divide the allegiance of the country, is inexplicable in such terms. "Community of interests" tells us nothing: it would make the Hanseatic League a nation. Geography will frequently afford us a clue to the limits of a nation, but it will not explain it. We are forced to admit with Renan that a nation is a spiritual principle, or as Ernest Barker puts it, "A nation is not the physical fact of one blood, but the mental fact of one tradition—a fund of common thoughts and common sentiments acquired by historic effort and backed by a common will to live resolutely in their strength."¹

National consciousness, in this sense, hardly existed or at least was inarticulate and incapable of expression before 1789. A man's loyalty was given to his prince or to his particular locality; the term "nation" conveyed little to him. In France, it has been said, "*'pays'* was more fundamental than '*patrie*'". The Frenchman still thought of himself as a Gascon, Norman, Burgundian or Provençal: local patriotism was immensely strong. Even in England there was an active dislike of the Scotch as late as Dr. Johnson's time, while Cornishmen were considered almost as foreigners, a fact illustrated by the survival of the old Cornish language (a Celtic dialect) down to the end of the 18th century. If such conditions existed in countries which had been politically unified

¹ *National Character* (1927), p. 12. Cf. Renan, *Qu'est ce-qu'une Nation?* (1882), and Carlton Hayes's *Essays in Nationalism* (1926).

for centuries, how much weaker must national feeling have been in Germany and Italy and among the Christian peoples in the Balkans, where political disunity or foreign rule had existed for ages? The allegiance of the German or Italian was bestowed on his city or province: he was first and foremost a Florentine or a Venetian, a Saxon or a Swabian. "‘Vaterland’ almost invariably meant one’s own particular State; other parts of Germany were referred to as ‘foreign parts’ (Ausland) ”¹. Patriotism was even regarded by men like Lessing, Goethe and Schiller as a mark of barbarism of which they rejoiced to be rid.

Upon this broad and tolerant cosmopolitan society burst the storm of the French Revolution. The doctrine of the sovereignty of the people produced a magical effect. It transferred to the nation as a whole the loyalty that had formerly been directed towards the King. The abolition of class distinctions and titles of nobility, the levelling of all individuals to the general rank of "citizen", the diffusion of sentiments of fraternity and of the feeling that "the people" should make common cause against "tyrants" everywhere, all contributed to create an intense consciousness of nationality. Even before the fall of the Monarchy this tendency was manifest. The abolition by the National Assembly of the old historic provinces of France (Brittany, Normandy, Burgundy, Champagne, etc.), the annexation of Avignon, the erection of "The Altar of the Fatherland" in the Champ de Mars, and the invention of the tricolour flag, were important steps towards the creation of the Nation-State. With the establishment of the democratic Republic, "one and indivisible," and the opening of the war against the European monarchies in defence of the Revolution, the process was accelerated. The King had gone, the people were now sovereign indeed: the Marseillaise, the first great national hymn, proclaimed all Frenchmen to be "enfants de la Patrie". France had become "a nation in arms", as the revolutionary orators put it: her mission was "to liberate all peoples struggling against oppression", and by a curious fate, the outburst of democratic nationalism in France coincided with the destruction of Poland by the three Eastern despotisms. The cynical contempt of international decencies displayed by this lawless act furnished the revolutionaries with a splendid theme for denunciations of the wickedness of kings and impassioned harangues on the sacred rights of nationalities. Poland continued to provide for over a hundred years a striking example of a people of ancient culture and traditions deprived of their independence and parcelled out among foreigners. The partitions first gave the Polish people their national consciousness. We may say of Poland that she never thought of herself as a nation until she had ceased to exist as a State.

Thus France in the West and Poland in the East created between them, in very different circumstances, the conception of nationhood. The armies of the Republic proceeded to annex all conquered territories racially and culturally akin to France, such as Belgium and Savoy,

¹ W. H. Bruford, *Germany in the Eighteenth Century* (1935), p. 297.

and to set up in all other countries traversed by them republican and democratic régimes allied to France by the closest political ties. A federation of European republics with France at its head was probably the ultimate aim. This notion was borrowed by Napoleon, for whom, however, the end was World Monarchy with himself as universal Caesar. But the spirit of nationalism, once released, could not be imprisoned again in a new Roman Empire. It broke out first in Spain, a country intensely proud of its ancient greatness, then in Russia, in Germany, in Italy, and indeed almost everywhere in Europe. Not without reason was Leipzig in 1813 called "the Battle of the Nations". The French were overthrown by the genie they themselves had conjured up.

The years between 1815 and 1870 may be called the period of Liberal nationalism. It was the age of Mazzini and "Young Europe", of Garibaldi and the Risorgimento, of the renaissance of the Slavonic peoples of the East, of the heroic struggles of Poland against Russian domination, of the re-awakening of the Christian races in the Turkish Empire. Because of its intimate connections with the French Revolution, nationalism was adopted by Liberals and progressives everywhere, and as a consequence, the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, which received the blessings of the democrats, were more often movements for national independence or at least self-government than for constitutional liberty. In these years the rights of nationalities were championed by almost every school of thought in Europe. Liberals applauded the desire of the people to win their freedom both from domestic tyrants and foreign oppressors. The Romantics were stirred by the memory of Byron's death at Missolonghi in the Greek War of Independence, and poets and dramatists from Victor Hugo downwards greeted Poles and Italians, Slavs and Hungarians, as heroes grappling with Tsars and despots in the sacred cause of liberty. Catholics followed with sympathy the struggle of their co-religionists in Ireland, Belgium and Poland to emancipate themselves from alien rule. Free traders believed that, once the multi-national absolute monarchies were destroyed, a federation of free and independent Nation-States would establish a system of the fullest economic co-operation, which would do away with tariff barriers and trade monopolies, permit the free export and import of food, capital, raw material and manufactured goods, and thus stimulate the production and increase the prosperity of the world.

No man was more certain that nationalism made for peace and happiness and the betterment of the human race than Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), and no man did more to invest that cause with a halo of religious sanctity. A radical journalist from Genoa, he grew to maturity in the dark years when the Holy Alliance was governing Europe and the Austrian yoke was riveted firmly on his beloved Italy. The invasion of the revolutionary armies, the overthrowing of the decadent régimes of the petty princes and dukes, and the creation of the Napoleon kingdom of Italy had given the Italian intellectuals a glimpse of a strong and united fatherland, but the fall of Napoleon, instead of winning them their freedom, merely restored the pre-revolutionary conditions and, in fact,

strengthened the hold the Hapsburgs had had on Italy ever since 1748. As Italy, unlike France, possessed no Charter, the Liberal movement could operate only in secret and underground channels. The famous secret society of the Carbonari was founded soon after 1815 and took a leading part in the anti-Austrian military revolts of 1820. The failure of these outbreaks, while increasing Italian hatred of Austria, probably led Mazzini to abandon the Carbonari which he had joined as a boy, and to found about 1830 the first of the modern "Youth Movements", which have become so familiar to the modern world. "Young Italy" was to be an association appealing to the idealism and heroism of the hot-headed and rather flamboyant Romantics of that day, and working for the re-establishment of Italy as a nation worthy of her past heritage.¹ "We are a people," cried Mazzini, "who have twice given to humanity a tie, a watchword of unity—once in the Rome of the Emperors, again, ere they had betrayed their mission, in the Rome of the Popes. Yet we have no flag, no political name, no rank among European nations." Mazzini was not a narrow nationalist of the swaggering militarist type: rather was he a seer and a mystic, an unpractical dreamer for ever hatching futile conspiracies, full of emotional religiosity, a utopian dreaming of a "Young Europe", a brotherhood of free, democratic republican states working for the common ends of civilization. He held that there were three stages of human progress: freedom of the individual, freedom of the nation, and freedom of the world, of mankind organized in a vast association of sister-republics. Three nations were to lead this movement: Italy for the Latin world, Germany for the Teutonic world, and Poland for the Slavonic world. The Italian Revolution was to free the nations as the French Revolution had freed the individual. These splendid hopes were never realized; the unification of Italy was achieved in a way Mazzini never contemplated and of which he did not approve, and the brotherhood of man, the federation of the world, remained a dream. But the pale, emaciated, sombre little man who skulked around the cafés and lodging houses of Victorian London had done more than anyone to spread the idea of nationality throughout the world: for good or ill, it rooted itself in the minds of millions.

Mazzinian nationalism was at its height between 1820 and 1848, and was stimulated by the extraordinary success of the Greek revolt against Turkey, which held the attention of the world throughout the 1820's. The victory of the Greeks, after ten years' fighting on land and sea, was complete, issuing as it did in the recognition of a sovereign independent Hellenic kingdom, and the struggle had so thrilled Europe that it was frequently overlooked that, but for the intervention of the military power of Russia and the naval power of England and France, the Turks would certainly have crushed the rebellion. At the other end of Europe it was observed that Irish nationalism, under the brilliant leadership of Daniel O'Connell, was strong enough to force Catholic emancipation on a reluctant English Government. Thus inspired, the

¹ No one over forty years of age was admitted: each member was given a pseudonym, a dagger a gun and fifty cartridges.

Belgians, Italians and Poles made a strenuous effort in 1830 to win their national independence. Only the Belgians succeeded, because their Dutch overlords were themselves relatively weak. France and England sympathised strongly with the rebels and were in a position to help them, while the influence of the Holy Alliance was at its strongest in Central and Eastern Europe, at its weakest in Western Europe. The Italians failed disastrously and somewhat ignominiously, but the Poles put up a heroic fight against the Russian giant and gave in only after suffering enormous losses. The years that followed saw the development of a strong nationalist propaganda, largely due to Mazzini's example and the encouragement of the victorious Liberals in the West. The Polish example produced a marked effect on the Czechs of Bohemia, who had been an integral part of the great Hapsburg Monarchy for over two hundred years, and the success of the Greeks and the Serbs against Turkey reacted on the Magyars in Hungary, who since Joseph II's day had chafed at the centralizing policy of their German rulers. The little Republic of Cracow, which was all that the Congress of Vienna had allowed to survive of the former Polish State, became a centre of lively agitation against Russia and Austria, and was as a consequence suppressed by those Powers in 1846. Meanwhile in Italy and Germany the Liberals and patriots kept their countries in a state of perpetual effervescence. The nationalist pot simmered, and then boiled over in 1848. The Italians revolted from the Alps to the Mediterranean and carried all their rulers with them. The Magyars proclaimed their independence. The Czechs set up a government of their own in Prague. The German Liberals called a national Parliament at Frankfurt to discuss plans for creating a united German Empire. Only the Poles, cowed by the fearful punishment meted out to them in 1831, remained quiescent.

1848 was the greatest effort ever made by revolutionary Liberalism. Yet though the tide of democratic nationalism seemed likely to sweep all before it, though thrones fell like ninepins and kings and emperors bowed before the storm, though Metternich fled and Mazzini found himself head of the Roman Republic, the movement failed. The nationalities quarrelled among themselves—a fact ominous for the future. The Austrian army, intensely loyal to the dynasty, remained uninfected by nationalist ideas. The Hapsburgs found themselves strong enough to suppress the Czechs and Italians, to humiliate Prussia and to re-establish their control over Germany. The Magyars, under Kossuth and Georgei, proved too hard a nut to crack: The Tsar Nicholas, fearful lest an independent Hungary should be followed by an independent Poland, offered his assistance, and the Russian troops pouring in through the Carpathians soon extinguished the Hungarian revolution. It was the last victory of the Holy Alliance.

From this time onwards the nationalist movement underwent a subtle change, which became more strongly marked after 1870. For some years nationalism indeed seemed a spent force. The defeats of 1849 had been a bad blow to the Liberals. Mazzini was once more an exile. The Second Republic in France had drawn attention to the grave social problems which

industrial capitalism was creating, and the revolutionary movement seemed like to be diverted from nationalism to socialism. Marx, who wrote his most important works in the 1850's, almost ignores the whole nationalist agitation and concentrates on the social and economic evils of the world. Mazzini joined the First International (founded in 1864), but left it when he found that it was different to the rights of nations and thought only of the rights of the proletariat. Italy, unable to win her freedom unaided, had to seek the support of France, and the war of 1859, which Cavour persuaded Napoleon III to undertake against Austria, prepared the way for the erection of a national Italian monarchy under the House of Savoy. The Poles, thinking that Napoleon would help them as he had helped the Italians, rebelled again in 1863 and were smashed completely.

But nationalism was not destroyed: it was merely changing its character and methods, ready to emerge a far more potent and terrifying thing than ever it had been in the days of 1830 and 1848. The steady drift towards democracy, the tendency to widen the electorate so as to include the workers and peasants as well as the propertied, professional classes, played a big part in this transformation. The history of the Second Republic in France had taught the conservative forces of Europe a striking lesson. This was that the mass of the people were not Liberal, and preferred government by a strong man when a suitable strong man was available. The French people had elected Louis Napoleon to the presidency, they acquiesced in the destruction of the Republican régime, and they voted enthusiastically for the Second Empire. To a political genius like Bismarck this seemed to mean that more democracy meant less Liberalism, that universal suffrage might easily lead, not to a régime of republican liberty, but to an absolute monarchy based on popular support. The favourite devices of Liberalism could be turned against the Liberals themselves. What was more, the nationalist movement might with a little skill and luck be captured for the conservative cause. Bismarck was brilliantly successful in both these aims. The intoxicating victories of 1864, 1866 and 1870, which sent Prussianized Germany to the leadership of Europe and humbled France to the dust, drove even the Liberal survivors of 1848 into the Bismarckian camp. The most hardened German revolutionary could find little to criticize in a régime which had made his nation the most feared and respected in Europe. The German Empire of 1871 was far different from that planned by the unfortunate debaters in the Vorparlement of 1848-49: it was an autocratic monarchy disguised under parliamentary forms, a unified State strongly militarist, protectionist, and anti-Liberal. Cavour's Italy failed to satisfy Mazzini: Bismarck's Germany must have satisfied him still less.

The amazing success of Bismarck thus explains why, after 1870, Liberalism waned while nationalism waxed stronger year by year. The Mazzinian dreams of universal brotherhood of federations of free and equal nationalities co-operating to preserve the peace and increase the prosperity of the world, gave place to the stern reality of the fierce racial rivalries, ruthless scrambles for overseas markets, international hatred

and tension, economic warfare, conscript armies, boastful imperialism, and blatant assertions of one nation's superiority to another. Everywhere Germany set the pace. Her armies, conscripted, trained and organized with Prussian efficiency on Clausewitzian lines, compelled every Great Power to keep millions of men under arms. The building of the German fleet, commenced in 1898, forced all the maritime nations to increase their naval forces, at the cost of adding a crushing burden to their budgets. Her ardent desire to obtain "a place in the sun," that is to possess a colonial empire that would compare not unfavourably with those of the older powers, produced a general rush for colonies in Africa, in Asia, in the Pacific and elsewhere, and stimulated the fierce competition of concession-hunters, land-speculators, diamond merchants, rubber producers and the like whose unscrupulous greed played no little part in bringing about the disaster of 1914. Her determination to build up powerful industries quickly and so catch up with the economic development of England led her to abandon free-trade in 1879 in favour of a high protective tariff: this was the signal for the general adoption of protectionism in Europe, and drove another nail into the Liberal coffin. Her historians and philosophers loudly declared the political, moral and intellectual superiority of the Germans over all the other peoples of the earth and so provoked rejoinders from all quarters. British, Americans, French, Italians, Russians lauded in turn their national virtues and poured contempt on the inferior foreigners. Pan-Germanism was soon rivalled by Pan-Slavism, Pan-Americanism, and even Pan-Turanism for the Turks and the half-barbarous tribes of Central Asia! Her scientists, adopting eagerly the evolutionary idea of Darwin, introduced the doctrine of "the survival of the fittest" into the political world, and the Germans learnt that in the struggle for national existence, young and vigorous nations like themselves survived while old and decadent nations like the French and British were doomed to destruction.

From 1880 onwards Imperialism was everywhere in the ascendant. Huge empires grew up overnight. The whole world seemed falling under the control of a group of "white" Powers: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United States. "Backward" and "coloured" races were conquered and subdued. Germany vaunted her superior "kultur", England passed through the period of late Victorian "jingoism" and dreamt of painting the whole map red, the Americans discovered that "manifest destiny" ordained their expansion from ocean to ocean, into Mexico, Cuba, the Philippines, the Russians resumed the drive on Constantinople, the Italians dreamt of a new Roman Empire. Trade followed the flag, and sometimes the flag followed trade. Everywhere peoples growing to political self-consciousness under the democratic urge enthusiastically hurried their governments into imperialist aggression and expansion. Public opinion under the influence of the cheap press and of universal compulsory education, was more vocal than ever before. Patriotism was taught in every school, the national policy was defended in almost every newspaper, and in Continental countries every able-bodied youth passed through a period of military training and was told to

hold himself in readiness for the hour in which he would be called upon to defend the fatherland against external foes. Communication between country and country had never been easier : railways, steamships, cables, telegraphs and aeroplanes annihilated distance but failed to render the peoples of the earth "internationally-minded". The more they saw and knew of each other the less they seemed to like each other. Racial propaganda increased in virulence. The theory that certain races are "higher" than others, that white men are superior to yellow men, that both are superior to black men, that fundamental inequalities exist even among white peoples, was first given a pseudo-scientific backing in the Comte de Gobineau's famous book *The Inequality of the Human Race* (1853), and reached its culmination in Houston Stewart Chamberlain's equally famous *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* (1899), in which the superiority of the Teuton to the "mongrel" peoples of Southern Europe was asserted in its most extravagant form. The intrusion into political phraseology of the term "Aryan", coined by philologists to designate the common ancestor of the group of languages which include Latin, Greek and Sanskrit and their modern derivatives, had mischievous consequences, since the word was given a racial connotation it was never intended to bear, and the myth of a primitive Aryan conquering race was let loose upon Europe.¹ Those who suffered most from it were the Jews who towards the close of the 19th century were subjected to new persecutions on the ground that the presence of these "nationless" Semites tarnished the purity of the Aryan stock. Anti-Semitism found expression in forms varying from the savage pogroms of Russia to the Dreyfus Affair which convulsed France for several feverish years and almost wrecked the Third Republic. Zionism was the natural reaction of the Jews to this racial vendetta.

Thus the gradual weakening of the religious sanctions of the past, and the exposure in practice of the defects of parliamentary democracy, resulted in the worship of the Nation, an intense veneration which far surpassed the old loyalty to the king or prince or to some particular form of government. By 1900 nationalism had become a world-wide phenomenon. Not only great European peoples like the Germans and Italians, but Asiatic races like the Chinese, Japanese and Indians, Moslem peoples like the Turks, Arabs, Persians and Egyptians, and small racial groups like the Basques, Flemings, Catalans, Irish, Estonians, Finns, and Icelanders, were all loudly demanding autonomy and creating national flags and national hymns. To some extent the movement resembled a reversion to primitive clan life : indeed Toynbee defines nationalism as the "sour ferment of the new wine of Democracy in the old bottles of Tribalism."² Religion had lost its grip ; the kings and aristocracies were gone, the people, who craved a religion, could worship only themselves, and like a true religion, nationalism, far from remaining confined to the political,

¹ "It was the sad fate of the scholarship of the 19th century that it invented two conceptions—that of the race and that of the language-group—which proved as explosive as any invention of the laboratory" (Barker, *National Character*, p.26).

² *A Study of History* (1934), vol. 1, p.9.

persisted in encroaching on the spiritual sphere and thus in claiming supremacy over all aspects of human life. Democracy and Liberalism had unconsciously created a tyrant that threatened to destroy the last remnants of human freedom.

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2. FROM METTERNICH TO BISMARCK

Nineteenth century Europe is dominated politically by two great Germans, Metternich and Bismarck. Between them comes the strange interlude of Napoleon III, who vainly endeavoured to strike a compromise between revolution and the counter-revolution, and to prevent the leadership of Europe from being transferred from France to Germany. The two Germans present striking points both of similarity and contrast. Both were defenders of conservatism against revolution, both were champions of the authoritarian principle against Liberalism, both set up monarchy and aristocracy against the levelling propensities of the democrats. But while Metternich was a man of the Catholic South, Bismarck was a man of the Protestant North, while the former relied on the ancient imperial tradition of the Hapsburgs, the latter substituted the brand new kingship of the Hohenzollerns. Metternich hated nationalism as much as he hated Liberalism, for both were fatal to the survival of the Austrian monarchy. Bismarck cleverly exploited nationalist sentiment in the interests of Prussian absolutism and drove Austria out of Germany. The fundamental difference between them is that Metternich failed while Bismarck succeeded. The Austrian Chancellor fought blindly against the tendencies of the age : the German Chancellor showed greater genius by forcing those very tendencies to serve his purpose. Liberalism triumphed over Metternich but succumbed to Bismarck.

Metternich was the less fortunate in that he was fated to deal with a young and vigorous revolutionary movement embodying political ideals whose weaknesses had not yet been fully revealed in practice. He was forced to defend a venerable and antiquated régime, upon which the dust of ages lay thick, against ardent spirits intoxicated by the new gospel of popular freedom, the rights of man, and national self-determination. It was not surprising that it proved a losing battle. For several years after 1815 he was able indeed to drive the revolutionary agitation underground by turning the Tsar Alexander's Holy Alliance into a kind of League of Autocracies, pledged to suppress Liberalism whenever it might appear above the surface. The dangerous outbreaks of 1820 were with some difficulty put down, but the Greek revolt from 1821 onwards, which Russia supported and which Metternich wished to treat merely as another revolutionary rising to be crushed by common action of the Powers, destroyed for a time the unity of the absolutist front. This division in their enemies' camp was the opportunity of the Liberals, who in 1830 won a series of startling victories. The Bourbons lost the throne of France and were replaced by the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe ; Belgium revolted against Holland, the Italians rose against Austria and the Poles against Russia. These last two insurrections tied the hands of Metternich and the Tsar, and prevented them from intervening against the revolutionaries in the West. The independence of Belgium and of Greece, the granting of constitutions in several of the smaller German States, and the successful

Anglo-French intervention in favour of Liberalism in Spain and Portugal, were so many blows struck at Metternich's system. The West was obviously lost to autocracy and legitimism, Central Europe was wavering, the dreaded revolution was moving steadily eastwards. The Polish rising at least had been crushed with pitiless severity, but the fact that a Great Power like France, the old centre of revolution, had gone over to Liberalism and that since the Reform Bill of 1832 the middle classes were in power in England, boded ill for the future.

Shaken by these defeats, the Chancellor could only concentrate on saving Austria's position in Germany and Italy, where unfortunately it was her fate to come into direct conflict with the rapidly growing demand for national unity and constitutional liberty. In no other countries, except for the land of its origin, had the French Revolution produced such an electrical effect. Politically disunited since the early Middle Ages, intimately connected with the representative institutions of medieval supra-nationalism—the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire—Germany and Italy had long been curiously amorphous entities, parcelled out into petty principalities at the mercy of stronger centralized Powers. The Emperors, ambitious of dominating the fair lands south of the Alps, neglected their German kingdom and allowed the local princes to attain virtual independence. The Popes, fearing lest a powerful dynasty in the peninsula should threaten their liberty as spiritual heads of Christendom, worked to keep Italy divided. In the days of the Emperor Maximilian and Ulrich von Hutten, of Machiavelli and the Medici, there seemed a chance that Germany and Italy might follow the example of France, Spain and England and acquire a unified government. But the Reformation and the Thirty Years' War disrupted the German body politic still further, while the military weakness and mutual jealousies of the Italian States allowed first Spain and then Austria to establish an overlordship that passed almost unchallenged until the 19th century.

Even in the last years of the Enlightenment slight stirrings of national consciousness became evident in both countries. Herder in Germany had put forth the doctrine of the *Volkseele*, the collective soul of a people; the Romantics turned youthful minds towards the old forgotten past of the Niebelungenlied and the Minnesinger and even of Woden and Thor, and Italian audiences in the 1770's and 1780's applauded fantically the poetic dramas of Alfieri (1749-1803), where "tyrants" were held up to execration and the glories of a "free government" were eloquently extolled. The Revolution, with its attacks on feudalism and clericalism, was warmly welcomed in Upper Italy and in the Rhineland, where the middle classes were strongest. The Republican armies and Napoleon after them swept away the old confusing mosaic of principalities with their petty princes and comic-opera little courts, abolished feudal law and introduced the civil code, administrative unity and economic freedom—reforms heartily approved by the bourgeoisie, denounced by the nobility and clergy, and viewed with indifference by the peasantry, who formed the bulk of the nation. The Napoleonic kingdom of Italy and the Confederation of the Rhine were but pale shadows of the mighty unified nations that were to

arise in the mid-19th century. German nationalism really dates from the fall of Prussia in 1806, which stung the people into a desperate revolt against the French conquerors, and found its prophet in Fichte (1762-1814), whose famous *Addresses to the German Nation*, delivered in Berlin in the dark days of 1807-08, though little heeded at the time, mark the opening of a new era. Fichte began as an individualist fascinated by Rousseau's teaching, became a Jacobin during the Revolution, and ended as a nationalist and the champion of a strong State which alone could rescue Germany from the humiliations inflicted on her by Napoleon's armies. As early as 1800 he had urged in his book *The Closed Commercial State* that Germany should become an economic unit, that internal customs should go and be replaced by a high tariff against all foreign goods. The disaster of Jena convinced him that individualism was helpless in face of attack and that the rooted particularism of Germany was responsible for his ignominious collapse. The *Addresses* were a passionate appeal for German unity, collective action and cultural rebirth. The Germans were to inaugurate a new epoch as pioneers and models for the rest of mankind. Sacrifices must be made for the Fatherland, even liberties that hinder effective State action must be surrendered. Already we see foreshadowed the great Reich of Bismarck and of Hitler.

Fichte's political teaching was carried a stage further by his great successor Hegel (1770-1831), through whom Greek influence, dating back to Lessing and Winckelmann, came to dominate German idealist thought, and his theory of the State bears obvious affinity to Plato's. The State is regarded as the culminating expression of social life, of which it is the highest form, and is considered as endowed with a personality which must issue in a visible head. Each nation is the distinct emanation of the Absolute, having its life and history to live by itself. It is significant that Hegel found his ideal not in any nebulous Holy Roman Empire or Germanic Confederation but in the Prussian Monarchy, the State par excellence—compact, unified, paternal, militarist. Hegel's philosophy which enjoyed a wide vogue in early 19th century Germany is, in its political aspect, so essentially conservative, monarchical, and anti-Liberal, that we should not perhaps be surprised at Bismarck's success in damming back the democratic stream and deflecting the nationalist movement into the courses of traditional autocracy.

The German War of Liberation of 1813 and the revolt of the Italians against Napoleon's rule encouraged the hopes of the Liberals. Great was the disillusion when at the general settlement of 1815 it was found that Prussia did not intend to grant the constitution that had been promised, that Austria was still to be permitted a predominating share in German affairs, and that Italy was to be disintegrated afresh by the restoration of all the old kingdoms, duchies, and principalities that the Revolution had swept away. Agitation against the Holy Alliance and its decrees sprang up among the middle classes in the cities, who felt themselves cheated of the benefits the Revolution had conferred. These men—lawyers, teachers, university students, business men—were to be the most fervent champions of Liberal constitutionalism. Where they were numerous and influential,

as in the North Italian towns and the great cities in the Rhineland, Liberalism held sway ; where they were weak, as in South Italy and East Prussia, the feudal and conservative elements were able to put up a strong resistance to innovating ideas.

Austria's position was stronger in Germany than in Italy. In the latter country she was hated as an alien power : in the former she could be attacked only on the grounds of her hostility to popular government and national unity. How the Germanic Confederation and the Italian principalities were to be turned into national States was a perplexing problem : between 1815 and 1870 most people thought a federal system the only solution. After all, federalism appeared to work well both in small countries like Switzerland and large countries like the United States. A centralized government would mean that one State must be given supreme authority over all the rest. Such a solution was ruled out in the case of Germany because neither Austria nor Prussia would abdicate in favour of the other, and in the case of Italy because of the delicate question of the Papacy. Thus the federal plan in various forms was advocated in Italy by men like Mazzini and Gioberti, and was actually put in practice in Germany by Bismarck himself as late as 1867.

Metternich's position became more critical after 1830. Continual agitation, fomented chiefly by Mazzini, went on in Italy ; Austrian rule in Lombardy and Venetia, though neither corrupt nor inefficient, grew increasingly unpopular, while the Magyars in Hungary and the Czechs in Bohemia stirred uneasily. In Germany Prussia was quietly consolidating the territory she had gained in 1815 ; the reforms which Stein and Hardenberg had inaugurated after the disaster of 1806 were maintained and slowly extended, though a constitution was still refused, and in 1834 Metternich was disconcerted by the news that Prussia had concluded a Zollverein or customs-union with most of the other German States from which Austria had been excluded. Prussia's widely scattered territories made the abolition of internal customs barriers a *sine qua non* of her economic development ; the smaller States which lay in her way had to be persuaded to admit Prussian goods free of duty, and this internal free trade system was speedily adopted over the greater part of non-Austrian Germany. It was a blow to Austria's prestige, yet Metternich could do little. The Emperor Francis died in 1835, but his successor Ferdinand was eccentric almost to the point of insanity, and the Chancellor's task was rendered heavier. In 1840 the accession of a romantic idealist to the throne of Prussia in the person of Frederick William IV aroused the high hopes of all Liberal Young Germany—hopes that were partly realised by the attempt of the new king to evolve a parliamentary constitution out of the old provincial diets. In 1846 there occurred what Metternich had thought an impossibility : the election of a Liberal Pope. This was the beginning of the end. The reforms of Pius IX revived the latent nationalism of Italy in its most violent form ; the agitation in Hungary assumed formidable proportions, and worst of all, there were rumblings in Vienna itself. In his last days of power

Metternich found himself in strange alliance with Guizot, the "conservative-liberal" minister of Louis Philippe, who was maintaining the bourgeois Orleans monarchy against the attacks of socialists and extreme democrats, and in more congenial agreement with the Tsar Nicholas. The Republic of Cracow, the centre of Polish agitation against Austria and Russia, was suppressed in 1846. It was Metternich's last victory.

The Orleans monarchy fell in 1848. It had throughout rested on a narrow class basis and was dependent on the votes of the upper bourgeoisie. The old aristocracy, Bourbonist almost to a man, sulked in isolation, the Catholics could not forgive its anti-clericalism, the Bonapartists derided its feeble foreign policy and declared that only an Imperial restoration could re-establish France's prestige abroad, the Republicans declared they had been cheated in 1830, and the socialists denounced the greed and corruption of its wealthy supporters and its callous indifference to the sufferings of the wage earning proletariat. Opposed by many and supported by few, Louis Philippe's somewhat inglorious régime was overthrown almost without resistance and a Republican-Socialist government set up in its stead. The fall of the Orleans monarchy sent a mighty wave of revolution rolling across Europe. It was in February that Louis Philippe and Guizot fled from France: in April Metternich joined them in exile in England.

His fall marked the end of a forty years' struggle to maintain the integrity of the absolutist system. The rising tide of democracy had submerged him at last, yet the cause he defended was not wholly lost, for the old régime possessed more vitality than had been suspected. The revolutionaries, though noisy and violent in the cities, had little following in the country, were ill organized and badly-led (except in Hungary), and reckoned without the still powerful forces of tradition and loyalty. The socialistic movement in France was ruthlessly crushed by the propertied classes, and before the year was out Louis Napoleon as President of the Republic was wielding a power as great as that exercised by Louis Philippe. The desperate efforts of the Italians, under the rather unwilling leadership of Charles Albert, to shake off the Hapsburg rule were foiled by Radetsky's well organized armies. Czech dreams of an independent Bohemia were shattered by Windischgrätz's cannon at Prague. The Southern Slavs, infuriated at the contempt with which they were treated by the German and Hungarian Liberals, assisted the Imperial government to suppress the revolt in Vienna. The Prussian democrats mismanaged the situation so badly that the King was able to rid himself of them and establish a safe conservative constitution. The Frankfurt Parliament, which was to draw up a constitution for the whole of Germany, split up into quarrelling groups and parties—Republicans and Monarchists, Particularists and Nationalists, Federalists and Centralists—and only when it was too late did they compose their differences and offer the crown of a United German Empire to Frederick William of Prussia. But by this time Austria was recovering herself, the revolutionary agitation was dying down, the loyalty of the army had been tested, and Schwarzenberg, who had succeeded to Metternich's position, announced that Austria

would never consent to be excluded even in part from a united German State. In face of Austrian disapproval Prussia dared not consent to assume the leadership. Frederick William refused the proffered crown.

Austrian Liberalism fell between two stools: loyalty to German nationalism and loyalty to the general principle of national self-determination. It wished to maintain the integrity of the Hapsburg realm, and so lost any chance of winning over the Czechs and Italians who desired full autonomy. It could not rid itself of the German feeling that the Slavs were an inferior race and therefore not entitled to the same rights as the more "advanced" national groups. When it became clear to the Viennese revolutionaries that they were not strong enough to win through without assistance, they allied themselves with the Hungarian rebels under Kossuth and so lost the sympathy of the Croats and Slovenes whom the Hungarians had persecuted. Windischgrätz's victorious army from Prague was able to recapture Vienna and re-establish the Imperial authority in the German provinces. But Hungary defied all efforts to subdue her, until Russia offered help to Austria and the Tsar's Cossacks finally broke the resistance of the Magyars. Victorious at home, Schwarzenberg was also able to reassert Austria's supremacy in Germany by forcing Prussia to withdraw her forces from the State of Hesse, which she had occupied under pretext of putting down disorders there. This "humiliation of Prussia", acknowledged by the agreement of Olmütz in 1850, was followed by Schwarzenberg's successful demand for the restoration of the old Germanic Confederation. The clock had been put right back. The position of 1815 seemed to have been restored.


The European outlook in 1850 might have depressed the stoutest democrat. The popular risings had everywhere failed. Germany and Italy were as far as ever from unity, and the Austrian supremacy had been re-established over both countries. Mazzini's Roman Republic had been destroyed by the French themselves. Louis Napoleon was about to abolish the very Republic to whose headship he had been elected. The Austro-Russian suppression of the Hungarian Revolution recalled the palmist days of the Holy Alliance. Trials, imprisonments, shootings, floggings, press prosecutions went on as in 1820 and 1830. The yoke of absolutism had again been riveted on Europe.

There was, however, from the Liberal point of view some slight ground for hope. The upheavals in the Hapsburg dominions had at least succeeded in destroying serfdom and partially freeing the peasants from the grip of the great landed proprietors in Hungary, Bohemia and the German provinces. Even Schwarzenberg made no attempt to go back entirely on the agrarian reforms carried through by the revolutionaries during their short tenure of power. At least one Italian state—the kingdom of Sardinia—had preserved the parliamentary constitution which had been set up in the mad days of 1848, and so in radical eyes assumed the character of an oasis of democracy in the desert of absolutism. As regards France, it soon became clear that the Second Empire, resting as it did on popular plebiscites, could not altogether ignore the strong Liberal sentiment in the country: it kept up some form of parliamentary

government, never became an unqualified autocracy, and soon made an attempt to strike a compromise with Liberalism. In 1852-53 two events happened which gave heart to the Liberals. The first was the death of Schwarzenberg, who, had he lived, might have prevented Bismarck transferring the supremacy of Germany from Austria to Prussia, and the second was the outbreak of the Crimean War.

The Crimean War should have been primarily an Anglo-Russian affair. The occupation of the Danubian provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Tsar, following a hint that Russia was contemplating anew her favourite scheme of partitioning the "sick man's" territories, was sufficient to rouse the bellicosity of an England tired of forty years' peace and already delighted with Palmerston's successful bullying of foreigners from Greeks to Chinese. The advance of Russia beyond the Danube had been viewed with uneasiness by England since the days of Catherine the Great, for the British government preferred the trade routes of the Levant to remain in the possession of the feeble Turkish power rather than to fall into the strong grasps of the Tsardom. England found her anti-Russian policy warmly supported by Napoleon III, whose attitude was dictated, not by trivial disputes between Greeks and Catholics over the custody of the Holy Places, but by the desire to strengthen the Empire by a successful war, to set aside the peace treaties of 1815, and to revenge himself on Russia for his uncle's defeat at the hands of Alexander I in 1812. The disgrace of Moscow was to be wiped out in the Crimea. So England and France made war on Russia, and after the most desperate efforts took Sebastopol and broke her naval power in the Black Sea. The Crimean may have been one of the most unnecessary wars in history, but it had momentous consequences.

First, it gravely damaged the prestige of Russia which had stood high since her defeat of Napoleon forty years before, and proved to an astonished world that the colossus had feet of clay. Secondly, it aroused the jubilation of the Liberals all over Europe, for Russia under Nicholas I had been regarded as the very incarnation of absolutism and the sworn enemy of popular freedom, so the defeat of the Power which only a few years before had intervened decisively to crush Hungarian Liberalism was welcomed as a blow to the reactionary forces that might prove fatal. Thirdly, it undermined the faith of large sections of the Russian people in their government and led to demands for drastic reforms. The disasters of 1855 prepared the way for the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 and encouraged the growth of a revolutionary movement which fought the Tsardom for half a century and finally ruined it. Nihilism and its later development Bolshevism were born on the bloodstained fields of Inkermann and Balaclava. Fourthly, it re-established the position of France, whose lustre had grown dim during the prosaic reign of Louis Philippe, and at the Congress of Paris in 1856 Napoleon might well feel that he had done much to efface the bitter memories of 1812-15. Fifthly, it wrecked the friendship between Russia and Austria, since the Tsar naturally expected some help from the Hapsburgs in

gratitude for his action in 1849, whereas Austria, fearful of the extension of Russian influence in the Balkans, was inclined to support France and England. The result was that when Austria's turn came, in 1859 and 1866, she had to fight her battles alone. Sixthly, it gave a new lease of life to the decadent Ottoman Empire and postponed for twenty years the emancipation of the Christian races of the Balkan peninsula. Finally, Cavour's action in sending a Sardinian contingent to fight with the allies in the Crimea ensured for his country a seat at the peace conference, enabled him to bring the Italian question before the Powers of Europe, and induced the French Emperor to promise his assistance in driving the Austrians out of Italy. 

Unquestionably, Napoleon III in 1856 was the most important man in Europe. Few characters in history have been more variously estimated in their own lifetime than he. Derided at first as a futile adventurer, he came to be feared after the *coup d'état* as a dangerous and subtle schemer, and finally after he led France to disaster in 1870 was half-forgotten and despised as an incompetent failure. His contemporaries seem to have been made unable to decide whether he was a fool or a knave. Palmerston thought him shrewd and cunning: Bismarck found it easy to bluff him. His reputation has suffered from the fact that his career closed in utter ruin and that after Sedan nobody cared to attempt a defence of the Emperor and his régime.¹ There can be no doubt that he lacked entirely the clear intelligence, cool judgment and quick decision of his illustrious uncle. Probably there was no more simplicity than subtlety in him, especially in his later years when disease had dulled his faculties. The secretiveness and reserve, which led many to regard him as a Machiavellian intriguer and to talk of his "sly look" and his "fish-like eyes", was perhaps a legacy of his Carbonaro days when he had belonged to revolutionary societies and led a fugitive life in the underworld of great cities dreaming of how he could restore the Napoleonic empire. The charge of insincerity brought against him can hardly be sustained. The socialistic ideas he expressed in his early pamphlets were not mere claptrap: he did genuinely wish to improve the lot of the poor, and he gave the French workmen privileges they had never before possessed. He honestly believed in Italian nationalism when few other people in France did, and he did his best to help the Italians achieve their unity. He sympathized sincerely with the Poles but he was not in a position to assist them. He did ardently desire the peace of Europe and made vain efforts to solve international problems by round table conferences. He really thought that his government was the most satisfactory that could have been devised for France, that it "closed the era of revolutions by satisfying the legitimate needs of the people" by the reconciliation of order with liberty. But though full of good intentions, his vacillations and bad judgment exasperated friend and foe alike and drove one party after another into opposition. Moreover, the fact that he had forcibly overthrown the régime he had sworn to

¹ Except the faithful Emile Ollivier. Mr. F. A. Simpson later also undertook the task of rehabilitation.

uphold gave his Republican enemies every chance to denounce him as a perjured usurper.

Ten years of success were followed by ten years of failure and 1859 is the dividing line. It was in that year that Cavour's persuasive eloquence and Orsini's bomb induced him to take up the cause of Italian liberation, for which he had fought in his youth. Cavour, the cleverest statesman Italy had produced since Alberoni, had read aright the lesson of 1848 : the Italians were not strong enough to drive the Austrians out of their country unaided. The assistance of one of the Great Powers was needed. Much sympathy for Italy existed in England, but apart from some indirect naval help, little was to be expected from that quarter. France alone remained, and even Napoleon would consent only at a price. Nice and Savoy, mainly French-speaking provinces which had been temporarily annexed to France during the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, were to be ceded permanently, then Napoleon would act and clear the Austrians out "from the Alps to the Adriatic". Such was the programme agreed upon by Cavour and the Emperor at the secret meeting at Plombières.

The programme was only partially carried out. Cavour cunningly provoked Austria (who had lately been pursuing a more liberal policy in Lombardy and Venetia) into a war in which she appeared the aggressor ; France joined forces with Sardinia, and after a fierce struggle Austria was ousted from Lombardy. So far all was well : Austria was fighting alone, since Russia was savagely indignant at the cold neutrality her former friend had displayed during the Crimean War and was not sorry to see the Hapsburgs in trouble. But it soon became clear that German national feeling would not be unmoved by the defeat and humiliation of what was after all a Germanic Power, and a threat of Prussian mobilization on the Rhine alarmed Paris. Nor was France unanimous in its approval of Napoleon's policy. The Liberals and democrats might applaud, but many Frenchmen asked why they should help to create a strong State next door to them, while the Catholics protested that the victory of the Italian Revolution (which the Saccardi laws of 1855 had shown would be strongly anti-clerical) would endanger the Papacy and destroy the Temporal Power. So instead of advancing into Venetia, Napoleon entered into secret negotiations with Austria and signed an armistice by which it was agreed that Lombardy alone should be given up. Cavour was furious at what he regarded as Napoleon's "treachery", but he was compelled to bow to the inevitable. In any case, the war had given a tremendous impetus to the revolutionary movement, and Austria was no longer in a position to save the anti-Liberal Italian princes. The dukes of Parma, Modena and Tuscany were driven from their dominions ; Garibaldi's red shirts landed in Sicily with the connivance of the British Fleet, and crossing over to Naples, destroyed the effete Bourbon monarchy ; Cavour, fearing the impetuous adventurer would proclaim a republic, violated the neutrality of the Papal States in face of the protests of Europe by sending Sardinian troops across Central Italy to join forces with Garibaldi's volunteers in

the south, and by 1861 only Venetia (under Austrian rule) and Rome (under Papal rule supported by the French) remained un-incorporated into the new kingdom of Italy, of which Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia was proclaimed king a few months before Cavour's death.

The Italian Revolution, to which the spectacular victories of Garibaldi imparted a romantic hue, was hailed with enthusiasm by the Liberals. Never perhaps did their cause seem brighter than in the early 1860's. The triumph of representative government, of popular rights, of free trade, of political equality, of religious toleration, of humanitarianism, of the principles of 1789, was evidently at hand. The system of Metternich was dead. The Holy Alliance was no more. Italy was practically free. Parliaments were coming into being in countries which had hitherto remained utterly impervious to democratic ideas. Slavery had been finally abandoned by all the nations of Europe: the infamous traffic in negroes was at an end. The American Civil War ended in victory for the Abolitionist North. Cobden's free-trade treaty with Napoleon III in 1860 brought down the tariff walls not only in France but in most other European countries. In Russia, hitherto the very citadel of reactionary despotism, a reforming Tsar was on the throne, and the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 evinced the genuineness of his Liberalism. In France the "Liberal Empire" of 1860 had succeeded the scarcely disguised absolutism of Napoleon III's first years. In England the aristocratic Whiggism of Palmerston gave place to the more radical Liberalism of Gladstone, and the second reform Act in 1867 gave the vote to the working classes. When, in 1864, Pope Pius IX protested against the anti-Christian features of the new bourgeois democratic age in the famous "Syllabus of Errors" and anathematized the proposition "that it was the duty of the Roman pontiff to come to terms with progress, liberalism and modern civilization", it was widely believed that the Papacy had signed its own death-warrant. Liberalism had come to stay. Few realized then that actually it had passed its zenith and that the man was at hand who was to challenge its supremacy and send it on the road to decline. In 1862 Otto von Bismarck became Minister President of Prussia.

The great statesman who, in a few short years, was to make a Prussianized Germany the most powerful military empire in the world, came from a part of Europe where an old-fashioned feudal agrarian economy survived intact, untouched by the urban industrialism of capitalist magnates and the democratic propaganda of Liberal politicians. His family had for centuries been landowners of the English squire type in Brandenburg and East Prussia: they belonged to the class known as Junkers, descendants of medieval German knights and barons who had carried the culture of their home country into the backward Slav regions and reduced the native population to the status of serfs. They lived like patriarchs on their vast estates, dispensing paternal justice to their numerous dependants, conscious of the social and military eminence of their class, scornful of the innovations of money grubbing burgesses and the egalitarian notions of democratic reformers who

pretended that the peasant was as good as his lord ! Were they not the truest Germans, the defenders of Germanic culture against the barbarous hordes of Slavdom ? In this semi-feudal, aristocratic, stiffly conservative atmosphere Bismarck grew to manhood. In his youth he was a swashbuckling country squire with a long succession of duels and drinking-bouts and love affairs to his credit, a lover of the open life, riding for miles a day over forest and heath and shooting game on the marshy flats of the Baltic coast. He hated the close, confined air of towns and quarrelled with his mother because she preferred the fashionable society of the capital to the companionship of the boorish and uncultured gentry of East Prussia. In early manhood he was converted to a pietistic sort of Christianity, and though his religious convictions may never have been deep, he probably retained to the end the Old Testament idea of the God of battles fighting on his side. Intended for a diplomatic career, he had already held several minor posts when, in 1847, he was elected to the Prussian Landtag or Diet, which Frederick William had called as the first stage towards the granting of a constitution, where he distinguished himself by the ability with which he defended the traditional monarchy against the radicals. He viewed the revolutions of 1848 with abhorrence, but they taught him some useful lessons : the alacrity with which the masses will follow an able leader, the supreme importance of the army, and the futility of parliamentary debates in the face of really grave crises. But for the loyalty of the army to the dynasty, the Hapsburg empire would have collapsed in 1848. If a great popular leader had arisen in Prussia, the revolution would have won in Germany. If Prussia had possessed a powerful army, she would not have suffered the crushing humiliation at the hands of Austria at Olmütz in 1850. Already Bismarck was convinced that Germany must be unified, not along liberal, but along conservative lines, that Prussia must be the leader of the new German State, that Austria must be excluded and that as she could be ejected only by force, her rival must be strong enough to overcome her before any outside Power had the chance to intervene. During the 1850's, when he held diplomatic posts at Paris and St. Petersburg, he worked carefully to prepare the ground. The situation was none too favourable. The defeat of Russia in the Crimean War revived the Liberal agitation everywhere, and an attenuated form of parliamentary government was set up in Prussia, to Bismarck's disgust. He tried to take advantage of Austria's defeat in the war of 1859 to secure the revocation of the Convention of Olmütz, but German sentiment was strongly pro-Austrian and nothing could be done. However, Prussia's army was being thoroughly reorganized by Roon, and King William, who came to the throne in 1861, was a safe conservative, unlike his erratic and unstable predecessor, a competent soldier and a firm believer in military preparedness.

The refusal of the Prussian Diet, where the Liberals had a majority, to sanction Roon's army reforms created a deadlock between Crown and Legislature, and the King, who was meditating abdication, at last called on Bismarck to solve it. Thus began in 1862 the great career that

was to startle Europe. In his first speech to Parliament the new Minister threw down the gauntlet to the Liberal opposition. "The unification of Germany," he cried in a famous sentence, "cannot be achieved by speeches and the votes of majorities, but by blood and iron." A new and harsh note, ominous for the future! With high-handed efficiency he circumvented the Diet, secured the support of the Upper House and forced the reforms through in defiance of the Lower. The process of breaking parliaments had begun!

Events now moved with amazing rapidity. The army was soon ready: a pretext must be found for a war with Austria, still smarting under the defeats of 1859. But beforehand the friendly neutrality of the rest of Europe must be secured. The Polish rebellion of 1863 gave Bismarck his chance of winning the gratitude of Russia, which he did by checking all attempts on the part of France to mediate on behalf of the Poles. The Tsar received more support from Prussia than from Austria—a fact which helps to explain his attitude in 1866. The Liberals, who sympathized with the Poles, were bitterly critical, but Bismarck knew that in any case the resurrection of an independent Poland would encourage the "German" Poles in Posen to rise. The complicated affair of the Schleswig-Holstein duchies, which, though members of the Germanic Confederation, were ruled by the King of Denmark, enabled him to enlist German patriotic sentiment on his side, to try out the new Prussian army, and to provide an occasion for quarrelling with Austria. When the Danes attempted to incorporate the duchies in their kingdom, Bismarck persuaded Austria to join him in forcibly expelling them, since Vienna was afraid it would lose the leadership of Germany if it refused to intervene in an affair which had strongly roused nationalist feeling. The Austro-Prussian forces made short work of the Danish opposition, and the duchies were divided between the two Powers. Opportunity for creating friction existed in abundance, relations between Austria and Prussia grew increasingly strained, and in 1866 the fight for the supremacy broke out.

The War of 1866 was Bismarck's masterpiece. A more favourable moment could scarcely have been chosen. Russia's friendship had been assured through his attitude towards the Polish rebellion. Italy had joined forces with Prussia on being promised Venetia in the event of victory. The greater part of France's army was absent in Mexico, where Napoleon was trying to create a Latin Empire to counteract the influence of the United States, and so the French government was unable to make its full weight felt in Europe. French opinion was anxiously watching events in Germany, but Napoleon believed there was no real danger: Austria and Prussia were well matched, the struggle between them would be long and mutually exhausting, and the country as a whole would be weakened for a long time to come. Moreover, had not Bismarck hinted at "compensation" for France on the left bank of the Rhine and in Luxemburg, and possibly even in Belgium? Many Germans themselves were bewildered and indignant at Prussia's proceedings: they felt she was forcing on a civil war among the German peoples, and nearly all the

smaller states from Bavaria and Saxony downwards sided with Austria. Yet the war was over in seven weeks. The great military machine perfected by Roon and Von Moltke moved with clockwork precision : the railways were used to the full to shift about enormous masses of men : Austria's German allies were scattered like chaff, the Prussian forces entered Bohemia, and on the field of Königgrätz the work of Frederick the Great was completed and the leadership of the German nation transferred at long last from Vienna to Berlin. The speed at which the campaign was fought astonished Europe and thoroughly alarmed the French, who viewed with terror the rise of a mighty military empire across the Rhine. Intoxicated by success, King William and the army chiefs proposed a triumphal entry into Vienna and the annexation of a large part of Austrian territory. But Bismarck would have none of it. Austria had been beaten, but she must not be crushed and humiliated : her neutrality might one day be useful to Prussia, it were better therefore to treat her leniently. She lost no territory save Venetia, which Bismarck, true to his promise, handed over to a grateful Italy, but was compelled to assent to the dissolution of the old German Bund of 1815 and the creation of a new North German Confederation under Prussian aegis. Some of the smaller States like Hanover and Hesse-Cassel were punished for supporting Austria by outright annexation to Prussia : the Catholic kingdoms south of the river Main were left to themselves. Austria was excluded entirely from German affairs, and was thus forced to seek compensation in the Balkans (which brought her into conflict with Russia and led ultimately to the cataclysm of 1914), and to counteract the growing agitation among the Slav races of her empire by raising Hungary to an equal partnership with herself. The war of 1866 created in 1867 the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.

The unification of non-Austrian Germany was not complete. The southern States viewed aggressive Prussia with fear and dislike. Only in one way could they be brought within the new Reich that Bismarck was planning : by joining with Prussia in a nationalist war against a foreign aggressor. That war could be fought only against France, and if successful would wipe out for ever the memories of 1806. This is not to say that Bismarck deliberately planned the war of 1870. France herself hurried on the catastrophe, believing that she was strong enough to deal with Prussia before the latter got really dangerous. Bismarck knew that France would be a stiffer proposition than Austria, and he was fearful of foreign intervention if the war lasted too long. All he could do was to sow distrust and suspicion of Napoleon in the minds of Europe ; thus at the critical moment in 1870 he revealed to England Napoleon's negotiations concerning Luxemburg and Belgium and so destroyed for a time English sympathy for France. The German statesman's efforts to keep France isolated were wonderfully successful. With Russia he was still on friendly terms, and in any case the Tsar was not likely to help a country which had defeated him in the Crimea and had expressed open sympathy with the rebels in Poland. Austria could hardly be supposed to harbour cordial feelings towards the Power which had driven her out of Lombardy in 1859.

England under the pacific rule of Gladstone would certainly stay neutral, especially after the revelations of Napoleon's designs in the Low Countries. Italy was in a painful dilemma : France had helped her in 1859, Prussia had helped her in 1866 ; should she choose sides or keep out of the struggle ? Finally, she remembered that the French were still occupying Rome and that Napoleon's defeat would enable her to seize the papal city and complete the Risorgimento. No help came to France from the Italians.

The pretext for the war when it came was the Hohenzollern candidature in Spain. It cannot be denied that the French put themselves in the wrong by their arrogant and overbearing attitude and that though they entered the war " with a light heart " as one of their Ministers said, they were almost entirely unprepared. Bismarck had got them where he wanted them. The " editing " of the Ems telegram, for which he has been severely criticized, was undoubtedly a piece of sharp practice, but the French were already determined on war and it is doubtful if it made much difference. The war itself repeated the triumphs of 1866, though the French put up a far stiffer resistance than the Austrians, and not until Paris had fallen six months after the opening of hostilities did the exhausted nation accept the onerous terms proposed to it. Bismarck had attained his goal : all Germany had been united in this fight against the national enemy, and it was the king of Bavaria who acclaimed the Prussian sovereign German Emperor in Louis XIV's palace at Versailles. Yet the Treaty of Frankfurt (1871) was a bad mistake. Moderation had been shown to Austria, but none was shown to France, who was stripped of two provinces and saddled with a crushing indemnity. It is difficult to assess Bismarck's responsibility for these harsh terms. We are told that the military chiefs, who felt they had been cheated in 1866, forced his hand and extorted the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine as a guarantee against future French attack and were supported in their demand by the South German States who remembered Louis XIV's devastations of the Palatinate and insisted on a strong frontier. The Chancellor may also have felt that the two provinces (which indeed were largely German speaking) would be a pledge of German unity, since they had been won by the combined efforts of the north and the south. It is true that in 1870 the populations of France and Germany were about equal and that no one could have foreseen that within the next forty years the latter would completely outstrip the former and so make it certain that France would never again be in a position to challenge the German power single-handed. It is also true that the humiliations inflicted by Napoleon on Prussia in 1806 were quite as bad as those inflicted by Bismarck on France. Yet Bismarck could have afforded to be generous, and his failure to be so created in France the bitter desire for " la revanche " and so led to the war of 1914 and to the " Carthaginian peace " of 1919, when Germany was treated as France had been in 1870.

1870 was undoubtedly one of the great turning points in European history. The overthrow of France ended the hegemony she had exercised over Western Europe for nearly three centuries and shifted the centre of gravity to the great Teutonic people placed between the Latin and the

Slav. The danger point was no longer Paris but Berlin. The process of unification and the military triumphs that had completed it seemed to change the character of the German people. Hitherto dreamy and pacific, devoted to philosophy and music¹, they became imbued with the Prussian spirit, whose origin is to be sought back in the days of the Great Elector, and the "barrack-square" mentality, the disciplinary efficiency and the proud self-assertiveness, spread throughout the entire nation. The rest of the Continent, uneasy at the sudden emergence of an enormously powerful military empire in their very midst, feverishly sought security from possible attack by arming to the limit of their capacity. Huge fleets and armies, the size of which would have staggered the conquerors of antiquity, consumed more and more of the national revenues and spelt ruin to the rosy hopes of universal peace which had been widespread only a few years before.

Finally, the rise of the new German Empire was the beginning of the end of Liberalism, which had defeated Metternich but was itself beaten by Bismarck. As later as 1860 it was possible to believe that the Liberal creed was destined in a short time to become universal: before the century was out it was clear that the era of individual liberty, humanitarian pacifism, free trade and "the rights of man," was passing away to be succeeded by an age of aggressive nationalism, State-worship, militarism, racial exclusiveness, and despotism supported by the masses. "The Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World" receded rapidly into the background. Bismarck fought with amazing success the ideas the French Revolution had let loose over Europe. He captured nationalism for the conservative cause. He utilized the democratic device of universal suffrage to strengthen the position of the governing class. He paid lip-service to parliamentary government, but the Reichstag was nothing and the Chancellor and the Emperor everything. He abolished free trade, and the prosperity of Germany advanced by leaps and bounds. He even tried to "kill by kindness" a new enemy far more dangerous than the old—Socialism—and nearly succeeded. The dismay of the Liberals is well expressed by the Italian philosopher Croce, one of their last survivors: "The Liberals were distressed by doubts of their own faith, because they no longer beheld before them one of those old régimes in which authority—poorly supported by allies of clerical and aristocratic cliques, deserted by men of intellect and culture, incapable of progress, reactionary and backward—revealed so that all might read its inferiority in the historical struggle. Instead they saw a State that had rejected popular government, based itself on authority, taken its rulers only from above, and was obtaining such triumphs as no other State in Europe had the ability or the audacity to challenge: a State perfect in its mechanism and in its administrative work and a people that was the best taught and the richest in knowledge and learning of all the peoples of the world and before whom there was unfolding as well a vast field of activity in economic production and commerce."² The Counter-Revolution had at last found a leader.

¹ This was how they were regarded in the early 19th century by most foreigners, who seem to have taken their ideas of Germany from Mme. de Staël.

² *Europe in the Nineteenth Century* Eng. tr. (1934), pp.254, 255.

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3. REALISM OUSTS ROMANCE

The French critic Seillière, in his book *Le Mal romantique*, attempts to trace the development of Romanticism through five phases from Rousseau to the opening of the 20th century. The appearance of *La nouvelle Héloïse* in 1761 inaugurated the period of "sensibility" and the whole anti-classical reaction: to the second phase, introduced by Schlegel's *Aesthetic Letters* in 1795, he gives the German name "weltschmerz" (ennui, weariness of life), and the third, of which Victor Hugo's *Hernani* (1830) forms the starting point, he characterises as "mal du siècle." The fourth is the period of pessimism, symbolized by the extraordinary vogue enjoyed by Stendhal and Schopenhauer in the 1860's, and the fifth that of "neurasthenia," the *fin de siècle* "decadence" of Verlaine and Oscar Wilde, which carries us down to 1900.

Now it is perfectly true to say that the influence of Rousseau is alive and active today and that the revolt of which he was the leader had not yet been quelled. There had been no return to the dignity, the order and the restraint of classicism as it was understood in the century 1660-1760. The love of wild nature still induces men like D. H. Lawrence and Aldous Huxley to seek solace from an over-refined civilization in the deserts of New Mexico or the jungles of Central America as it once drove Gauguin to Tahiti and Stevenson to Samoa. The belief in the essential goodness of human nature still inspires humanitarians to declaim against the use of force and violence even in the punishment of criminals. Ardent pleas for "the rights of passion" and attacks on conventional sexual morality, with its barriers against "the freedom of love", are found in a hundred novels which every year pour from the press. The impulse to lay bare one's soul and disclose the most private details of one's life finds expression in the innumerable "frank confessions" which today are the most usual form that autobiographies take. Stendhal as early as 1817 prophesied that the characteristic of the 19th century would be "a love of strong emotions". It seems to be still the characteristic of the 20th.

The literature of the 19th century nowhere betrays the decorum of the classical age and may be said to be thoroughly saturated in Romanticism. But it is clear that the Romanticism of the first half of the century differs strikingly from that of the second; so much so, in fact, that the name Realism has been applied to the latter. Too often it has been assumed that Romanticism and Realism are two diametrically opposed tendencies. A closer study, however, reveals that they are merely two aspects of the same thing. Realism is simply Romanticism disillusioned, "gone down on all fours," as Irving Babbitt puts it. The hopeful fervour of Rousseau's day had given place, before the end of the 19th century, to a black and bitter despair because the evils of the world had not been righted so easily as had been believed, because grim experience had overturned many idols

and no new God had been found to worship, unless indeed it were the God of Science. A strain of melancholy had always run through the Romantics and their works but it was in the main a melancholy born of regret that the past had been so miserable. The men of the *fin de siècle* displayed not a wistful melancholy but a gnawing pessimism because they saw no hope in the future. This is the meaning of the transition to "realism", of the amazing gulf which separates Scott from Hardy, Chateaubriand from Zola.

One of the most striking features of 19th century literature is the predominance of the novel, especially of the "social novel". Born in Spain in the 16th century, the novel was taken up and developed in France in the 17th, in England in the 18th century. It was at first a tale told to amuse and consisted of rapid action and incident. Then it was used to delineate character and to paint the manners of the time. The Romantics invented the historical novel, which in a sense was a reversion to the novel of incident. Finally, there came in (chiefly with Balzac) the novel "with a purpose", which aimed by a portrayal, not of remote or idealized, but of contemporary and "real" society, at the exposure of the abuses of government and the vices of civilization. Thus Dickens, beginning as a narrator of amusing tales, turned to scarifying the callousness of officialdom, the law's delays, the brutality of industrial capitalism. Zola set himself to reveal, in all its naked horror, the sufferings of the poor in mine, in factory, in city slum. Dostoevsky and Tolstoy and indeed nearly all the Russians found in the novel the best means of preaching the moral and social revolution in which they so fervently believed. Thanks to the system of universal compulsory education which spread all over Europe before the end of the century, the number of literates rapidly increased and with it the novel-reading public. The drama suffered for a time and everywhere lagged behind the novel, until at the close of the century it also became in the hands of Ibsen and Bjornson, Hauptmann and Sudermann, Shaw and Pinero, a vehicle for the propagation of views on social relations which were already partly familiar to the readers of fiction. The growth of the social novel may have been facilitated by the abolition of the censorship which had long pressed heavily upon men of letters. Except in Russia, the novelist and the dramatist were usually allowed the widest latitude that public opinion would tolerate.

The pioneer of the new movement was Honoré de Balzac (1799-1850), who came of a Tourainian family of peasant origin. When, declining to adopt the legal career his parents had planned for him, he fled to Paris and took to writing plays and stories in a lodging house garret in the early 1820's, the Romantic literature of the day consisted chiefly of tales, of sentimental love à la Werther, "nature descriptions" of moonlit lanes and supernatural extravagances in haunted castles. Scott's historical novels, then being devoured with avidity all over Europe, impressed the youthful Balzac, and his first considerable tale, *Les Chouans* (1829), was based upon the Royalist risings in Brittany during the French Revolution thirty years before. But Balzac had no taste for documentation and no desire to go grubbing among musty chronicles to find material for novels

of medieval chivalry, and he turned instead to survey the world of his own day from direct experience, in which he was followed by all the later Realists, who seldom laid the scene of their stories more than a generation back. The "Comédie Humaine" was planned as a vast panorama of modern society, described without any Romantic sentiment or idealization. The books which Balzac produced in rapid succession during the last twenty years of his life have been condemned by literary critics for slipshod writing and lack of style, but few have ever denied their power and influence. Frederick Green's verdict on Balzac is that "he succeeded in imparting to his creations the stature, the universality and the intensity which one had hitherto associated with a Shakespeare, a Corneille or a Molière". In other words, he is the first novelist (if we except Cervantes and perhaps Fielding) whose work is worthy to stand beside that of the great dramatists. His tales have a truly epic quality. *Eugénie Grandet*, a study of avarice, *César Birotteau*, a study of social ambition, *Le Recherche de l'Absolu*, a study of intellectual passion, reveal motives of conduct which had rarely been delineated with such vigour and insight. It is significant that Balzac, who had little of the romantic in his make-up (though his life-long devotion to the Polish Countess Hanska might seem to belie it) and viewed passion as a dangerous, anti-social force, reduced love to its proper proportions and refused to make it the mainspring of almost all human action. On the contrary he seemed to regard lust of money as a more powerful influence than lust of sensual pleasure. Unhampered by the old aristocratic tradition which frowned upon all mention of financial matters as unforgivably vulgar and materialistic, Balzac went out of his way to emphasize frankly the part played by money in social life and the economic interdependence of the various classes. Eugénie Grandet's father is the classic type of the harsh, ruthless old miser. César Birotteau, the perfume-manufacturer who uses his wealth to "climb into" fashionable society only to be betrayed by his rascally notaries who abscond and leave him facing bankruptcy, in a sense typifies the whole 19th century, for which lust of money, as Balzac foresaw, was to be the dominating passion. The grasping avarice of the French peasant was first portrayed in Balzac's pages, where the romantic trappings which had covered rural life since Rousseau's time was ruthlessly stripped off. Had he lived after 1850, when industrialism developed more rapidly and the new moneyed aristocracy acquired increasing wealth and power, he would doubtless have elaborated the theme still further. Despite the haste with which he wrote, Balzac died before the *Comédie Humaine* had been completed. But he had blazed the trail for the Realists and Naturalists who succeeded him. He had founded the modern social novel; he had foreshadowed the new money economy, he had insisted on the influence of "surroundings" — race, climate, social milieu — on the formation of character, thus preparing the way for the elaborate documentation of the Naturalists and their endless newspaper-clippings, and dismissing contemptuously the dream world of the Romantics, he had exposed with faithful (perhaps too faithful) pen the stark and sordid realities of life. Balzac, one might almost say, was the Shakespeare of the novel.

The rise of machine-industry, the horrors of the early factories, the creation of a propertyless proletariat sunk in wretchedness and misery, the mad pursuit of wealth, the feverish rage for speculation, the accumulation of colossal fortunes, and the appearance of the hard, mercenary and uncultured manufacturer and stockbroker in his top-hat and frock-coat, could not but leave an ineffaceable mark on literature. A deadly drabness settled over the century, as the smoke of the factory-chimneys slowly covered the fresh fields with a layer of grime and soot. The noble and the heroic seemed to depart out of life; ugliness and stupidity were triumphant; the "divine people", to whom the democrats wished to hand over the government of the world, seemed, on close inspection, at best dull-eyed sheep, at worst a lunatic mob. Hence literature took on an increasingly gloomy hue and descended into the abyss of vice and misery. In all the great novels and poems which appeared during the latter half of the century it would be difficult to find a really noble character, wit or humour, or anything but concern with the lowest and most debasing aspects of life.

This sense of bitter disillusion, this wallowing in the mire, this new awareness of social problems and of the wretched condition of the masses, is best illustrated in France. The earliest pictures of realistic "low life" in Paris are to be found in the second-rate novels of Eugène Sue, especially in his once famous *Mystères de Paris* (1842): the socialism of Proudhon and Louis Blanc found a convert in that unstable and emotional woman writer George Sand, who after preaching the Rousseauist doctrine of free love in a scene of tales of ill-assorted marriages ending in adulteries, turned to attack the social evils of the day and in particular the unequal distribution of wealth. Sand at least had some faith in a better world, which is more than can be said of Gustave Flaubert (1821-1880), an aesthetic poseur totally out of sympathy with the drab bourgeois society that surrounded him. Like Oscar Wilde, whom he closely resembles, Flaubert was something of an aristocrat—cultured, refined, fastidious—a "late Romantic" who despised the vulgar herd and their boorish philistinism. He hated the bourgeoisie and yet was fascinated by them. His masterpiece, *Madame Bovary* (1857), is one of the most depressing books ever written. The dull stupidity of Charles Bovary the husband, the cold and heartless adultery of Emma, and the general air of dreariness hanging over the country village where the action passes, is made barely tolerable by the writer's exquisite style and perfect choice of words. To Flaubert life was truly "a tale told by an idiot, signifying nothing". Revolted against the dismal folly of the 19th century, which thought of little but floating companies, buying and selling shares, building factories, gambling on the stock exchange, and hurrying about from place to place in as short time as possible, he worked off some of his bile in that "hashish nightmare" *Salammbô* (1860), a tale of ancient Carthage, depicting in gorgeous colours a frenzy of blood and slaughter, of erotic luxury, of obscene orgies in dim temples—"delirium by torchlight" it has well been characterized.

With the Naturalists Realism reached its limits. The Naturalists, of whom the Goncourt brothers and Emile Zola were the best known, formed a definite school of writers whose influence was paramount in the 1880's. Their aims and methods cannot be understood unless we know something of the extraordinary fervour with which biological science was worshipped after Darwin's theories had become famous. Science for a moment assumed the aspect of an anti-Church, in whose infallibility its devotees blindly believed. Taine, who made the famous remark that "vice and virtue are products like vitriol and sugar", claimed that literature could be reduced to scientific rules. Zola (1840-1902), accepting this, believed that the art of the novelist was a branch of experimental science. Born of mixed French, Italian and Greek stock, his childhood and youth were spent in grinding poverty and until he obtained a post as clerk to a publishing business, his life had been passed slinking around the alleys and stews of Paris in contact with the thieves and harlots and vagabonds who constitute the scum of a great city. His unhappy experiences during his most impressionable years induced an unwholesome concentration on the vicious and the degrading: it also gave him an insight into the life of the poorest class such as few novelists have possessed. From scientific textbooks he learnt something of the influence of heredity¹ and conceived the idea of writing the history of a single family, its legitimate and illegitimate branches, illustrated by authentic facts culled from newspaper reports. This was the famous Rougon-Marquart series, which began with *Les Fortunes des Rougon* in 1871 and ended with *Le Docteur Pascal* in 1893.

The apostle of Realism, armed with his notebooks and his bundles of clippings, wandering over the battlefield of Sedan and talking to ex-soldiers to gather material for *La Débâcle* and going down the coal-shafts and discussing their mechanism with the miners so as to be sure that the descriptions in *Germinal* were technically correct, is a strange and melancholy figure. His books, which sold in thousands, were fiercely criticised both by moralists and literary judges, and the doors of the Academy were for ever closed to him. True, he was not an artist: the true artist selects, whereas Zola put in everything he could find. Yet he is a figure representative of his age, morbid, and tragic. His novels were intended to illustrate the inescapable influence of heredity. Free-will is rejected: we are the sports of fate. Of religion we hear hardly anything, for has not God, under pressure of a materialist science, abdicated the government of the universe? Man, once regarded as a little lower than the angels, is now scarcely above the animals. Zola's sombre gloom, the sordidness of his descriptions, his unhealthy preoccupation with sex (wherein he anticipated Freud and the psychoanalysts), his insistence on mentioning the unmentionable, his total lack of reticence and delicacy, combine to weary and disgust the reader. His world, for all its "realism" is, we feel, unreal—its evils are surely exaggerated. What he shows us is a charnel-house. Even his most loyal disciples broke away from him when *La Terre*,

¹ Sir Francis Galton's *Hereditary Genius*, which is commonly regarded as having founded the science of eugenics, appeared in 1869.

a horribly repulsive picture of rural life, appeared in 1887 : even Anatole France protested against the portrayal of peasants "fornicating under every hedgerow".

Zola and his fellow Naturalists may perhaps be regarded as examples of the way in which the humanism of the Renaissance has worked itself out. Originally a protest against the eternal and the other worldliness of the Middle Ages and a defence of the "natural man" and of the joys of mundane life, it has degenerated first into the sickly sentimentalism of Rousseau and finally into the animal bestiality of Zola. The earth has claimed its own ; Man is revealed as a naked, repulsive creature, activated by low, brutish impulses. All vestige of spirituality has gone from him. Gone is the laughter and boisterous hope of Rabelais : Zola is at the other end, he is disillusioned and sad and does not laugh. Compare the calm and pleasant scepticism of Montaigne with the biting cynicism of Maupassant, in whose brilliant and bitter short stories one seeks almost in vain for a noble character or an elevating sentiment. Contrast the gay if carnal poetry of the Renaissance with the savage hopelessness of Baudelaire, whose *Fleurs du Mal* (1857), proclaim the devil the legitimate king of the universe and seek an escape from the dull realities of life in an erotic satanism. Even science itself, as with Renan, ceased to attract in the end : for has it not degraded man to the level of a brute ? The obsession with sex (for love in its highest sense is unknown to the Naturalists) is probably due to the anxiety to seize hold of something that may reveal the secret of the unity underlying the universe. In the mystery of life and reproduction is sought the certainty and the consolation spurned in religion.

In England the social novel followed rapidly on the heels of Scott. The widespread distress of the post-Waterloo period, culminating in the miseries of the "Hungry Forties", and the gradual revelations of the ghastly horrors of mine and factory, led to a speedy transition from historical romance of plumed cavaliers to novels of real life and didactic purpose. Few now perhaps read Kingsley, Reade, George Eliot or Mrs. Gaskell, whose books, written to rouse the public conscience against the intolerable evils of early Victorian England, survive as social documents rather than as works of art. The same certainly cannot be said of Charles Dickens (1812-1870), who like many humorists had a deep vein of underlying seriousness. Having tasted in his boyhood the bitterness of poverty in the blacking-factory at Hungerford Stairs, he retained to the last a fierce hatred of all exploiters of the poor. Though *Pickwick* is almost entirely pure fun, he soon turned in *Oliver Twist* to lash the callousness of the official Bumbles, in *Bleak House* the delays of Chancery, and the harsh capitalism of the mid-19th century was never more severely arraigned than in *Hard Times* in the characters of Podsnap and Gradgrind, the latter "a man of parts and calculations, with a rule and a pair of scales and the multiplication table in his pocket, ready to weigh and measure any parcel of human nature". The typically English humour and gentle caricature saved Dickens from the morose gloom of the Continental Realists. He stood for the rights of the common man against the hard

and bleak rationalism of the Utilitarian age, whose champions coldly told the poor, in George Eliot's words, "to do without opium and live through their pain". Realism of a dourer and harsher character entered English literature with Thomas Hardy (1840-1928), whose Wessex novels, published between 1872 and 1895, breathe a spirit of black pessimism reminiscent of Zola and the French Naturalists. Like Zola, Hardy had imbibed many of the scientific notions of the Darwinian age, among them the overpowering influence of physical surroundings on the development of character. He sees his men and women—ordinary simple folk of his own Dorsetshire countryside—as Priestly says, "in their environment, like fish swimming in a tank".¹ His tales are tragedies, where bewildered victims like Tess of the D'Urbervilles, are caught in the web of fate—blind, cruel, remorseless Destiny. Hardy believed neither in heaven nor hell, neither in God nor devil, but his Fate is a more ruthless and savage Deity than even the grim God of Calvinism. He is the greatest of the English Realists—void of humour, sombre and bitter, brooding over the evils of life, angrily baffled by the mysteries of the universe. We rise from his novels with an uncomfortable and depressed feeling. Perhaps the Realists felt it was right that we should be made uncomfortable. They at any rate showed us something of the real life of the poor and downtrodden, hitherto in literature regarded as little more than figures of fun, like the "rude mechanicals" of *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. They led us into the slums and hovels hidden away in the back streets and forced us to hold our noses at the stench and squalor, but at least they shook the outer world from its complacency. They exaggerated, as all ardent reformers exaggerate, but they did something to rouse the conscience of society against the canker festering in its bosom.

To the mighty offensive against the abuses of 19th century industrialism and bourgeois futility one European country, hitherto virtually inarticulate, added a powerful and unexpected aid. Russian literature, as an integral part of world literature, hardly existed before 1820, and even then was scarcely known to the West before 1860. It is true that the pioneers, Lomonosov and Karamzin, flourished in the 18th century: they drew upon the culture of the West, especially of France, nor is it without significance that Russia in her literary childhood was inoculated with the rationalism of the *Aufklärung*. The golden age is dated from Pushkin's first poems, published in 1820, and reached its maturity between 1860 and 1880, when the finest novels of Turgeniev, Dostoevsky and Tolstoi were given to the world. Chekhov and Gorki around 1900 mark the decline into the silver age. The writings of the great Russians seem to possess a universality, a cosmic significance absent from the more parochial productions of the West. This is probably because the Slav mind, curiously dreamy and unpractical, has always been more interested in "ideas" than in actions, and still more because the cleavage of cultures went deeper in Russia than anywhere else in Europe, not excepting even France, and finally exploded in the Revolution of 1917. The intelligent Russian felt that the old order was keeping his country in a

¹ *The English Novel* (1927), p. 57.

state of semi-oriental barbarism, away from the full light of civilization. He wished to break with the past ; yet he could not stomach the hard, mercenary bourgeois culture which had conquered the West and which pursued, not beauty, truth or goodness, but just money. Yet it stood for civilization and progress. What could Russia do, how was she to steer her way between the Scylla of a corrupt and outmoded Byzantinism, which had ceased to satisfy her, and the Charybdis of a self-seeking and materialistic plutocracy which revolted her by its rejection of the finer values of human existence ?

The old Russia of unintelligent despotism, cruel serfdom, police spies and prison camps, was mercilessly satirized by its first great novelist, Gogol (1809-1852), best known by his comedy *The Inspector*, in which a stranger arriving at an inn is mistaken for a government official and made the recipient of innumerable bribes and polite attentions, and by his powerful novel *Dead Souls*, a study of provincial life so terrifyingly realistic that Pushkin, on reading it, exclaimed "How sad a place is Russia !" Ivan Goncharov created in *Oblomov* (1857) a character whose sum total of qualities has been called "an illness fostered by the nature of the Slavonic character and of the life of Russian society", a procrastinating apathy which loses itself, Hamlet-like, in dreaming philosophizing but never issues in decisive action. Turgeniev (1818-1883), the first Russian novelist to acquire a European reputation (mainly because he resided in Paris during the greater part of his literary career) took as a youth "an oath of Hannibal" never to rest till serfdom had been destroyed in his native land. It was he who coined the word "Nihilist" and used it to describe the social philosophy of Bazarov in *Fathers and Sons* (1862), the revolutionary wave of materialist atheism that was sweeping across the face of European society. He followed this up with *Smoke* and *Virgin Soil*, which revealed at last to all the world the tragic social problem of Russia : her corrupt and inefficient autocracy, her blind and stupid nobility, her dissatisfied and visionary intelligentsia, her miserable and animal-like peasants. A union of stark realism and sublime mysticism greets us in Feodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881), the scion of an old noble family of Moscow who as a youth read Gogol, Balzac, George Sand and perhaps even Dickens, became fired with a desire to alleviate the sufferings of the poor and the oppressed, and joined one of the revolutionary students' clubs. In 1849 Dostoevsky and several of his companions were arrested by the police, imprisoned in the fortress of S.S. Peter and Paul at St. Petersburg, and one morning led out to be shot. As the firing squad were making ready, an officer arrived with an order commuting the prisoners' sentence to imprisonment in Siberia. In that living tomb Dostoevsky lived for four years, herded with the worst criminals, "like a man nailed down in his coffin," and the ghastly experiences of that period seared themselves into his soul. *The House of the Dead* (1858), the book in which he described his life in the prison camp, made the horrors of Siberia familiar to the world. His greatest work, *Crime and Punishment* (1866), one of the most tragic and powerful novels ever written, embodies his mature philosophy, which is Christian without being strictly orthodox, and

stresses the positive value of suffering as a purifying agent. Raskolnikov, the student murderer, kills two unpleasant old women in a fit of morbid dejection springing from his unhealthy introspective self-analysis and his distress at the universal misery which seems to surround him. The rest of the book is occupied with his Hamlet-like musings and tortured uncertainty whether to confess to the crime or not. Finally, persuaded by Sonia, the humble street-walker (the theme of the noble prostitute has been borrowed by Dostoevsky from the Romantics), he gives himself up to the police, is tried and sentenced to Siberia, whither Sonia follows him into exile. The bare recital of the plot, which is thin enough, is inadequate to indicate the profound psychology displayed in the novel. Dostoevsky means more to us today than he did to his own generation. If we are to believe Berdyaev, he championed a spiritual freedom and alike rejected Liberal democracy and materialist socialism as destructive of human personality. Belief in God means belief in men : to lose faith in God is to lose faith in man. Of the eternal mysteries, those "cursed questions", the problem of freedom agitated him most. Free goodness entails liberty of evil. Evil could only be eliminated at the price of surrendering freedom, and to do good by compulsion is no virtue. To reject God helps not a whit to solve the problem : on the contrary, it makes it darker still, by depriving us of the only clue we possess. Dostoevsky saw a positive and purifying element in suffering : the brightness of good is the more dazzling by contrast with the darkness of evil. Unless we understand this, we shall fail to notice the thin ray of divine light which shines through his sad and sombre novels.

The fame of Dostoevsky, which has steadily increased in our day, was overshadowed at the time by that of Leov Tolstoi (1828-1910), which has now correspondingly declined. Possibly we have come to believe that Tolstoi has little that is new to offer us, that he is merely a 19th century Rousseau. Like Rousseau, he "returned to Nature", by abandoning contact with his own social class — the nobility — and living with the peasants, sharing their life and helping them in the fields. Like Rousseau, he revolted against the artificialities of civilized existence, and the bourgeois industrialism of the West disgusted him. Like Rousseau, he was melancholy and introspective, and filled lengthy books with a minute account of his thoughts and feelings from the earliest recollections of childhood. Like Rousseau, he rejected orthodox Christianity for a sentimental Deism which he claimed was based on a strict interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount, and especially on the injunction "Resist not evil". Autocracy, orthodoxy and militarism came to be his strongest aversions. All governments, he declared, had become "Genghiz Khan with the telegraph", organizations of violence based on no principles but the grossest tyranny. The regimentation of the human race in conscript armies, marching and counter-marching in every country of Europe, aroused his deepest indignation. "What is sacred to the civilized man of today? They say to him, 'You must become my slave, and this slavery may force you to kill even your own father,' and he quietly puts his head under the yoke." *War and Peace*, the epic of Napoleon's Moscow

campaign, *Anna Karanina*, the story of the successful revolt against the cramping bonds of society, and *Childhood, Boyhood and Youth* and *My Confession*, a detailed Rousseauist autobiography, made Tolstoi's fame during the last thirty years of the 19th century. Curious visitors flocked to his home in the Crimea, as their predecessors had once flocked to see Rousseau at the Hermitage, to view the Russian prophet in his peasant's smock and moujik's cap.

Maurice Baring observes that Russian literature, though the youngest, seems spiritually the oldest. The total lack of the freshness and hope of youth, the infinite sadness and melancholy introspection, the constant portrayal of a social problem that seems to admit of no solution, does indeed bespeak maturity. Perhaps we may say of Russia, as Walter Pater said of Mona Lisa, "Like the vampire she has been dead many times and learnt the secrets of the grave."

While the novel in England, France, Russia and many other countries, had become the main vehicle for the portrayal of social abuses and the propaganda of radical and revolutionary views, a small and hitherto insignificant nation suddenly produced two dramatists of outstanding ability who revived (and persuaded all Europe to revive) the use of the theatre for didactic purposes. In the last quarter of the century Bjornson and Ibsen revolutionized the drama, put Norway on the literary map, and excited violent controversies, echoes of which still survive in the works of their disciples. Of the two, Henrik Ibsen (1828-1906), exercised the wider influence. Born of a middle class commercial family, he was apprenticed to an apothecary at Grinstad, where, it was said, he "walked about like a mystery sealed with seven seals", so morose and taciturn was he even in youth. Abandoning the drudgery of an apothecary's assistant, he entered journalism and earned a precarious living writing poems and plays. His dramatic powers matured early: his first efforts were saga dramas or romantic tragedies, but his Norwegian countrymen showed little appreciation of him and were probably repelled by his disagreeable temperament. In 1864 he departed in disgust for Southern Europe, where he remained for nearly thirty years. His disappointments imparted a satiric edge to his pen, and he first acquired fame by his dramatically powerful if intellectually feeble attacks on the religious conventions of the age in *Brand* (1866). The events of the years 1864-1871—the German war on Denmark, the overthrow of Austria and France by the military power of Prussia, the Paris Commune and its attendant horrors—may have helped to convince him of the diseased condition of European society. He resolved to force into the limelight the intimate problems of social life and in particular those aspects of the relationship between men and women hitherto treated flippantly rather than seriously. His "social dramas" are mainly studies in commercial or sexual morality: Ibsen poses problems but does not solve them. His business, as he saw it, was to diagnose the ills of society, not to cure them. Beginning with *The Pillars of Society* (1877), an exposure of business hypocrisy, he preached a bold feminism in *A Doll's House* (1879), where Nora's slamming of the door on her husband and family became the talk of Europe, roused a

furious storm by venturing to touch the subject of venereal disease in *Ghosts* (1881), satirised the dishonesty of public officials in *An Enemy of the People* (1882), and the intriguing futility of party politics in *Rosmersholm* (1886), returning in his last years to a more mystical and poetic drama in *Hedda Gabler* and *The Master Builder*. Saintsbury called Ibsen "parochial", in that he was a frequenter of the parish hospital and asylum, whereas Gosse found in him "a soul full of doubt and sorrow and unfulfilled desire". Like most of the great literary figures of the day, he dwelt over-much on the unpleasant aspects of life and his pictures are of almost unrelieved gloom. He suffered as severely as any from the *mal du siècle*; the disappearing religious tradition had left a void that could not be filled, and Ibsen groped in vain for positive foundations. His influence was extraordinarily widespread: Hauptmann and Sudermann, in Germany, Brieux in France, Shaw in England, before the century was out, were representing on the stage scenes and actions hitherto confined to "realistic" novels, and none disdained to acknowledge the great Norwegian as his master.

The art and literature of the later 19th century are permeated by a crushing sense of frustration and futility. It was not surprising that observers like Max Nordau saw in the wave of *fin de siècle* "decadence", a weakening of the moral fibre of the European peoples, symptom of degeneracy and rottenness.¹ The idols of the past lay around shattered. Democracy and liberty and the "rights of man" had not brought peace and happiness. The old tyrannies had gone only to be replaced by new ones. Parliamentarism brought more corruption than the old autocracies; nationalism brought more wars and hatred than the dynastic quarrels of kings; industrialism brought a slavery almost as deadly as that of the plantations; science became as dogmatic and intolerant as the orthodoxies it claimed to have superseded. Nietzsche revolted at a flabby humanitarianism that seemed to grovel before the trivial and the ignoble, against the futile mediocrity of bourgeois democracy, and demanded an aristocracy of intellect to save society, a new "heroic age" in which men should live and act as men. Darwinism destroyed the Romantic illusions about nature: if to Wordsworth she was sweet and tender, to Tennyson she was savage and remorseless, "red in tooth and claw". The "noble savage" of Rousseau became the "good gorilla" of Renan. Hope died out in the Western world, except perhaps among the anarchists. "Voltaire would have despised a relic," says Chesterton, "but he would scarcely have despised a vote. We do not find them both despised till we come to the age of Oscar Wilde." Desperately anxious to escape from a world that afforded them no pleasure, some shut themselves in their "ivory towers," others fled like Gauguin to the South Seas or like Loti to the eternal East, others sought refuge in strange cults and strange vices. Baudelaire introduced Poe's weird tales to France, artists ceased to cultivate the beautiful and turned to the

¹ Max Nordau's once famous book *Degeneration* (1893) would have been more telling had it been more restrained, but its author lumped together Ibsen's dramas, Zola's novels, Wagner's operas, and the Symbolists' poems in one sweeping condemnation.

grotesque, the mutilated and the ugly,¹ disillusioned rationalists found in Schopenhauer a quasi-Buddhist emphasis on the Will as the sole reality, and Freud and the psychoanalysts, whether they wished it or not, accelerated the "flight from reason". All was in a state of flux. Matter dissolved into electrons; Bergson propounded the view that life was a perpetual "becoming" which never reached finality, the Freudians disintegrated the mental life of man into a confused jumble of unconscious impulses and conflicting emotions, and the "futurist" and "cubist" artists pulled man to pieces in order to build him up again in geometrical units.

Morally, the 19th century closed on a note of sombre tragedy. Maupassant dying of syphilitic brain-disease in the asylum at Charenton, Verlaine reeling, drunk with absinthe, in the gutters of Paris, the mad Nietzsche at Naumburg crying out that he was Christ or Dionysus, Oscar Wilde hounded out of English society for perversions that recalled the days of Catullus and Petronius, were, each in his own way symptoms of a fundamental malady gnawing at the heart of the civilization of Europe. The "decline of the West", the displacement of a decadent Europe from the leadership of the world, appeared already foreshadowed, when the cataclysm of 1914 burst upon a sick Continent.

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A once-famous attack on the *fin de siècle* "decadents". The book is too unbalanced to be convincing, but is not altogether negligible.

¹ The tendency appeared about 1860; thenceforth a number of fantastic crazes succeeded one another in the art world, each more extravagant than its predecessor: Impressionism, Post Impressionism, Cubism, Vorticism, Futurism, Gagaism, etc. For a slashing and perhaps over-severe criticism of these movements from the standpoint of "classical" aesthetics, see F. W. Ruckstall's *Great Works of Art* (1925).

4. SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM

When Francis Bacon, at the close of the Elizabethan age, prophesied that experimental science, rejecting or ignoring the theories of philosophers and devoting itself to the patient accumulation of facts with the practical object of increasing the happiness and comfort of mankind, would produce "a great renewal" of civilization, he would have rejoiced could he have foreseen the amazing extension of our knowledge of the physical universe, the victories over distance and disease, the mechanical inventions and the spread of luxury, which marked the great scientific era of the 19th century. Since Newton's day the prestige of science had been steadily augmented; its results had been summarised and published to the world, especially in France, by men of letters like Fontenelle and Voltaire, Diderot and Buffon, and academies and other learned societies facilitated exchange of views and the communication of fresh discoveries. But in the 19th century the pace was quickened; more and more of nature's secrets were wrested from her; theories more revolutionary than that of Copernicus were propounded and found wide acceptance, and in that utilitarian age, science was gradually yoked to the chariot of industrialism and thus given a practical bias. While the ordinary man, who understood little of evolution, thermodynamics, spectrum analysis or an electromagnetic induction, could fully appreciate ocean cables, telephones, automobiles and wireless telegraphy and thus came to regard science as some beneficent Arabian Night's genie who produced wonders out of the air, the intellectual classes were convincing themselves that evolution was the key that was to unlock the last recesses of the mysterious universe and that dead and purposeless matter was perhaps after all the alpha and omega of reality. During the last years of the 19th century an uncompromising materialism, such as had not been heard of since the days of d'Holbach and La Mettrie, dominated almost all schools of European thought.

The 18th century, until its close, broke little fresh ground in science. It was fascinated by the beauty and perfection of the Newtonian universe, which Burt describes as "a world hard, cold, colourless, silent and dead; a world of quantity, a world of mathematically computable motions in mechanical regularity".¹ Colour and beauty had been transferred from the world itself to the mind of man, for they were "sense-impressions" which might have no objective reality. Had not Newton explained, by a few simple laws, the entire mechanism of the heavens as a perfect machine constructed by the Grand Architect who had wound it up and then left it to run on by itself? There seemed little left to discover, except to decide the exact place occupied by man in this system. Could he also be brought under the rule of natural law? "It would be very singular," remarked Voltaire, "that all nature, all

¹ Burt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science* (1925).

the planets, should obey the eternal laws, and that there should be a little animal, five feet high, who, in contempt of these laws, could act as he pleased, solely according to his caprice".¹ The 19th century was to attempt, with the help of chemistry and physiology, psychology and biology, to ascertain "man's place in nature".

In the last years of the 18th century France was unquestionably the scientific centre of Europe and the Paris Académie des Sciences the home of the most brilliant savants of the age; Lefrange the mathematician, Lavoisier the founder of modern chemistry, Laplace the astronomer, Cuvier and Lamarck the biologists. The patronage of the State added not a little to their prestige. Though a Revolutionary judge sent Lavoisier to the guillotine with the famous remark "The Republic has no need of savants!" the new régime came to look with a favourable eye upon the labours of scientists and enlisted them in the service of the democratic State. The Convention founded a polytechnic school in Paris and frequently consulted the Academy—a practice confirmed and continued by Napoleon, who took a body of scholars and scientists with him on his expedition to Egypt in 1798. Outside France it was a different tale. The universities of Germany were not yet the hives of research they were later to become: Alexander von Humboldt, the greatest naturalist of the day, was more at home in Paris than in Berlin. Across the Channel, official encouragement of science was so meagre and Newton's old university of Cambridge so sterile that a book was written in 1830 with the title of *The Decline of Science in England*. Perhaps in response to this challenge, the British Association was founded the very next year.

Astronomy and physics are the oldest of the sciences, but in the 19th century they were somewhat thrust into the background by the emergence of the new sciences of chemistry and biology, and only returned at the end of that period as a result of the remarkable discoveries made in the realm of electrical phenomena. Chemistry had been slow in shaking itself free of the quackeries and impostures of the old alchemists, who brewed their elixirs and potions down to the 18th century, and it was not until after 1750 that much advance was made in the subject. Priestley and Cavendish in England discovered some of the properties of oxygen, and the latter in 1781 found that water, hitherto considered one of the simple elements, was really a compound of oxygen and hydrogen. The actual names were invented by Lavoisier (1745-1794), "the father of modern chemistry", who established the fundamental principle of the persistence of matter throughout all changes. His experiments proved that every substance, whether changed backwards and forwards into solid, liquid or gas, remains constant in quantity, the same amount being present at the end as at the beginning. Clearly then matter was indestructible: the mass of the universe was unchanging and unchangeable.

The work of Lavoisier led straight on to the revival of the atomic theory by John Dalton (1766-1844), a Quaker schoolmaster who claimed

¹ Quoted by Dampier-Whetham, *A History of Science* (1929), p.214.

about 1803 that the properties of gases could be best explained by the assumption that all matter is, in the last analysis, composed of minute atoms. The ancient theory of Democritus and Lucretius, favourably regarded by Galileo and Newton, was at least submitted to experimental test. Dalton held that, since matter is indestructible, all we accomplish by changing, for example, ice into water and water into steam, is the separation of the tiny particles which are bound tightly together in solids, more loosely in liquids, and move about most freely in gases. He recognized the existence of some twenty "elements", that is, substances pure in themselves and incapable of decomposition, such as hydrogen and oxygen, the constituents of water: the number has since been multiplied to ninety-two.

While chemistry was vindicating for itself a place among the major sciences, much light was being thrown on the curious property of attraction and repulsion possessed by certain bodies on being rubbed—a property which William Gilbert, at the close of the 16th century, had named "electricity" after the Greek word for amber, one of the earliest substances to be electrified by friction. Little further progress was made until the latter half of the 18th century. It was supposed that "electric fluids" existed in all bodies, one fluid being "positive" and exercising attractive force and the other being "negative" and exercising a repellent force; that in most bodies the two fluids were present in equal proportions and therefore neutralized each other, but that in certain "magnetic" bodies there was a preponderance of distribution at the ends, so that an excess of negative fluid would cause the body to repel other bodies and an excess of positive fluid would cause it to attract others. About 1750 Benjamin Franklin discovered that lightning was a form of electric discharge, by flying a kite in a thunder-storm and noticing the electricity enter the metal tip and flow out through a key fastened to the kite-string. To secure a continuous flow of electric current was, however, difficult, owing to the rapidity with which equalization took place between two differently electrified bodies, until two Italians, Galvani and Volta, found a means of storing large quantities of electricity in a "pile" of zinc and copper discs arranged in order. Each copper disc, it was noticed, was slightly higher in electric potential than the zinc, and if both were immersed in an acid solution and connected to each other by a wire, an electric current flowed continuously through the wire. Thus was constructed in 1800 the first battery. Almost immediately the electrical phenomena were linked to chemistry by the discovery that two (positive and negative) wires of a battery brought together under water will send out bubbles of hydrogen gas from the negative wire and bubbles of oxygen gas from the other. Evidently electricity could be used to disintegrate compound substances into their separate parts.

These preliminary investigations into electrical phenomena opened up an astoundingly wide field. Ampère reduced the forces due to electric currents to mathematical laws and thus rendered possible the electric telegraph, invented by Samuel Morse in 1836. In the mid-19th

century two Englishmen, Faraday and Maxwell, laid the foundations of electro-magnetism. Michael Faraday (1791-1867) carried out in 1831 the first successful experiment in electro-magnetic induction, reduced the complexity of electro-chemistry to two simple laws named after him, and discovered how the existence of "magnetic fields" created around a wire when a current is passed through it, can be used to produce a continuous current of electricity. His work made possible the commercialization of electricity, for the invention of the dynamo and other machines which have revolutionized modern industry followed directly upon his experiments. "Not only do Faraday's experiments underlie the later development in theoretical and applied electro-chemistry, but the ideas which he formulated are the basis on which has been built the whole great structure of modern atomic and electromagnetic science."¹ Clerk Maxwell (1831-1879) brilliantly reduced Faraday's discoveries to mathematical formulae, showed that light was an electro-magnetic wave, and prepared the way for the discovery of the Hertzian (wireless), Röntgen and other waves.

It was early observed that an electric current, passing through a conductor, produced heat. The problem of the exact nature of heat soon led to the theory of the conservation of energy and the laws of thermo-dynamics. That heat was a form of energy had long been suspected, but it was not until about 1850 that James Joule discovered the mathematical relation between temperature and work expended. Energy in any system was found to be a constant quantity, the proportion that was lost as work reappearing as heat. Now heat always passes from a hot to a less hot body until the temperature of both are equal. According to Lord Kelvin (1824-1908), this irreversible process, continuing throughout the entire universe, will ultimately reduce everything to one uniform temperature.² When this takes place, no more supplies of heat will be available and no further work will be possible. All the energy in existence will have been converted into heat distributed throughout nature at an even temperature. The universe will run down and die. The machinery of the cosmos is steadily approaching destruction, for once run down, we know of no way of winding it up again. This gloomy prophecy has not commanded general adhesion, but it served to temper the excessive optimism with which the 19th century hailed every fresh advance in science. The theory of the dissipation of cosmical energy is known as the law of entropy, the second law of thermodynamics.

Lavoisier's proof of the persistence of matter throughout all chemical changes, the atomic theory of Dalton, the reduction by Faraday and Maxwell of the phenomena of electricity and magnetism to mathematical laws, and the formulation by Kelvin and others of the principles of thermodynamics, made less noise in the world than the biological revolution launched by the publication of Darwin's *Origin of*

¹ Dampier-Whetham, *op. cit.*, p.236.

² The Sun is almost our sole source of energy, which it radiates as heat, so that its temperature is steadily falling.

Species in 1859. The chemists and physicists were dealing with impersonal entities and their work could be viewed with impartial detachment, but the biologists, who suddenly leapt into the limelight during the latter half of the century, laid rude hands on man himself and audaciously challenged accepted traditions concerning the origin and development of life. They carried through in the teeth of the fiercest opposition, a second "Copernican revolution," and it was long before the smoke and dust of that formidable conflict cleared away.

Before the evolution theory was formulated, the ground had been to some extent prepared by work in organic chemistry, physiology, and most of all geology. In the two first-named sciences the Germans took the lead and discovered a whole series of important new facts. In 1828 Wöhler, by synthesizing urea, showed that substances hitherto found only in living bodies could be artificially manufactured in the laboratory. Organic substances were gradually classified in three groups, as proteins, fats, and carbohydrates—the element carbon appeared significantly in each. Gall, a Viennese doctor, found that the "grey matter" was the essential part of the brain; Johannes Müller showed that sensation depends on the nature of the sense-organs—pressure on or irritation of the optic nerve produce the sensation of light, as well as light itself, Von Baer discovered that the prenatal growth of man is similar to that of animals; Schwann and Schleiden in 1838 announced that the bodies of all higher animals were made up of tiny units which they named cells, and the great French bacteriologist Pasteur (1822-1895) disproved the old theory of spontaneous generation by showing that infectious diseases in plants, animals and men could almost invariably be traced to the presence of bacteria (microscopic vegetable organisms) introduced by germs from without. When even an orthodox Catholic like Schwann could believe that the living body was merely a physico-chemical machine, it was not surprising that physiologists as a whole came to be more and more infected by a materialistic outlook.

Geology heralded the coming revolution in thought by overthrowing the old belief, based on a literal interpretation of the "six days" of Genesis, that the world was at most six or seven thousand years old. Leonardo da Vinci, in the days of the Renaissance, had perceived that fossils were the remains of animals and plants, and discussions afterwards arose as to whether marine fossils found on high mountains had got there as a result of the upheaval of the Deluge. In the 18th century Buffon boldly proposed to estimate the earth's age at 70,000 years. Modern geology was founded by James Hutton, whose *Theory of the Earth* appeared in 1795 and advocated the thesis that the stratification of rocks and the embedding of fossils was a process that was still going on. Georges Cuvier compared the fossils of extinct animals with the structure of existing ones and thus indicated that the past must be linked to the present. In 1826 a Catholic priest discovered some human and animal bones in a cave at Torquay which pointed clearly to a far more remote origin than had hitherto been thought of. Sir Charles Lyell published in 1830 his great *Principles of Geology*, which collected all

the facts then known as to how the earth had been moulded by the action of water, volcanoes and earthquakes.

The simple idea of evolution, as distinct from the facts advanced in proof of it, can be traced, like so many other theories, back to the Greeks, among whom Heracleitus and Empedocles taught that everything was in a state of flux and that life was a process of continual change, of sifting and winnowing, the purpose of which was to produce more perfect from imperfect forms. Some thinkers of antiquity even guessed that this process arose from the fact that those types who were better fitted to their environment survived, while others died out. But they got no further than guesses, and for two thousand years no attempt was made to collect evidence in support of the thesis. The scientific revival of the 17th century brought with it a firm belief in the "fixity of species," and this, reinforced by the Protestant insistence on the literal interpretation of the Biblical narratives, led everyone who gave a thought to the matter to conclude that each distinct species had been created separately and had no organic connection with any other. Every elephant was descended from the first pair of elephants, every sparrow from the first pair of sparrows, and so forth. The notion that birds and reptiles, insects and mammals, might possibly have all originated from some common form of primitive life would have been scouted as the absurdest nonsense.

Nevertheless, a few philosophers and scientists inclined to favour the "development" hypothesis. Buffon was impressed by the changes produced in animals by a modification of their environment. Erasmus Darwin, the grandfather of the great naturalist, asked whether it "would be too bold to imagine that all warm blooded animals have arisen from one living filament, with the power of acquiring new parts and of continuing to improve by its own inherent activity and of delivering down these improvements by generation to its posterity". Lamarck (1744-1829) advanced the discussion a big stage forward by suggesting that changes of climate, soil, etc., would necessarily modify the habits of living creatures and either alter their existing organs or call new ones into being, these changes in bodily structure being passed on to their descendants.¹ He adduced the famous example of the giraffe's neck which became longer and longer through continual stretching after leaves or branches just beyond his reach. Lamarck thus stressed "the inheritance of acquired characters", as responsible for changes which might ultimately produce an entirely new species.

Thus evolution was "in the air" long before Darwin. This is not to detract in the slightest from that great genius of science, the Newton of biology, whose supreme merit it was to produce, by years of patient exertion, proofs and illustrations sufficient in number and cogency to force the problem of evolution on the attention of the whole world. From a philosophic fancy it became a living issue which no longer admitted of being ignored. So powerful indeed were the arguments

¹ The change in environment would produce a new *need*, this would lead to a new *effort*, which resulted in individual modification. Note that this theory presupposed the existence of *mind* in the creature; the modification was due to conscious effort, not to blind chance.

advanced by Darwin that evolution became a catchword of the public and the watchword of a party. It penetrated every department of thought ; it was seized upon by philosophers and poets, politicians and historians, and given strange twists and interpretations that would have astonished its author, who was for less "Darwinian" than many of his ardent followers. No scientific hypothesis ever enjoyed so widespread a vogue, so lasting a popularity.

Charles Darwin (1809-1882) came of a family whose scientific proclivities were strong, and his grandfather Erasmus was no mean naturalist. When only twenty-two, he sailed in 1831 on the celebrated voyage of the *Beagle*, a ship especially equipped and sent out to South America on a naturalist mission. For five years young Darwin, like Alexander von Humboldt thirty years before him, explored a good deal of that little known continent and studied the teeming plant, animal and insect life of its tropical and sub-tropical lands. Returning to England, he chanced to read in 1838 Malthus's *Essay on Population*, originally published in 1798, which purported to show that increase in population always outstripped that in the food supply and the starvation of the masses was only averted by the agency of war, disease, and the postponement of marriage. This gloomy book, whose fallacies were then unrecognised and which exercised a most depressing influence in its day, gave Darwin the idea that all living nature was engaged in a continuous "struggle for life," that millions more creatures are born than can possibly live, and that those types possessing qualities of "survival value" to assist them in this struggle alone survived, and the qualities that enabled them to do so spread through the race owing to the elimination of those who did not possess them. The result was, in Herbert Spencer's famous phrase, "the survival of the fittest". For twenty years Darwin busied himself with collecting all the evidence he could find in favour of this theory, and finally in 1859 the *Origin of Species* was given to the world.

The book gave rise to one of the most resounding controversies in the history of science. Darwin, of course, did not originate the idea of evolution : he showed, by the most plausible hypothesis yet advanced, how evolution *might* have worked, namely, by what he termed "natural selection". Nature selects those qualities which are most useful in the struggle for existence ; these qualities are inherited by subsequent generations, those who do not possess them die off, and gradually a new species is established. Lamarck thought the giraffe acquired his long neck through constantly stretching after the foliage of trees. But according to Darwin, some giraffes in the beginning had slightly longer necks than their fellows, by reason presumably of some variation in the germ-plasm. When no food was to be obtained on the ground, the long-necked giraffes were able to eat the leaves of high trees while the short-necked ones went without, starved and died out. The long-necked survivors thus gave rise to a new species the average length of whose necks was much greater than that of the original species. The attack on Darwin came from two quarters : from outraged divines who felt that

the theory contravened the first chapter of Genesis, struck at the argument from design, by showing nature working through "blind chance", and reduced man to the level of a mere brute with apes as his first cousins, and from many of his fellow scientists, including the great German ethnologist Virchow, who found the theory too bold and lacking sufficient proof. Too much has perhaps been made of the first class of opponents and too little of the second. It should not be forgotten that Bishop Wilberforce, in his foolish attack on Darwin's champion Huxley at Oxford in 1860, is said to have been primed with anti-evolutionary arguments by Sir Richard Owen, the greatest English naturalist of the day. Theologians, like other people, accept the science of their time and are perhaps naturally more conservative than most, yet we must admit that many of the champions of evolution went much further than Darwin himself and propounded with dogmatic assurance the most blatantly materialistic and anti-religious theories on the flimsiest of evidence. In Germany in particular the most extravagant forms of "Darwinismus" ran riot, culminating in 1899 in Haeckel's celebrated *Riddle of the Universe*.

Darwin's work helped to bring into being the science of anthropology. As early as 1863 Huxley, by a comparison of the anatomical structure of apes and man, replaced man where Linnaeus had put him a century before, as first in the order of Primates, the distant cousin of the gorilla and the chimpanzee. Darwin gave his own opinion on the subject in *The Descent of Man*. Geographical discovery also helped to provide evidence from hitherto unknown primitive races of the physical, moral, social, and religious evolution of man. The labours of the great explorers of the mid-19th century provided ethnologists with an embarrassing wealth of material, as strange tribes and stranger customs were progressively revealed in different parts of the world. The rites and beliefs of the American Indian, the Australian blackfellow and the African Pigmy were carefully studied. Extinct races were unearthed by the spade of the archaeologist. Curious fragments of skull and bone were dug up, some of which, such as those found in Neanderthal in Germany (1856), in Java (1891) and at Piltdown in Sussex (1912), were expected to supply the "missing links" in the chain of descent supposed to connect modern man with his ape-like ancestors. The evidence, however, was tantalizing incomplete. The Neanderthal man was undoubtedly human, since he knew the use of fire and buried his dead, but the experts could not agree whether the Java "man" and the Piltdown "man" were apes, humans, or some "intermediate" creatures.

Although much has been written about the "conflict" between science and religion in the 19th century, less attention has been paid to the conflict between science and philosophy and to the strange attempts at reconciliation made later. Since the Renaissance, philosophy had cut adrift from its religious basis but had found none other to which to attach itself. Descartes separated faith and reason, matter and spirit, and the see-saw of Idealism and Materialism issued in the blank scepticism of Hume. Kant attempted to save the situation by criticising the grounds

of our knowledge and dividing reality into two compartments, noumena, the "things in themselves", which lie behind the external world and can be grasped only by an act of moral intuition, and phenomena, the world of outward appearances present to our senses. Science is concerned only with the latter: it can affirm nothing of God or the soul or any other super-sensible entity, since it is incapable of penetrating the noumenal world. As his philosophy stressed Mind and taught that to reach reality we must transcend the world of sensible appearance, it was named Transcendental Idealism, and dominated the schools of Germany for half a century. Kant himself was keenly interested in science and was a physicist of no mean competence, but his successors, particularly Hegel, convinced themselves that the world of appearance as well as that of reality was the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind and that a complete philosophy of nature could be constructed *a priori* without the aid of experimental science, which they despised as crabbed, narrow and materialistic. Open warfare was now waged between the scientists and the Idealist philosophers. The former regarded with contempt the grandiose system of Hegel: the latter sought to disparage Newton, the idol of their enemies. "Three times," said Hegel, "has an apple proved fatal. First to the human race in the fall of Adam, secondly to Troy through the gift of Paris, and last of all to science through the fall of Newton's apple."¹ Goethe attempted to discredit Newton by framing a new theory of colour, which failed, however, to stand the tests of analysis. The scientists, deriding the fogginess of Hegelian idealism, went their way, ignored the metaphysicians and took for granted that the model of Nature they were busy constructing in their laboratories was a true picture of the ultimate reality. The philosophers, and with them the Romantics, whose conception of genius as intuitive led naturally to a scorn of experimental science, declared with lofty disdain that the universe could be apprehended without the aid of physics or chemistry, which pursuits were unworthy of a great intellect.

By the middle of the century, however, the situation had changed. Hegelianism was a spent force. Romanticism had withered away after the disillusionment of 1848. The success of science in its search for the laws underlying natural phenomena, and still more the mechanical inventions being placed on the market in rapid succession, which owed their existence to scientific research, seized hold of the public imagination. As each new discovery was announced, optimists imagined that the solution of the problems of ages was near at hand. Were not ancient mysteries, which had puzzled sages from time immemorial, being cleared up one after another? And did not everything tend to show that matter was the base of the universe? Lavoisier had proved its persistence through all chemical changes, Dalton had reduced all substances to a combination of material atoms, and physiologists had traced many actions of mind and body, hitherto assigned to spiritual causes, to mechanical stimulation. The theory of energy weakened the belief that a "vital force" controlled living beings, since it appeared that animals, like

¹ Quoted by Dawson, *Progress and Religion* (1929), p.27.

machines, could only work if supplied with energy. Kelvin's second law of thermodynamics announced the ultimate "death of the universe" and seemed to many a justification of materialism.

By about 1850 philosophic materialism was establishing itself in the schools of Germany, and the most extravagant theories were preached which were alleged to rest on scientific foundations. The mechanists produced no outstanding thinker, but their philosophy, in its general outline, won wide acceptance during the latter half of the century, and was strongly reinforced by Darwin's evolutionism. Moleschott in 1852, starting from Lavoisier, held that life was a perpetual circulation of matter from the inorganic to the organic world. Bücher in 1855 declared evolution to be the cause of the order in the world and mind to be but matter in motion. "The brain secretes thought," remarked Vogt in a famous sentence, "as the liver secretes bile," or to put it more technically, "psychical activity is nothing but radiation through the cells of the grey substance of the brain of motion set up by external stimuli." The reaction against Hegel could go no further.

English philosophers were more cautious. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) who set out, like Hegel, to construct a grand "synthetic philosophy" embracing all departments of knowledge, was preaching a complete theory of evolution some years before Darwin became known. The universe and all in it had developed from the simple to the complex and was the product of a blind, mechanical process. Whether there was a God or any spiritual force behind the external world we could never be certain: did such a deity exist, he must remain for ever "unknowable", though cynics declared that Spencer seemed to know quite a lot about him. Huxley, the man who did more than any other man to popularize Darwin's views, was of a similar opinion. Yet he was no uncompromising materialist, since he believed matter to be "the phenomena of consciousness". Beyond phenomena we can neither affirm nor deny anything: we must be "agnostics" or "not-knowers". God may exist, but we can know nothing about him. Though Tyndall, in his famous address to the British Association at Belfast in 1874, declared matter to be "the promise and potency of all terrestrial life" and Kingdon Clifford in the same year prophesied that in a short time as good evidence would be found of the non-existence of God as we already have of the non-existence of a planet between Venus and the earth, few scientists were found to champion an unabashed materialist atheism, or even to go so far as Haeckel, who in his *Riddle of the Universe* (1899), propounded a monist philosophy and asserted that the simplest form of living protoplasm arises from carbon compounds by a process of spontaneous generation, of which, however, no convincing proof was offered. Many 19th century scientists, while assuming mechanistic determinism as a working principle, were none the less profoundly religious men, albeit somewhat confused thinkers.

It cannot be denied, however, that materialism was held, if not as a clear and coherent philosophy, at any rate as a vague faith, especially by men who were compelled to assume in the laboratory or dissecting

room that man was a machine and that the workings of nature are explicable in terms of mathematical laws, irrespective of any guiding Force or Intelligence. As Whitehead puts it : " A scientific realism based on mechanism is conjoined with an unwavering belief in the world of men and of the higher animals as being composed of self-determining organisms. This radical inconsistency at the basis of modern thought accounts for much that is half-hearted and wavering in our civilization."¹ The later 19th century really did believe that the mysteries of ages were within an ace of being solved, and that God and final causes were now unnecessary postulates. Though no link between the living and the non-living had yet been found, though no one could explain how mind had evolved from the mind-less, and though Mach in 1883 pointed out that science only constructs a model of what our senses tell us about nature and that mechanics may be merely one aspect of that model rather than the ultimate reality, the cocksure popularisers of science were loudly proclaiming that the origin of life and of the universe had been finally explained by " evolution". " The men of the 19th century," says Ferrero, maliciously, " thought they knew everything. We know they knew nothing." Science had become a veritable cult : indeed serious attempts were made to invest it with a kind of religious awe. Comte prided himself that his new religion of Humanity purged of all supernatural elements and based on positivist philosophy, was thoroughly " scientific" : was not Sociology, the positive science of man, the culmination of intellectual progress? Renan, in *L'Avenir de la Science*, written in 1848 but not published till 1890, foresaw science enthroned in the place once occupied by theology.² The theory of evolution was pressed into the service of many strange ideas. Thus writers were found who asserted that the moral instincts are but chance variations preserved and deepened by natural selection. Nietzsche declared that Christianity taught " a slave-morality", that brute force alone would help a nation in its " struggle-for-life", and that the Superman of the future would be as superior to present day man as the latter is to the apes—an attitude that explains much of German pre-war " Kultur". In France and elsewhere " le struggleforlifeisme" was made the excuse for contravening conventional morality, and produced the curiously morbid and unhealthy *fin de siècle* mentality. Novelists like Zola constructed their books on " scientific" principles ; revolutionists like Marx announced that only " scientific socialism" would strike the fetters from the oppressed proletariat. Yet the cold agnosticism of science struck a chill into many hearts. " Never in the history of man," complained Romanes, " has so terrible a calamity befallen the race as that which all who look may

¹ *Science and the Modern World* (1926), p.94.

² " La science est donc une religion ; la science seule fera désormais les symboles ; la science seule peut résoudre à l'homme les éternels problèmes dont sa nature exige impérieusement la solution" (*L'Avenir de la Science*, p.108). But note that, in the preface written in 1890, Renan shed much of the optimism of 1848. " Il est donc possible que la ruine des croyances idealistes sont destinée à suivre la ruine des croyances surnaturelles et qu'un abaissement réel du moral de l'humanité date la jour où elle a vu la réalité des choses. A force de chimères, on avait réussi à obtenir du bon gorille un effort moral surprenant, ôtées les chimères une partie de l'énergie factice qu'elles éveillaient disparaître" (p.xviii).

now behold advancing as a deluge, black with destruction, resistless as night, uprooting our most cherished hopes, engulfing our most precious creeds and burying our highest life in mindless desolation."¹ Alfred Noyes has described "the cold sense of reality and the deepening shadow of a new loneliness"² which overcame him, when, as a youth of sixteen, he read Huxley in the last decade of the 19th century, and found that God was a myth, the universe a fortuitous combination of atoms, and the end of all things an eternal death. Neither science nor philosophy, however, was destined to remain in this impasse. The day in 1895 when Röntgen, putting his hand in front of a vacuum-tube, accidentally discovered X-rays, marked a new epoch in the history both of physics and of human thought.

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¹ *A candid Examination of Theism* (1878), p.51.

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5. MARX AND THE NEW SOCIALISM

The individualistic creed of Liberal democracy, which in the days of Bentham and the Mills, seemed set for a universal triumph, was assailed after 1870 by two powerful enemies: nationalism and socialism. The best known and the most successful exponents of these two anti-Liberal movements—Bismarck and Karl Marx—were Germans. Their work was done with German thoroughness. Each gave a new content, or at least a new strength, to the political or economic system which he championed. Each fought for the soul of Europe over the prostrate body of Liberalism. Though bitter rivals, they had something in common, and Lassalle was almost a link between them. Bismarck was something of a socialist, Marx was not altogether a stranger to nationalist prejudices.

Early socialism had been a strangely vague and chaotic creed, a confused and indignant protest against the shocking exploitation of white workers by the masters of capital and industry in England and France. Saint-Simon really belonged to the pre-industrial era, and dreamt of a return to what he regarded as the humaner conditions of labour of the later Middle Ages, when master and workman were linked together by a personal and even a religious tie. Fourier's trenchant criticism of a wasteful and irresponsible capitalism was partly nullified by his fantastically utopian schemes of reform. Robert Owen seemed at first more practical, and the co-operative movement is a lasting memorial to him, but he entangled himself in unsuccessful plans for substituting a "labour currency" for ordinary money, and the communistic farm he founded at New Harmony was an utter failure. It was Louis Blanc who insisted that political action must come first and who appealed over the heads of the intellectuals to the workers themselves. The precocious socialism of France, which differed from the contemporary Chartist movement in England in that it was both political and economic, made a brave attempt to dominate the Republic of 1848, but the only result was to frighten the bourgeoisie into suppressing the proletarian movement with all the force at its disposal. In the 'fifties socialism vanished into obscurity, and economic prosperity and higher wages almost reconciled the workers to the capitalist order. In point of fact, however, this period afforded time for socialism's greatest leader to reorganize the movement and set it upon firmer foundations. The philosophy of Marxism was formulated between 1848 and 1870.

Karl Marx (1818-1883) was born of a German Jewish family settled at Trier in the Rhineland. The French Revolution had liberated the Jew from the ghetto and conferred on him full rights of citizenship. Nevertheless, profession of the Christian faith was a necessary passport to the best career, and the elder Marx renounced the synagogue for the church, for the sake, it would appear, of worldly advantage rather than from intellectual conviction. His son was reared neither as a Jew

nor as a Christian :¹ the two creeds cancelled each other out, and the result was the complete rejection of all religious belief. Marx, a clever though unsociable boy, was sent to Bonn University, where he imbibed the notions of the then dominant Hegelian school, and took his doctorate with a thesis on ancient Greek philosophy. Failing to obtain a post at the university, he turned to journalism, became editor of a small Rhenish paper and found himself compelled, because of the vigorous controversy on the agrarian question going on in its columns, to devote himself to a serious study of economics. This converted him to revolutionary politics, to which indeed his temperament and situation inclined him. He really belonged to no nation and to no creed ; religion meant nothing to him, patriotism very little,² so the only escape was by way of revolution. In 1843 he arrived in Paris a convinced Socialist, and here he met Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), who was to be his *alter ego* for the rest of his life. Engels was the son of a German cotton-spinner who had a factory in Manchester, where the youth was sent to learn the business. English industrialism seen at close sight converted him to socialism ; he wrote a book *The Condition of the English Working Class in 1844*, based mainly on the reports of Parliamentary commissions, which supplied the hitherto rather academic and unpractical Marx with the concrete facts necessary to build up his case against capitalism. Expelled from France in 1845, Marx retired to Brussels, where he came in touch with various small revolutionary bodies, for one of which, the Communist League, he drafted the famous Manifesto which appeared on the very eve of the 1848 revolutions.

The overthrow of Metternich and his system enabled Marx to return to Germany, where he conducted a vigorous propaganda not only against the reactionaries but also against all bourgeois democrats and radicals who talked only of political liberty while clinging tenaciously to the rights of property. He diagnosed the German situation correctly : the democratic leaders were feeble and incompetent and terrified of allowing the agitation to go too far. They feared the working classes and wanted a respectable, middle-class revolution, with a Parliament and free institutions. The reaction speedily triumphed ; Marx, though acquitted of a charge of treason, was expelled from Germany. Disillusioned, embittered, and utterly destitute, he and his family sought refuge in London, where for years they lived in poverty and wretchedness in a Soho tenement, kept from starvation only by gifts from the generous Engels. Yet Marx's spirit remained unbroken in adversity ; he founded the International in 1864, attended meetings, wrote articles, and toiled day after day in the reading room of the British Museum, compiling the massive book on capital, the first volume of which appeared in 1867, which he

¹ He is said to have been brought up "nominally" as a Protestant, but it does not appear that he had any understanding of Christianity. He regarded it as a moribund creed, whose history really ended with the French Revolution.

² Yet he seems to have felt the German's contempt for the Slav (see his book *Revolution and Counter-Revolution, or Germany in 1848*), which was one of the motive forces behind his bitter feud with the Russian Anarchist Bakunin. It is amusing to reflect that Marx would probably have heartily despised Lenin.

hoped would be to the workers' revolution what the *Social Contract* had been to the French.

He was indeed the Rousseau, or perhaps rather the Calvin, of socialism, for he provided it with a clear-cut exposition of doctrine and aims, a philosophy of history, a theory of tactic and a detailed plan of the new social order. Had he contented himself with criticising the evils of capitalism, describing the sufferings of the workers or sketching visionary utopias on Fourierist lines, his work would have been valueless, for all this had been done before. Instead, he produced with German thoroughness a detailed analysis of capitalist society, based upon an enormous accumulation of facts, placed that society in its historical setting, proved (or seemed to prove) why it was doomed to destruction, and pointed to the inevitability of a successful socialist revolution, not in the distant but in the immediate future. This insistence on the impending collapse of the capitalist régime was a tower of strength to Marxism: it encouraged the working classes in the same way as the first Christians had been encouraged by the belief in the Second Coming of the Lord and the destruction of the pagan Babylon.

Marx's philosophy was borrowed largely from Hegel, his economics from Ricardo and Adam Smith. It is important, however, to note that he took over from Hegel only the latter's method, not his results. To Hegel the historical process was the gradual realization of the idea of freedom. In the Oriental despotisms only one (the sovereign) was free; in the Graeco-Roman world, which rested on a basis of slavery, only a few were free; among the modern European nations the time is rapidly approaching when all will be free. To Marx, however, the most vital fact in history was the perpetual struggle of classes, the haves against the have-nots, patricians against plebeians, lords against serfs, aristocrats against bourgeois, employers against workers. "These warring classes of society," he said, "are always the products of the modes of production and of exchange—in a word, of the economic conditions of their time." All history—the rise and fall of dynasties and empires, the growth of religions and philosophies and legal systems—is based in the last analysis on economic necessity. Before we can worship gods, or paint pictures, or elaborate moral codes, or spin philosophical theories, we must eat, drink, and clothe ourselves. That is the fundamental fact. Every civilization develops certain modes of production and exchange, and its institutions are but the reflections of its economic system. Thus ancient classical society was based on slavery, feudal society was based on land, bourgeois society is based on liquid capital. This is the famous Materialist Interpretation of History, which Marx and Engels considered their peculiar discovery. By applying to the historical process thus explained Hegel's "dialectical" key, the inevitability of socialism was shown. According to Hegel, the most universal of all relations is that of contrast or opposition. Every positive has a negative, and the contradictions are united to form a new positive whole. The union of thesis and antithesis produces a synthesis, this in turn creates its own opposite, and so on. Mind and body, truth and falsehood, good and evil, freedom and slavery,

how could anything positive emerge at all save from the clash of these opposites? Apply this to the class conflicts of history. The agrarian society of feudal landlords was destroyed by the urban middle class in the French Revolution : out of this struggle came industrial capitalism. This latter also contains within itself the seeds of its own dissolution, for the capitalist society of bankers and manufacturers will be destroyed in its turn by the workers : out of this struggle will come the classless socialist order of the future. The proletarian revolution is as certain and inevitable as tomorrow's sunrise ; it follows from the inexorable logic of the historical process. Does this mean that we must simply await it with folded arms ? By no means, answers Marx, it is our duty to hasten the process by every means in our power ; we must work actively for the overthrow of the capitalist régime, and at the right moment the workers must seize by force the machinery of the State and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat, the transitional stage between the actual revolution and the realization of the full socialist order, where all classes and indeed the State itself will have disappeared. Hegel, who discovered in the Prussian Monarchy the highest embodiment of the Absolute, would indeed have been startled to find his dialectic and his philosophy of history pressed into the service of revolutionary socialism.

Marx's economic theories were not original : he derived them from the English writers he read in the British Museum. From Adam Smith came the labour theory of value, i.e., the belief that the value of an article is determined by the amount of labour that goes to its production. From Ricardo came the "iron law" of wages, itself derived from Malthus's theory that population always tends to outrun the food supply and so poverty is rendered inevitable ; competition among wage-earners tends to drive wages down to the lowest level of subsistence. The labourer would earn enough just to keep him and his family alive ; under the competitive system his wage would never rise. He toils to produce an article, is paid only a small fraction of its value, the "surplus value" going to the capitalist in the form of rent, interest, or commercial profit. Thus labour is robbed of its due reward. Needless to say, these theories have been subjected to severe criticism. Leaving aside the fact that the value of a commodity may depend quite as much on its rarity or on the amount of demand for it as well as on the labour expended on its production, there is the further objection that Marx painted a wholly misleading picture of the capitalist as a man who received enormous profits while doing no work. It may be true that in large-scale businesses the directors and shareholders have nothing to do but draw their dividends, and monopolists of land, minerals or credit may also be described as "idle rich," but small capitalists usually work as hard as their employees, and Marx took no account whatever of the highly paid managers, technicians, scientific experts, and "brain-workers" of all kinds without whom no large enterprise could be run at all.

The trouble was that Marx, like most reformers, saw everything in black and white. The world for him was divided simply into capitalists and workers. In the *Communist Manifesto* of 1847 he declared that

"society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat." He shrewdly foresaw that unrestrained competition would lead to monopoly, since under such a system the weakest go to the wall, the strongest and most unscrupulous survive, the smaller capitalist sinks to the proletarian level, and the control of industry passes to a handful of fabulously rich men. He thought this would mean the end of capitalism. "The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property is sounded. The expropriators are expropriated." The Manifesto closed on a note of lyrical enthusiasm: "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workers of the world, unite!"

The prophecy remained unfulfilled. The growth of monopoly in the form of great trusts, corporations and cartels, which was a marked feature of the later 19th century, certainly decreased the number of active capitalists, but it led to an enormous increase in the number of the *rentier* class, persons of comparatively small means living passively on their dividends. The larger the company the more numerous the shareholders, who will naturally be defenders of the capitalist system by which they profit. Even working-men frequently invested their savings in industrial concerns, thereby becoming less enthusiastic for a revolution that would lead to the loss of their investments. The ramifications of industrial, commercial and financial capitalism had become world-wide by 1900, the quest for fresh markets and new fields of investment stimulated the mad imperialism of the "jingo" period, backward and undeveloped countries were forcibly "opened up," and persuasive salesmen arrived in the African jungle to thrust Manchester cotton goods on naked negroes. This should have resulted, according to Marx, in the creation of an international labour movement, the organization of the proletariat of all lands, before whose united attack capitalism should fall. But Marx reckoned without the forces of nationalism and racial pride. To get the white worker to feel any solidarity or kinship with the lowly-paid black or yellow worker was well-nigh impossible. And the patriotism of the worker was almost as strong as that of the bourgeoisie: in 1914 every Socialist party in Europe gave its support to the capitalist government in its own country. Marx, like his master Hegel, was too logical and rational, and made no allowance for the large element of irrationality in human nature. The final paradox of Marxism is that the socialist revolution came, not in the highly industrialized countries like England, Germany and the United States, but in semi-feudal, semi-oriental Russia, a country of landlords and peasants, where bourgeois capitalism was hardly a generation old.

"Marx," says Dawson, "was one of those exiles of Israel like Spinoza, whose isolation from the religious community of their fathers serves only to intensify their proud consciousness of a prophetic mission."¹ Is it

¹ *Religion and the Modern State* (1935), p. 86. Cp. Levine, *Faithful Rebels* (1936).

possible to isolate any specifically Jewish elements in his thought? Can we see in the conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie an echo of the conflict between the Chosen People and the Gentiles that know not the Lord? Is not the destruction of bourgeois society as a result of the mighty world revolution reminiscent of the inexorable divine judgement upon the idolators of Babylon? And what is the reign of the triumphant proletariat but the New Jerusalem of the Socialist Apocalypse? Marx's vision, it has been said, was the Kingdom of God upon earth—without God. He was the last of the Hebrew prophets, consumed with a burning fury against the oppressors of the poor, intensely proud of his mission, cold, suspicious and jealous of all rivals, fervent and intolerant in his very atheism. Somewhere in Marxism there is a soul.

This passionate fervour probably accounts for the contradictions in Marx's thought. We learn that there is no absolute standard of morals, that the ethics of a given society are mainly reflections of that society's economic status, that the essential principle of morality is conformity to the spirit of one's class: why then does Marx waste so much moral indignation on wicked, blood-sucking capitalists who are only acting in the interests of their class? To betray one's class is the real immorality; then surely Marx, a failed bourgeois, is himself a traitor! If the dialectic be true, what guarantee is there that the classless socialist order of the future is destined to endure? Might it not, on Hegelian principles, contain within itself its own contradiction, and give place ultimately to a different order? Why should history suddenly stop when the revolution is accomplished?

Marxism must repel many for graver reasons than logical fallacies, for its materialism, its glorification of violence, its cold inhumanity. Materialistic determinism enjoyed a great vogue in the Germany of 1850, and Marx went further even than Feuerbach and other radicals of the Hegelian Left in denouncing as weak and flabby sentimentalism all profession of belief in moral and spiritual values. Strange indeed that the fiercest enemy of bourgeois civilization should have been attracted by the very materialism which other critics found so repulsive; one is inclined to agree with Berdyaev when he said that the real cleavage is not between capitalist and proletarian, who both believe that man lives by bread alone, but between those who are interested in things of the spirit and those who are not.¹ The *Communist Manifesto* opens with a panegyric on the glorious *material* achievements of the bourgeois epoch. "The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all the preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's forces to machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of

¹ This point is put more brutally by Spengler, who describes the belief that the worth of a man is to be reckoned by the amount of wealth he possesses as "the standpoint of proletarian and parvenu, who are at bottom one and the same type, the same weed of a metropolitan pavement—from the thief and the tub-thumping agitator to the speculator in stocks or party advantage." *The Hour of Decision* (Eng. tr. 1934), p. 89.

the ground—what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour? ” Secondly, Marxism was a gospel of bitterness and hate. Not even Nietzsche could have spurned so contemptuously the Christian doctrine of love. In the class conflict no quarter was to be asked or given, and the “ exploiters ” were to be mercilessly “ liquidated ” in a bloody revolution. It is doubtless true that Marx did not invent the class war and that the bourgeois governing class had long used all the machinery of the State to keep the workers in subjection. It is also true that so respected a Liberal as Gladstone once declared that “ had the people of England obeyed the precept to eschew violence and maintain order, the liberties of this country would never have been won.” But the Liberal and the Christian agree that brute force is not a good thing in itself and is to be used only as a last resort when all other means of redressing grievances have failed. The Marxist seems to have a fondness for violence for its own sake : the bloodier the revolution the better. “ There is no way of breaking the class will of the enemy,” said Trotsky, “ except by the systematic and energetic use of violence.” The Marxian appeal to class hatred must be held partly responsible for that resort to force which is becoming so common and so dangerous a feature of modern life.

Finally, the socialist society envisaged by Marx seemed to leave small room for human freedom. Marx indeed promised that when the workers were in power the State would gradually “ wither away ” : there would be no necessity for it when all class distinctions had been done away with. Critics declared that it would be more likely that the immediate effect of the revolution would be an enormous extension of the State’s power and the creation of a vast bureaucracy of paid officials to supervise the transition from an individualist to a collectivist economy. “ When from regulation of the workers by the bureaucracy,” said Herbert Spencer, “ we turn to the bureaucracy itself, and ask how *it* is to be regulated, there is no satisfactory answer. Under such conditions, there must arise a new aristocracy, for the support of which the masses must toil, and which, being consolidated, would wield a power far beyond that of any past aristocracy.”¹ It was this threatened despotism of the State which made Marxism anathema both to Liberals like Spencer and to Anarchists like Bakunin. Marx was an authoritarian with no love for liberal democracy, which he regarded as a device invented by the bourgeoisie to delude the worker into believing that he was a free man instead of a capitalist slave. He pleaded for humanity but had little love for the individual. Possibly he hated the capitalists more than he loved the workers. He saw mankind only in the aggregate, in the mass ; his ideal apparently was a society of human bees, from whom all individual initiative had been remorselessly crushed out. Is it without significance that Marxism triumphed in a country that had never known either a free Church or a free State but had been inured for centuries to a semi-oriental despotism ?

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, vol. III, p. 588. This is exactly what has happened in Soviet Russia. Cp. Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed* (Eng. tr. 1937).

Next to laying the theoretical foundations of the new scientific socialism in "Capital," Marx's most important work was to co-ordinate all the revolutionary forces in Europe into a comprehensive "International." The reactionary victories of 1848-49 had for a time shattered both the proletarian and the bourgeois reformist movements. The fifties were a period of comparative calm. But the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War, the triumph of the Italian Risorgimento in 1859-60, the reforms of the Tsar Alexander, and the Polish rebellion of 1863, revived dying hopes, and in 1864 the International Working Men's Association was, to the alarm of established governments, formed in London. It was joined by revolutionaries of all types, from democratic nationalists like Mazzini to communistic anarchists like Bakunin. But it was soon clear that no common basis of agreement could be reached as between these divergent groups, nor was everyone prepared to submit to the dictatorial rule of Marx, who brooked no rivals and demanded unconditional obedience. He marked down Mazzini as a bourgeois idealist of the type he so bitterly detested; the Italian leader anticipated excommunication by a speedy withdrawal. The French members were found to be infected by the teachings of Proudhon, an individualist who believed in a kind of voluntary federative socialism rather than in collectivism, disapproved of violent revolution, and put his faith in the peasants rather than the town workers. Marx demanded that they repudiate their leader: they refused and broke away. Most spectacular of all was the duel between Marx and Bakunin for the control of the International. Michael Bakunin (1821-1876) was a Russian aristocrat who at twenty left the army for revolutionary politics, studied Hegel in Berlin and Proudhon in Paris, fought in the 1848 revolution in Germany, was arrested and handed over to the Russians, by whom he was exiled to Siberia, whence he escaped in 1861, via Japan and the United States, back to Europe. He was an extreme individualist who denounced all governments as engines of tyranny and corruption, recognized no authority but that of reason and science, demanded the abolition of the State and the organization of the human race in tiny, self-governing units, a federation of free associations. He was thus the real founder of modern Anarchism. The Anarchists and the Socialists agreed in denouncing private property and in defending the use of force and bloodshed to oust the "exploiters." They could not agree on the nature of the new social order. Bakunin fiercely opposed Marxism as State socialism, the very negation of freedom; he hated Jews, distrusted all abstract, intellectual systems, cared more for the peasants than for the proletariat, and failed completely to share Marx's admiration for the material achievements of bourgeois culture. "Marx wants what we want: the complete triumph of economic and social equality," he wrote, "but he wants it in the State and through the State power, through the dictatorship of a very strong and so to say despotic provisional government, that is, by the negation of liberty—We want the reconstruction of society and the unification of mankind to be achieved, not from above downwards, by any sort of authority, or by socialist officials, engineers and other accredited men of

learning—but from below upwards, by the free federation of all kinds of workers' association liberated from the yoke of the State."¹ Marx was not the kind of man to accept this sort of criticism. After a series of discreditable intrigues, he secured the expulsion of Bakunin from the International in 1872.² But it was a hollow victory: the International, shattered by internecine dissension, was itself dissolved in 1876.

With the disappearance of the International, Marx stood alone. The man who had done more than anybody to make socialism a living force in European life was deserted save by a handful of devoted followers, including the ever faithful Engels. In England, where he lived for over thirty years, he was ignored: the French socialists would not forgive his treatment of Proudhon, the Germans were inclined to follow Lassalle, who had lived and worked among them, while the revolutionaries of Russia, Italy and Spain had been converted to Bakunin's Anarchism, which because of its appeal to the peasants and the "déclassés" and its emphasis on federalism, the organizational principle of the pre-capitalist era, naturally took hold of agricultural countries where industry was in a relatively backward condition. The failure of the Paris Commune of 1871 convinced most socialists that the bourgeois State was too strong to be overthrown by direct assault: the alternative was to form political parties, secure election to the national legislatures, work first for small social reforms, and look forward to the time when they should obtain a parliamentary majority and be in a position to introduce socialism by peaceful constitutional means. This policy was first adopted in Germany, where as early as 1874 nine socialist deputies were elected to the Reichstag, and in 1875 the German Social Democratic party drew up the Gotha programme, an official statement of its aims. The document was sent to Marx, but the venerable prophet denounced with biting fury the treachery of his so-called disciples, who were allowing themselves to be trapped by the capitalist enemy into compromising with the bourgeois State. His criticisms were unheeded, and he died in 1883, wondering uneasily, perhaps, if his life work had not, after all, been a failure.

After 1880 socialism of the moderate, parliamentary variety spread rapidly over Europe. It was the age of universal suffrage, of the democracy of the masses, the workmen everywhere had the vote and could make his political influence felt. Industrial capitalism had come to Germany after the war of 1870, and was moving steadily across Central into Eastern Europe, where even isolated Russia felt the impact after 1890. Except among the Anarchists and their successors the Syndicalists, nothing more was heard of a forcible seizure of power; yet the governments were nervous and the spectre of the "red terror" continued to haunt Europe. What if the masses, goaded to desperation by some.

¹ Quoted by Otto Rühle, *Karl Marx* (Eng. tr. 1929), p. 291. Bakunin's views are best expressed in his book *God and The State* (Eng. tr. 1882), written apparently to show that he believed in neither.

² Bakunin was expelled for "resorting to fraudulent manoeuvres in order to possess himself of other people's property" (he was alleged to have embezzled 25,000 francs)—a strange accusation to be brought by a revolutionary party whose professed object was to abolish private property.

serious economic crisis, got out of hand? It was the astute Bismarck, who first conceived the policy of "killing socialism with kindness." Having failed in an attempt to suppress Social Democracy by the same methods Metternich had once used against the Liberals, he decided to use the old Prussian tradition of bureaucratic paternalism to provide the German workmen with insurance against accident, sickness and unemployment, with old-age pensions and free education for their children. The workman, better fed and better housed, with working hours shortened and possessing a security he had never before enjoyed, would, it was hoped, cease to plot revolution. The social insurance laws failed to check the growth of Social Democracy in Germany, as the workers were persuaded that the State was only paying them back part of that of which they had been robbed by the capitalists, but they at least took the sting out of much of the agitation against the bourgeois order. In England, where socialism was not so highly developed as in Germany, Bismarck's methods were imitated by Lloyd George. The bubble of mid-Victorian prosperity had been pricked at last: industry was feeling the competition of Germany and the United States, agriculture was being ruined by the importation of cheap corn from the American wheatfields, and social unrest reappeared in the 1880's for the first time since the Chartist agitation forty years before. The trade unions were reluctant to have recourse to political action, but they were so far persuaded that in 1900 a Labour party, not avowedly socialist, came into being, and in 1906 it first returned members to Parliament. The feverish spate of reform inaugurated by the Liberal ministry of 1906-14, of which the culmination was Lloyd George's "revolutionary" budget of 1909, was the last attempt made by the heirs of Gladstone to prevent their Labour followers from going over to socialism.

While the Labour movement as a whole was evolving along peaceful "reformist" lines in Germany, France and England, the followers of Bakunin and the adherents of pure Marxism reverted to the policy of terror and denounced the "parliamentary socialists" as weak-kneed traitors. Anarchism between 1880 and 1910 enjoyed an unenviable notoriety. It proclaimed a remorseless warfare against society; it argued its case with bombs rather than with books, and its advocacy of terrorism appealed only too successfully to unbalanced youths. In the last years of the century anarchistic outrages multiplied with alarming rapidity, and the line of illustrious victims¹ recalled the activities of the original Assassins of Crusading days. The futility of these crimes in the end became apparent, and terroristic Anarchism in the Latin world was replaced by the Revolutionary Syndicalism launched about 1895 in France by Sorel and Pelloutier. Syndicalism (the name derived from *syndicat*, the French word for trade-union) was a return to the genuine Marxist tactic: it rejected all accommodation with the capitalist system, repudiated parliamentary action, and demanded "direct action" in the form of a general

¹ Tsar Alexander II (1881), President Périer of France (1895), Empress Elizabeth of Austria (1898), King Humbert of Italy (1900), President McKinley of the U.S. (1901), King Carlos and the Crown Prince of Portugal (1908).

strike which would bring the whole industrial life of a country to a standstill and force the governing class to capitulate. In his *Reflections on Violence*, (1908) Sorel jeered at the "drawing-room socialists" of the type of Jaurès and Bebel, spurned the so-called reforms of the middle-class Liberal State, with its pensions and insurance benefits, as having been extorted by fear rather than granted from benevolence, and put in a frank plea for an orgy of violence that would clear the air and sweep away the hypocrisy of party politics.

Syndicalism was not without influence in France, but was received with more enthusiasm in Italy and Spain, where it captured the trade-unions and effected some kind of fusion with Anarchism. In Russia a Marxist Social Democratic party grew up in the 1890's, but in 1903 it split into two sections, named respectively the Bolsheviks (majority group) and Mensheviks (minority group). The general strike was actually tried out in 1905 with the object of overthrowing the Tsardom, but it failed owing to the loyalty of the army to the régime. Partly perhaps for this reason, socialism in the years immediately preceding 1914, launched a vigorous anti-militarist propaganda and demanded a drastic pruning of the defence budgets. Yet the crisis of 1914 caught the Labour movement unprepared, and revealed to all the world the irresistible appeal of nationalism and the unreality of the class war. To the Marxist the proletariat had nothing to do with the "capitalist war" except to use it to hasten the world revolution. The Parliamentary socialists decided that duty to their country came first and they voted the war credits demanded by the bourgeois governments. Not until the prolongation of the awful struggle had wearied and disgusted the masses did the tiny Marxian minority obtain a hearing. Their victory came in Russia in 1917. Thirty-four years after his death, Karl Marx came into his own.

The rise of socialism was the natural revolt of that strange coincidence whereby the reintroduction of democracy into the Western world synchronized with the arrival in the great cities of the proletariat created by the Industrial Revolution. The masses entered upon the stage of history, multiplying in their millions in the huge metropolitan centres of Europe, where they heard from the demagogic orators that they were free men possessing the same natural rights as their masters. The democratic demand of equal rights of citizenship for all could hardly be denied by the heirs of the Liberal philosophers of the 18th century; in the end the vote was given to everyone, to the consternation of observers like De Tocqueville, who saw in the crude, uneducated and undisciplined crowds pouring through the factory gates a threat to the secure and cultured civilization of the leisured minority. And in truth, Humanism could not survive in an age of mob-democracy. But when these crowds, finding that the vote did not buy bread, were encouraged to demand a radical redistribution of the wealth of society, the governing classes resisted vigorously. The struggle that followed was viewed with grief and anxiety by the defenders of the Christian order. The repudiation of Christian values by the secular bourgeois society of the 19th century had been followed by a socialistic reaction to the corporatism of the Middle

Ages, but on a materialistic and anti-religious basis, for unfortunately the socialist philosophy had been formulated at a time when science and thought were permeated by a mechanistic determinism which made of man a helpless automaton chained in the fetters of Nature's iron laws. To believe that man was a machine was natural in a society surrounded by cranks and pulleys, turbines and dynamos : it was not surprising that Marx was concerned, not with enriching human personality, but merely with rationalizing the slavery of the industrial state. It was this grave threat to human freedom that called forth protests from Liberal individualists like Spencer and Christian leaders like Leo XIII, whose encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (1891) condemned alike irresponsible capitalism and irreligious socialism and appealed for the abrogation of class hatred and the reconstitution of a *Respublica Christiana*.

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6. WELTPOLITIK

Few more extraordinary revolutions are recorded in history than the Europeanization of the whole world in the 19th century. The smallest of the Continents, which as late as 1683 had been threatened with conquest and absorption by the military might of Asia, won an economic, a political and an intellectual primacy over the Eastern Hemisphere. Civilized peoples of an ancient culture and barbarous jungle savages were alike compelled to submit to the audacious and invincible European. The scientific technique, the humanist philosophy and the machine industry of the West won an overwhelming victory. The old traditions were everywhere scorned, the old ways of life everywhere broken up. For a hundred years Europe enjoyed advantages of which no other civilization could boast. The long peace between 1815 and 1914, broken only by short wars in which seldom more than two great nations were engaged at a time, provided leisure and opportunity for the accumulation of wealth and the development of technique. The Industrial Revolution multiplied production and population : hence the search for fresh markets, new sources of raw material, and overseas colonies. Technical invention annihilated distance ; - the railway and the steamship, the electric telegraph and the aeroplane, brought the most far off countries within easy reach. Science had revolutionized war ; the guns and cannon of Europe were irresistible and made the white man feared as a God. Politically, also, the East was caught at a disadvantage : in China the alien Manchu dynasty was sinking into decay, Britain had a firm grip on India, Russia was closing in on Central Asia, and the world of Islam was stagnant and impotent under the now weak and degenerate rule of the Turk. When the West, bursting with new vigour, took the offensive against the East for the first time since the Crusades, opposition crumbled away. By 1900 Europe was mistress of the world. The white man had triumphed. But would he be able to maintain the commanding position he had won ?

When the Congress of Vienna concluded its labours in 1815, there was little sign of this astonishing change. Indeed, the days when European Powers held vast territories overseas seemed to have passed away. The old colonial empires of the 18th century had gone. France retained not a single foothold on the American mainland. The United States had freed itself from British control. South America was about to throw off the rule of Spain. The materials for the creation of a second British Empire to replace the one destroyed by the American Revolution were at hand, but no one thought of using them. Canada was peopled by a few thousand French survivors in Quebec and some English émigrés from the United States in Ontario and the Maritime Provinces. Australia was a dumping ground for transported convicts. Capetown was merely a coaling station with a few Dutch settlers in the hinterland. British dominion was being steadily extended over the weak and warring principalities of India, but

India was a vast Oriental empire, in no sense a colony. In England itself there was no enthusiasm for colonies, which, it was supposed, had a natural tendency to break away from the mother country on attaining maturity, like ripe fruit falling from a tree. The conception of the British Commonwealth of Nations had not yet dawned.

The European's ignorance of almost everything outside his own Continent was profound. Enormous tracts of the earth's surface were unexplored. The Western half of North America was little known : a geography published in 1800 contained no reference to the Rocky Mountains. The Indian and the buffalo still roamed the prairies which sixty years later were to feed many of the cities of Europe. The forests of Brazil had hardly been penetrated. Arctic exploration had been taken in hand after the Napoleonic wars by naval officers like Ross and Franklin, but it was not until 1847 that the latter found the long-sought-for but commercially useless North-West Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and perished in the attempt. Africa was still the Dark Continent ; the coasts were frequented by European traders, but the interior was a blank, and as late as 1860 the mythical " Mountains of the Moon " were marked on the maps. Australia was unexplored save for a few narrow coastal strips. European missionaries and traders were to be found in the ports and even in the inland cities of China, but the inner recesses of that huge country, the deserts of Tartary and Mongolia, were less known than in the days of Marco Polo. Japan was closed to the world : the Dutch alone were permitted to send one ship a year to Nagasaki. Russian settlements straggled across Siberia, but Europeans were rarely to be seen far from the river valleys. Yet by the end of the century there was hardly a tract of land of any value to be found anywhere in the world that was not politically controlled or economically exploited by the white powers.

The motive force behind this tremendous expansion was mainly economic : indeed Marx would have found more justification for his Materialist Theory of History in his own age than in any other. Industrial capitalism was responsible. The enormous development of large scale industry necessitated a continuously increasing supply of cotton, iron, coal, tin, oil, rubber and other raw materials, and as the output of the mills and factories and foundries of the West grew from year to year, new markets had to be found abroad to absorb the huge quantities of manufactured goods pouring out from Manchester and Birmingham and other great centres of production. During the Free Trade period, say from 1830 to 1870, it was fairly easy for Britain to persuade an agricultural Europe to accept the products of her factories, but the revival of protectionism in Germany, France, the United States and other countries after 1880 compelled her to look elsewhere. And if a country would not accept your goods, it might be induced to accept your capital in order to develop its economic resources. The mysteries of the credit system of Western finance were explained to the Eastern peoples ; they were persuaded to accept loans with which to build canals and railways, sink mines and bore oil-wells, or at least allow European experts and technicians to perform these services, and if they failed in the punctual payment of interest,

they would probably find their banks, customs and treasury taken over by their creditors, as actually happened in Turkey and Egypt. Companies floated abroad frequently made higher profits than home enterprises, as native labour was much cheaper and competition at first not so acute. Banks willingly made loans to backward and undeveloped countries if they were certain, as were the English banks in Palmerston's day, that the fleet would always be at hand for debt collecting. Imperialism usually had an economic aspect. Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 largely because that Khedive failed to pay the interest on the loans advanced him by European financiers. British rule in South Africa would never have been expanded so rapidly nor would the Boer War have been fought but for the discovery of the diamond fields at Kimberley and the gold mines on the Rand. The United States fought a war with Spain mainly because American capitalists were eager to control the rich sugar island of Cuba. Persia found herself virtually partitioned between Britain and Russia because both Powers were anxious to get possession of her oil wells. The succession of "incidents" and "crises" at Pendjeh, Fashoda, Agadir and elsewhere, which paved the way for the World War of 1914, were due in part to the intrigues of concessionaires, bankers and speculators who had the ear of their respective governments.

The new era of commercial imperialism may be dated from 1840, when the centuries-old isolation of China was abruptly shattered by a conflict with England, and the Far East was opened up to economic penetration by the Western Powers to a degree never before dreamed of. The "Opium War" marked an epoch in world history. The Chinese had hitherto regarded with scornful contempt the few foreign traders who came to their ports; they admitted them on sufferance, forced them to submit to humiliating indignities, and remained in blissful ignorance of the real might of the Western "barbarians." Opium had long been smuggled into China from India by British merchants who reaped high profits from this illegal and debasing trade, despite the efforts of the Chinese to stop it. In 1839 a cargo of opium was seized by the Chinese at Canton; they demanded of the British that the traffic should cease, recriminations followed, and the aggressive Palmerston, then Foreign Secretary, determined on punitive measures. To their astonishment and dismay, the Chinese found themselves confronted by guns and cannon of an efficacy they could not hope to equal; they were crushingly defeated, and compelled by the Treaty of Nanking (1842) to pay an indemnity, cede Hong-Kong, open up four ports to foreign trade, and agree to a fixed tariff rate which could not be altered save by mutual consent. Next year the British were granted "extra territorial" rights, similar to those enjoyed by the European Powers in Turkey under the Capitulations system; other countries joined in and exacted the same privileges, and the Chinese were bewildered and humiliated at seeing themselves suddenly placed at the mercy of the barbarians of the Far West whom they had always been taught to despise.

As the British had forcibly opened up China, so the Americans, anxious to break their rival's trade monopoly in the Far East, opened

up Japan. Commodore Perry arrived with a squadron off Yedo in 1853 ; his steamships and his guns startled the inhabitants of that island empire, who since driving away the Portuguese in the 16th century, had had little contact with white men. After the first shock of surprise, they consented to open two ports to American traders, but anti-foreign feeling was strong, and when an Englishman was killed by a mob and the Shogun was unable or unwilling to punish those responsible, a British fleet appeared in Japanese waters and bombarded Kagoshima. Meanwhile the Chinese continued recalcitrant ; the British complained that their merchants, the French that their missionaries, were ill-treated, and as the Crimean War had produced an Anglo-French alliance, joint action was taken by the two Powers in the East, culminating in 1860 in the capture of Peking and the burning of the Emperor's summer palace. At the same time Russia, seeking compensation in the Far East for losses incurred in the Crimea, compelled the Chinese to waive their rights to the territory north of the Amur river. Finally, in 1862, the French, again under plea of protecting their missionaries, landed an army in Indo-China and proceeded to help themselves to territories long regarded as under Chinese suzerainty.

In twenty years an amazing transformation had come over the Asiatic scene. China and Japan, so haughty and exclusive in 1840, were in 1860 at the mercy of the white powers. It cannot be said that the latter conducted themselves in a manner calculated to enhance the yellow man's opinion of European civilization. They behaved like greedy marauders, using their superior force to indulge in much wanton brutality and to deprive ancient empires of their sovereign rights. "Realpolitik" was not an invention of Bismarck and the Prussians : its methods were applied to hapless orientals years before by Britain and France. Decent minds were disgusted by the cynical arrogance of the Palmerston policy. "I thought bitterly of those who for the most selfish objects are trampling underfoot this ancient civilisation," wrote Lord Elgin, the very man who was sent out in 1857 to enforce the British demands on the Chinese government, and he added in his diary that British trade in China "was conducted on principles which are dishonest as regards the Chinese and demoralizing to our own people."¹ Cobden carried a vote of censure against the ministry in the House of Commons, but a general election returned Palmerston to power.

For good or ill, China and Japan had been forced into contact with Western culture and there could be no return to the old proud isolation. The efforts of the two Oriental monarchies to shake off the tutelage of their new white masters had strangely different results. Japan was a compact island state, admirably adapted by Nature for defence against invasion ; her people were able warriors and seamen, intensely patriotic and devoted to their ancient native dynasty, whose head, the Mikado, was revered almost as a god. Their statesmen, with astonishing shrewdness, realized that the Europeans must be fought with their own weapons : by no other means could Japan save herself from eventual

¹ Quoted by Hughes, *The Invasion of China by the Western World* (1937), p. 26.

subjection. Once this course of action was decided upon, Japan transformed herself with a rapidity that has no known parallel in history. The Revolution in 1867 swept away the hoary feudal system, abolished the hereditary shogunate, restored the Mikado to his position as absolute sovereign, and introduced railways and the telegraph, compulsory education and universal military service. The white man's institutions were carefully examined, the best copied and adapted to Japanese requirements. The schools were reorganized on American lines, the universities on the French model, German officers were called in to train the army, and British technicians and naval experts created a fleet. In 1889 a parliamentary constitution was set up, designed on Bismarckian principles : a House of Peers and an elected lower chamber did not seriously encroach upon the prerogatives of the autocratic and semi-divine Emperor. Thus did Japan take her place as a progressive and well-organized Power, already a potential threat to the white domination of the Eastern World.

China was less fortunate. The very size of her country hindered any rapid transformation of her social and political institutions : her trade was more valuable than Japan's to the Europeans, who by securing a grip on her customs and her ports dug themselves well in, and as her ruling dynasty, the Manchus, was alien and unpopular, no great national uprising under its leadership was possible. Indeed, the failure of the Manchus to defend China against the British in 1840 was partly responsible for the outbreak of the anti-dynastic rebellion of the Taiping, which after raging for sixteen years was finally suppressed with foreign help in 1865. The Manchus, like the Turkish sultans, were saved chiefly by the European Powers, who preferred to deal with a weak, unstable régime and feared that the Taiping might establish a strong China capable of driving out the hated "foreign devils." The rickety Dragon Throne was propped up ; foreign capital poured into the country, bridges and railways were built by European firms, banks and customs were controlled by Western officials, and in Shanghai and other great ports the white man carved out for himself "concessions" from whose parks and clubs the Chinese were rigidly excluded.

Such was the situation in 1894 when Japan made war on China for the purpose of seizing Korea, which she coveted for economic reasons. The war demonstrated the successful efficiency with which Japan had adopted Western technique and the lamentable failure of China under the corrupt and decadent Manchus to meet the European challenge. The supine helplessness of the vast empire was patent to all the world. The European Powers prepared to complete the process already begun, and to parcel out China among themselves. Having ordered Japan to relinquish the Liao-tung peninsula, one of the fruits of her military victory, they calmly staked out their own claims ; Manchuria for Russia, Shantung for Germany, the Yangtse valley for Britain, Yunnan and Kwangtung for France. Only America, absorbed in the conflict with Spain over Cuba, held aloof. But the vultures were destined never to secure their prey. After a fleeting attempt in 1898 to imitate Japan by

introducing Western reforms, the Chinese made a terrific effort in 1900 under the leadership of the Boxers to drive the foreigners into the sea. Many missionaries, traders and diplomats were massacred; the legations in Peking were besieged, and only the advent of an international army under a German general saved the whites from annihilation. China, it is true, was severely punished. Her capital was occupied for the second time in forty years, and she was compelled to pay an enormous indemnity with the customs as security. But little more was heard of the partition plan, which in any case was rendered hopeless with the victory of Japan over Russia in the war of 1904-05. This was Japan's revenge for the treatment she had received from the Powers in 1895. Russia lost Manchuria and Port Arthur, her warm-water port on the Pacific, and Japan was almost in a position to succeed Europe as arbiter of China's destinies. The victory of the yellow man over the white sent a thrill of joy and hope throughout Asia: the expulsion of the foreign intruders seemed imminent. But the United States, having seized the Philippines from Spain, was now a Pacific power; the French were in control of Annam, Tongking and Cochin China, and Britain held Singapore and Hong-kong. China herself, under the inspiration of Western-educated intellectuals like Sun Yat-sen, underwent a belated reformation; the decadent Manchus were got rid of at last in 1912, and a parliamentary Republic on the approved liberal-democratic model was substituted for a four thousand year old monarchy—a truly staggering revolution!

In Western as well as in Eastern Asia the triumphant advance of Europe met with no resistance. The Mohammedan world was far gone in decay, and the bitter rivalry between Turkey and Persia steadily weakened Islam. The Turks had tried to restore the Universal State of Islam as it existed in the days of the Caliphate, but although Syria, Irak, Egypt, the Holy Cities, and North Africa as far as Morocco passed under their control, their advance east of the Euphrates was checked by the powerful religious nationalism of the Persian Shiites, who rejected with contempt the Sultan's claim to the title of Caliph. The two Moslem Powers exhausted themselves in a series of indecisive wars, and Turkey found herself confronted with the rising might of Russia north of the Danube, the Black Sea and the Caucasus, and by the growth of nationalistic self-consciousness on the part of the long-submerged Christian races in the Balkan peninsula. Her ruling class had degenerated, her administrative system broke down, and the marvellous army, long recruited from Christian captives kidnapped in childhood and trained up as soldiers, ceased to be an instrument of victory. When in 1798 Napoleon, like a new Alexander, burst into the Levant, Western ideas began to seep through the weakening dikes of Islam. The French were succeeded in Egypt by Mehemet Ali, the first Moslem potentate to attempt to Europeanize his realm. With French encouragement, he even attempted to substitute an Arab-Egyptian empire organized on Western lines for the moribund Ottoman régime, but the other European Powers came to the Sultan's rescue and forced Mehemet to evacuate

Syria. A duel between France and England then began for the control of the Levant. The French, remembering the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem and believing that the route to the East lay through Egypt, seized Algiers in 1830, intervened in Syria in 1860, nominally to protect the Catholic Maronites against the Druses, and cut the Suez Canal in 1869. Britain, concerned for the safety of her Indian possessions, was anxious to keep open the Mediterranean and Red Sea trade routes and in particular, to prevent the Canal from falling into hostile hands. When, in 1881, the Khedive failed to pay the interest on the loans made him by European bankers, England and France prepared to collect the debt by force. Fearing a German attack at home, France backed out, and left her rival to occupy Egypt alone. Repenting too late of her timidity, she tried to turn England's flank by securing control of the Sudan, but though Marchand hoisted the tricolour at Fashoda on the Nile in 1898, he was compelled by Kitchener to haul it down. The bitter resentment thus created in France was barely assuaged by the "Entente Cordiale" of 1904.

While England and France were competing for the outlying provinces of the Turkish Empire, they were defending it in the Black Sea against Russian encroachment. The fear was that with Russia in control of Constantinople and the Straits, a third competitor would appear in the Levant. England and Russia also came into conflict in Persia, which was found to be rich in oil, that indispensable adjunct of the automobile age. Politically, Persia was in the doldrums. Her ruling class were effete and decadent, and totally unable to resist Russian penetration from the North across Turkestan and the Kirghiz steppe and British penetration from the south up the Persian Gulf from India. After some bickering the two rivals agreed to divide the helpless country into "spheres of influence," a blessed phrase invented, it would seem, by Lord Salisbury at the height of the Imperialist scramble. Patriotic Persians looked on in impotent wrath, but as yet there was no withstanding the white man's will.

The most complete example of European penetration of Asia is that afforded by Russia, who between 1860 and 1914 created a huge empire dominating the north and centre of that vast continent. It was the culmination of a long-continued effort, for Russian colonists had pushed across the Siberian plains in the 17th century, and as early as 1689 they made a treaty with China (the first that ancient empire ever made with a European State) fixing the Amur river as the boundary of their respective territories. Peter the Great diverted the attentions of his people to Europe, and it was only when their expansion south of the Danube had been thwarted for a time by the Crimean War that they seriously resumed their eastward drive beyond the Urals. In 1858 Muravyev, Russia's greatest empire builder, acquired the vast though empty territory between the Amur and the sea from a China distracted by the Taiping rebellion, and founded the port of Vladivostok, a proud name meaning "Conqueror of the East." In order to safeguard the overland trade-routes to China, Russia proceeded to absorb one after

another the turbulent Mohammedan Khanates of Central Asia. Tashkent was seized in 1865, the province of Turkestan established in 1867, Samarkand occupied in 1868, Khiva taken by storm in 1873, Khokand overrun in 1876 and the Merv oasis in 1884. The fate of Afghanistan hung in the balance. England desired to keep that remote and inaccessible land as a buffer state between Russian Turkestan and her Indian Empire. An Anglo-Russian war nearly broke out when the Tsar's troops seized Pendjeh on the Afghan frontier in 1887, but the crisis passed and the frontier was fixed by treaty in 1895. To link up these huge dominions, railways were run from Moscow to Samara, where one line branched south through the Kirghiz steppe reaching Merv via Tashkent and Bokhara, and another line (the Trans-Siberian) was run right across Northern Asia through Manchuria to Vladivostok. The Boxer rising gave the Tsar's government an excuse for throwing troops into Manchuria, whence they were expelled by the Japanese in the war of 1904-05. Russia's schemes in the Far East were checked, but as a result of the Chinese Revolution she established a protectorate over Outer Mongolia in 1913. Her territories then extended from Finland to the Bering Strait and from the Arctic Ocean to the borders of Persia, the greatest *compact* empire in the world.

Russia's achievement as an Imperialist power has frequently been underrated. What she accomplished was nothing less than the destruction of Nomadism in Central Asia, that breeding ground of world scourges, whose Attilas and Jenghiz Khans and Timurs had so often burst out of their deserts to spread death and ruin in the sedentary societies beyond. The wild and turbulent Tartars and Mongols and Turkomans were caught and tamed at last, a feat which neither the Chinese nor the Persians nor the Arabs had ever been able to achieve. Civilization never won a more resounding victory over Barbarism, yet the cost was relatively trivial, and the subjugated tribes, thanks to the wisely moderate policy pursued by the Tsars and even improved by the Bolsheviks, appear to have accepted foreign rule with more resignation than any other Asiatic race. This may be partly due to the admixture of Tartar blood in the Russians themselves; racial affinity blurred the distinction between conqueror and conquered, and permitted a genuine colonization by white men that was found nowhere else in Asia.

Imperialism scored its most amazing success in Africa, which was overrun by the white man in a single generation. Down to 1870 it was completely neglected by Europe, by reason of its forbidding climate and its presumed lack of valuable natural resources. The English, it is true, had occupied the Cape in 1806 and pushed the Dutch Boers beyond the Orange River; the French had seized Algiers in 1830, and the Portuguese retained a few unimportant stations in Angola and Mozambique. But it was not until the middle of the century that a number of brilliant explorers, braving immense difficulties and dangers, opened up the interior. Speke (1862) solved the riddle that had puzzled men since the days of Herodotus by tracing the source of the Nile to Lake Victoria; Du Chaillet astonished the world by finding a tribe of pigmies in Uganda,

Stanley's quest for the lost Livingstone aroused universal interest, and his own discovery of the vast Congo basin with its commercial possibilities, caught the attention of an age of Big Business. For the period of economic nationalism had now dawned ; free trade was being abandoned with other relics of Liberalism, and each country aimed at economic self-sufficiency by excluding the foreigner's goods and tapping fresh markets abroad. Germany went protectionist in 1879, France adopted a high tariff in 1882, and the United States shut its doors to Europe's products. Britain, threatened by German and American competition, was anxious to acquire lands where she could grow her own cotton or wheat or rubber. France, smarting under the humiliations of 1870, tried to erase the bitter memory of defeat by building up a great colonial empire. Germany and Italy, having only just attained nationhood, were eager for "a place in the sun" and wanted colonies mainly because the older Powers had them, though the problem of expanding populations undoubtedly influenced their policy. The Monroe Doctrine excluded them from the New World : Africa, with its sparse population of weak and barbarous negro tribes, was full of potentialities.

So the scramble began. In 1876 Stanley persuaded King Leopold of Belgium to found an International Association for the Exploration and Civilization of Africa, a philanthropic and scientific body which the wily monarch, who had heard about the rich rubber plantations of the Congo, turned into a commercial company for the exploitation of unhappy negroes and the enrichment of himself. In 1881 the French proclaimed a protectorate over Tunis, just in time to forestall an Italian occupation. In 1884 Bismarck, forced by pressure of the Pan-Germans to enter the colonial race, laid hands on a number of vacant spots which nobody else apparently wanted, and Togoland, South West Africa, the Cameroons and Tanganyika became Germany territory almost overnight. France hastened to move in from the Guinea coast and southwards from Algeria in order to claim as much of the hinterland as she could, even though most of it was empty desert. The Italians appeared in the Red Sea and took possession of Eritrea. In 1885 a European Congress formally recognized King Leopold's private possessions in Central Africa as the Congo Free State. And in 1890 Cecil Rhodes became Prime Minister of the Cape.

Rhodes (1853-1902) has always been regarded as the Imperialist par excellence. Born in a Hertfordshire rectory, he had been delicate from childhood, and at sixteen was sent to his brother's farm in Natal. Diamonds were found at Kimberley in 1870, the very year of his arrival in South Africa : he joined successfully in the "rush" and at nineteen found himself a rich man. A journey by ox-wagon across Bechuanaland and the Transvaal convinced him that these fertile, healthy and almost empty lands might profitably form part of the British Empire. Returning to England to take his degree at Oxford, he negotiated the amalgamation of the several South African mining companies and displayed the shrewdness of the born financier. In 1881 he was back in South Africa, the owner of a colossal fortune ; he took to politics and was elected a member of

the Cape Assembly. It was the year of Majuba. After the Great Trek in the 1830's, the Boers had moved first to Natal, which England annexed in 1842, and then to the Orange Free State, likewise annexed in 1848, and finally across the Vaal river, where the British left them in peace and even in 1854 reversed their policy and reorganized the independence of the two Boer Republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. When diamonds were found at Kimberley, the situation changed. The occupation of the Boer territory was resolved upon, but in 1881 a small British force coming up from Natal was wiped out by the Boers at Majuba Hill. Gladstone, who had just returned to power and who detested the Imperialism that Disraeli had recently made popular, accepted the defeat and acknowledged Boer independence.

Rhodes regretted this action as a deep humiliation for Britain. Already he was dreaming of a great chain of British territories stretching right through Eastern Africa from "the Cape to Cairo," and the occupation of Egypt in 1882 encouraged his projects, even though the death of Gordon at Khartum in 1884 and the consequent loss of the Sudan was a serious check. When the Germans appeared in South West Africa in 1884, Rhodes, fearing lest they should push further east and cut off Cape Colony from the north, urged successfully the annexation of Bechuanaland, the sparsely-peopled region north of the Orange River. Next year gold was found on the Witwatersrand, and the great rush into the Transvaal began. Further north, Dutch and German agents were negotiating with native chiefs for the sale of land, and the Portuguese in Mozambique were laying claim to the interior. In 1889 Rhodes launched the British Chartered Company for the nominal purpose of engaging in trade and mining enterprises in the land between the Transvaal and the Zambezi. It proceeded to persuade the Matabele chief Lobengula to sign papers the purport of which he did not understand but which placed his land under virtual British control. When he discovered the trick and had recourse to war, his tribe was easily defeated and the whole country annexed outright. Meanwhile Rhodes, who became premier of the Cape in 1890, pursued his schemes with unabated ardour. The agents of the Chartered Company advanced beyond the Zambezi in the rear of the Portuguese, occupied Nyasaland and Uganda, but were too late to stop the Germans moving inland from Zanzibar as far as the Congo State, thereby cutting Britain's African territories in two. From 1890 to 1896 Rhodes reigned at the Cape as a benevolent despot, until his political career was abruptly terminated by the Jameson Raid, an attempt made, with his connivance, to overthrow the Boer Republics which had refused to grant full political rights to the crowd of gold-seekers who poured into the mining districts of the Rand. The destruction of the Boer power, which was a hindrance to the mining interests of South Africa was, however, only postponed. War broke out in 1899. Rhodes, who had lived to see his name given to the great tract of land between the Transvaal and Lake Tanganyika, died just before its conclusion in 1902. He was the supreme figure of the bourgeois age : Spengler indeed saw in him the embodiment

of the "primitive" might and power of the Imperialist epoch of consolidation and organization which was succeeding "the literature-ridden age of rationalist thought." Rhodes was a strange mixture of plutocrat and idealist; the gold and diamonds with which he built an empire were valued not for their own sake, but as instruments of providence that might give his race the mastery of the world.

Imperialism may best be judged by its performances in Africa. That the substitution of European for native rule conferred many benefits cannot be doubted. Cannibalism, human sacrifices, witch-hunting and other abominations of the uncivilized blacks were stamped out. Slave raiding and inter-tribal warfare were likewise ended, and life became more secure in Africa than perhaps it had ever been. Medical science fought valiantly against tropical diseases like malaria and yellow fever: even *Sierre Leone* ceased to be "the white man's grave." Sanitation and modern hygienic methods reduced the appallingly high death-rate: for good or ill, the negro populations, hitherto kept down by war and disease, multiplied enormously. The education conferred on the native convert by Christian missionaries helped to raise his low cultural level. The white man often gave his new subjects a better government than they had ever enjoyed. No one would deny that *Algeria* and *Tunisia* have profited materially by the replacement of Turkish by French rule. *Egypt* was probably never governed better in all her long history than under *Cromer*. Yet Imperialism was all too frequently a cloak for tyranny and greed. Many European "empire builders" robbed the natives of their land and mercilessly exploited them. Every colonial Power was more or less blame-worthy, though not all were guilty of such horrors as were perpetrated in the Congo under *King Leopold's* rule. Even good government failed to win popularity; the natives, especially those of a higher type such as the Egyptians, preferred to be misruled by their own people than to be governed, however beneficently, by strangers who had seized their land by force. Moreover, the efforts of religious teachers to educate the African to higher things were largely nullified by the example of gross and avaricious materialism set by the diamond-merchants, gold-diggers, rubber-planters, land-speculators and concession-hunters who swarmed over the continent in search of commercial profits. *Gandhi* was first revolted at the sordidness of Western industrial civilization by his early experiences as a lawyer in South Africa during the "diamond days."

The Imperialism of the 19th century was a different thing from the colonization of the 18th. It did not imply large-scale settlement of white peoples overseas, because Britain had already secured in *Canada*, *South Africa*, *Australia* and *New Zealand* nearly all the vacant lands within the temperate zones, because *Asia* was too densely populated to absorb any surplus from Europe, because *America* was closed to European political domination by decree of the United States, and because *Africa* was mainly a tropical country unsuitable for white settlement. Europe controlled *China* financially and economically, and the Moslem world of the Near East either politically (as in *Egypt* or

North Africa) or economically (as Turkey under German and Persia under Anglo-Russian control), but the so-called "colonies" were not colonies at all. The majority of Europeans in them were soldiers and officials; few genuine settlers were attracted to them, they produced only moderate supplies of raw material, and most of them proved liabilities rather than assets to the mother country. The apostles of empire scorned such material considerations. It was enough for them that the white men dominated, or appeared to dominate, the earth; they were convinced that he was bringing a superior civilization to the "coloured" peoples, and that a new world order, a United States of the Eastern Hemisphere, under European suzerainty, was about to be born. The literature of 1900 is filled with this inspiring dream, surely a fitting culmination to the century of science and progress? Yet warning voices were raised which pointed out that a grave moral and spiritual malady was threatening the heart of Europe: had she gained the whole world to lose her own soul? And if perchance she failed, might not civilization itself crack, for were the peoples of the East, rent with discord and confusion, bewildered by contact with Western culture and the uprooting of their old traditions, in a position to take over the leadership? But Europe seemed resolved on abdication; the sceptre was slipping from her grasp, and in 1914 Chinaman and Indian, Persian and Arab, Turk and African, beheld with open astonishment and secret satisfaction their white masters plunge into a fratricidal strife that presaged the end of their "weltpolitik."

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7. DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM

The Franco-German War ushered in one of the most tragic periods of European history. The atmosphere of the next forty years was charged with a sense of impending disaster. All the world seemed to be slowly sucked into the seething whirlpool of national hates and rivalries, and every nation feverishly armed itself in preparation for the coming Armageddon. It is impossible to portray adequately the nervous hysteria of those years, the uneasiness felt by everyone, the fear that gripped all hearts, the terrible sensation that mankind experienced of living, as it were, on the edge of a simmering volcano, which might burst into eruption at any moment. No one knew but what each day might be the last of the Armed Peace, that bitter reply to the roseate hopes of former days of everlasting concord and harmony among the nations. Europe, having won the intellectual and scientific primacy of the world, was bent now on committing suicide.

After 1871 the centre of the European stage was occupied by the new German Empire, a young, virile, proud and victorious nation, which had fought three wars in the course of seven years and had won them all, and had finally marched to unity over the prostrate body of her French rival. The mighty statesman who had made Germany a Great Power for the first time since the days of the Hohenstaufen, realized that after her surfeit of glory she needed a period of peace to consolidate her gains and develop her internal resources. It is uncertain how far Bismarck approved the harsh treatment meted out to defeated France, and whether he was entirely responsible for the "war scare" of 1875, which was provoked by the unexpectedly rapid recovery of France and by the belief of the German military leaders that their irritatingly vigorous rival should be suppressed once for all and given no chance of securing her revenge. But there is no doubt that for the rest of his career Bismarck pursued a consistent policy of peace and strove to secure his ends by diplomacy rather than by force of arms.

It was obvious that the first aim of Germany must be to keep France isolated. The latter, with her stationary population of forty millions, could never hope to win a straight fight against a powerful military empire with a population steadily approaching sixty millions. As long as France could be prevented from obtaining allies, Germany was safe. Hence Bismarck laboured to secure the friendship of all the Powers France was likely to turn to, namely, Russia, Austria, Italy and England. Of these, Austria was willing to accept Germany's co-operation in order to gain support for her schemes of expansion in the Balkans, where she had found an outlet for her energies since 1866, and Italy was naturally grateful to the nation which had helped her to complete her unification. Russia was uncertain, for between the Teuton and the Slav there was little love lost, but the autocratic Tsardom was unlikely to feel much sympathy for Republican France with its known sympathy for the

oppressed Poles, and Bismarck had high hopes of winning her over completely to Germany. No understanding could be reached with England, because she refused to guarantee the German retention of Alsace-Lorraine, but in view of her traditional isolationism, Bismarck had little fear of any close relationship developing between her and France.

The greatest danger lay in the Balkan situation, which was to become for the next forty years the acutest problem in European politics and which has been well described as "the Achilles' heel of Bismarck's diplomacy." Nowhere had the nationalist movement met with a quicker response than among the Christian races of the decaying Turkish Empire. The emancipation of the Greeks and Serbs had fired all the other subject peoples with the hope of independence, and foreshadowed the total dissolution of the Ottoman State in Europe. Russian hopes of hastening the process had been temporarily frustrated by the issue of the Crimean War, but the recognition of Rumanian independence in 1861 and the continued oppression of the Macedonian Christians produced renewed unrest which burst forth in the Bulgarian rising in 1875. In this imbroglio Austria and Russia were intensely interested. Austria feared lest the creation of a strong Rumania and a Bulgaro-Serb State would attract the numerous Slav population within her own empire. If the Southern Slavs freed themselves from Turkish control, she would much rather entice them within her sphere of influence rather than let them grow into vigorous independent states. If Austria secured Rumania and Serbia, Russia would step in and try to dominate Bulgaria. This Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans was galling to Bismarck, who wanted these two Great Powers as allies of Germany. It was his cue to act as mediator between them and to preserve peace in the Balkans at all costs.

The Bulgarian revolt in 1875 produced a first-class European crisis. Pan-Slavism had made tremendous headway among the Christians in the peninsula and was powerfully encouraged by Russia, who since the days of Peter the Great had constituted herself the champion of Orthodox Christendom against Islam and who used the Slav movement as a convenient stalking-horse for her imperial ambitions and designs on Constantinople. Austria dreaded the spread of Pan-Slavism, for the creation of the Dual Monarchy in 1867 had given the Magyars political equality with the Austro-Germans and had effectively ruined whatever hopes the Slavs within the Hapsburg Empire had entertained of becoming a third partner. If a great Slav kingdom were created south of the Danube, Austria's Slav subjects would probably attempt to break away and join their kinsmen. When therefore after the "Bulgarian atrocities" had provided an excuse for intervention Russia began to bully the Turks and declared war on them in 1877, Austria backed the Sultan and thus found herself in agreement with England, who feared that a Russian occupation of Constantinople would bring the trade-routes of the Levant and perhaps the Suez Canal itself under the control of the Colossus of the North. The Russians, after taking Plevna, were compelled through financial difficulties to call a halt before venturing

to attack Constantinople, but they forced the Sultan to sign the treaty of San Stefano, providing for the creation of a "Big Bulgaria" stretching from the Danube to the Adriatic.

San Stefano was by no means a bad solution of the problem. It would have focused the Slav movement in one big State and perhaps avoided the wretched jealousies and rivalries which made their appearance when the peninsula was subsequently split up into half-a-dozen small States. But England and Austria were both afraid of the extension of Russia's power, and Bismarck, who preferred Austrian to Russian friendship, had perforce to join in the demand for revision which Disraeli put forward at the Berlin Congress in 1878. "Big Bulgaria" was dropped; two little states were substituted for it, one still under Turkish rule though with a Christian governor, and the greater part of Macedonia was left in the Sultan's hands. Austria was granted a "protectorate" over the two provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and was thus enabled to ward off the danger of a great Slav kingdom arising on her borders. Russia left the Congress bitterly chagrined and humiliated, and especially furious at what she regarded as Germany's ingratitude for her neutrality in 1870.

Still Bismarck was determined not to break with Russia. He distrusted her, but he was fearful of driving her into the arms of France, since such an alliance would place Germany in peril of having to fight a war on two fronts. He therefore negotiated in 1881 the Dreikaiserbund, or League of the Three Emperors, a strange ghost of the old Holy Alliance of Metternich's day, each party promising neutrality in case of one being involved in war with a fourth party. The next year the seizure of Tunis by France brought into the Triple Alliance an Italy infuriated at this cool annexation of what she had always regarded as her special share of North Africa. Germany could now congratulate herself on the formation of a strong anti-French bloc involving all the great European Powers except Poland. The Dreikaiserbund seemed to be fulfilling its purpose in restraining both Austria and Russia in the Balkans in 1885-87, when the latter intervened in Bulgaria to eject a prince who had proved himself unresponsive to Russian influences, and Bismarck was thus able to bid defiance to the Boulangist movement in France.

Yet Germany's position at the close of the Bismarckian era was not entirely invulnerable. The great Chancellor was somewhat in the position of a political Atlas, balancing the whole diplomatic world upon his shoulders, and it was not surprising that he sometimes staggered under the burden. The passionate nationalism which was spreading all over the world and affecting even the smallest peoples, was too powerful a force to be held in check by diplomatic jugglery. A clash between Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism could not be avoided. Russia declined to renew the Dreikaiserbund in 1887, so Bismarck had to keep her allied to Germany by means of the Reinsurance Treaty, containing the usual promise of neutrality in the event of war with a third party. The Italian alliance was of little value to Germany, for an undercurrent of hostility

was bound to remain between Rome and Vienna so long as Italia Irredenta remained in Hapsburg hands. And France, though Bismarck tried to distract her mind from "la revanche" by encouraging her colonial expansion in Africa and Indo-China, never reconciled herself to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. Austria was the only ally upon whose fidelity Germany could rely, and her racially-divided Empire was brought nearer to dissolution as nationalism, and especially Pan-Slavism, grew stronger.

The dismissal of Bismarck followed closely upon the accession of the young Emperor William II in 1888. That clever and forceful, but volatile and impulsive, sovereign was destined to be the foremost man in Europe for the next thirty years. He was not a great statesman, but flashy and theatrical, vain and rash, over-conscious of his position as head of a young and powerful Empire, and perhaps psychologically impelled to self-assertion as a kind of counter-balance to the physical defect of a withered arm. He had an autocratic temperament, like all the Hohenzollerns, but was totally devoid of that depth and fixity of purpose which had characterized nearly all his ancestors. There was not enough room in Germany for both him and Bismarck, so in 1890 he dropped the pilot, because, as the fallen statesman remarked, the Emperor intended to be his own Chancellor. All Europe soon became familiar with the rather swaggering, fiercely-moustached figure of Germany's new ruler, who had conceived it his duty to make the voice of the Teuton heard in every quarter of the globe.

From the moment of Bismarck's fall, German foreign policy began to degenerate. The real heir of the Bismarckian tradition in foreign affairs was Holstein, who directed policy from the Wilhelmstrasse from 1890 till his resignation in 1905. The successors of Bismarck in the Chancellorship were shadowy figures with little knowledge of diplomacy, which they readily surrendered into Holstein's hands. The latter pulled the strings from behind the scenes; he never emerged into the glare of publicity, and even his relations with the Emperor were conducted through the intermediary of Philipp von Eulenberg, William II's personal confidant. For all his brilliant qualities, Holstein was totally lacking in Bismarck's realistic insight. Where the master had known when to be conciliatory and when to strike hard, the pupil was merely clumsy and provocative and dragged his country through numerous "incidents" and "crises" from which she emerged with diminished prestige. Germany under Holstein was just aggressive enough to irritate everyone else without terrifying them. In Colonial policy the same fault appeared. Holstein had not the foresight and ability to pursue a systematic policy, but contented himself with interfering all over the world and picking up odd bits here and there—a procedure which engendered the uneasy suspicion abroad that Germany was committed to deep-laid schemes of universal expansion.

The first blunder committed by Holstein was the dropping of the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890, on the ground that it encouraged Russia's forward policy in the Balkans. The result was to throw Russia and

France together, the very thing Bismarck had striven all his life to avoid, for it meant the beginning of the "encirclement" of Germany. The Tsar was not particularly fond of Republican France with its unstable ministries and parliamentary scandals, and the French Socialists protested volubly against an alliance with the great Eastern despotism with its police spies, prison camps, Cossack knouts and Jewish pogroms, but fear of the German-Austrian-Italian bloc was so strong that the two Powers overcame their mutual dislike and signed a formal military convention in 1894. They agreed to help each other if either were attacked by Germany or Austria. The advantage of an agreement with France was clearly demonstrated when in 1905-06 the revolutionary movement in Russia was suppressed largely by means of substantial loans from Paris.

In these circumstances, it would have been only common-sense to cultivate friendly relations with England. While Bismarck was in power, no ruffle disturbed the harmony of Anglo-German intercourse. The partition of Africa in the eighties had been carried out with surprisingly little friction, and in 1890 England handed over Heligoland to Germany in exchange for Zanzibar. Holstein, however, was not disposed to regard friendship with England as a matter of great importance to Germany. England was unlikely to intervene in any Continental war, owing to the strength of isolationist sentiment among her people, and she was not on good terms with either of Germany's potential enemies. Fendjeh and Fashoda were not easily forgotten. Moreover, Holstein had got it into his head that England was bitterly jealous of Germany's colonial expansion and was putting obstacles in her path: hence he treated her brusquely.

The old friendly relations between the two Powers rapidly weakened as the quarrel between England and the Dutch Boers in South Africa moved to its climax. Popular sympathy in Europe and especially in Germany, was whole-heartedly on the side of the Boers, who were regarded as a heroic little nation of sturdy independent farmers struggling to maintain their freedom against the encroachments of greedy millionaires who were backed by the might of a grasping British Imperialism puffed up with all Kipling's contempt for "lesser breeds." The Boers came of Teutonic stock, and to the Pan-Germans their cause was sacred. German public opinion solidly approved the famous telegram the Kaiser sent to Kruger in 1896 congratulating him on the repulse of the Jameson Raid. But it aroused furious resentment in England, and was in fact a most injudicious move, since Germany without a fleet could afford no material help to the Boers when war broke out in 1899. Realization of Germany's weakness on the sea was the reason for the intensive naval policy inaugurated by von Tirpitz in 1898. Even then the cause of Anglo-German friendship was not wholly lost. Chamberlain, who disliked the Dual Alliance and was somewhat alarmed at the universal hostility shown to England during the Boer War, twice (in 1898 and again in 1901) suggested an agreement with Germany, each time to be repulsed by Holstein, who thought England was hardpushed and wanted help, and refused to be satisfied with anything less than a definite military alliance.

Meanwhile the international situation grew more and more complicated. The world's vacant spaces were filling up, and the German people were dissatisfied with their meagre acquisitions of territory overseas. While Britain, France and Russia possessed enormous empires, Germany, who had come late into the field, had only been able to pick up some islands in the Pacific and a few barren, unhealthy and expensive tracts in tropical Africa. China and the Far East were closed to European intervention after the Boxer Rebellion and the Japanese victory over Russia. The United States stood squarely by the Monroe Doctrine and refused to tolerate the slightest European penetration of Latin America. Portugal, probably encouraged by her British ally, declined to sell any of her colonies to Germany. Only two fields of expansion were therefore left : Turkey and Morocco. Germany had already commenced to cultivate the friendship of the Sultan and to reduce the influence which England had so long exercised at Constantinople, when William II during his tour of the Near East in 1898 declared himself the protector of the Moslem world. Shortly afterwards Germany obtained the concession for the Berlin-Bagdad railway, which would open up the vast undeveloped tracts of Asia Minor and the oil regions of Mosul. This was perhaps the greatest success of Holstein's diplomacy.

The repudiation of Chamberlain's second offer to Berlin, followed by the revelation of the German plans for a "big navy," impelled England to abandon the isolationist attitude she had maintained for so many years. Germany claimed with some justice that she must have a fleet to protect her scattered colonies, but England could not view without anxiety the creation of a formidable naval force in the North Sea. It was imperative to seek help on the Continent. Thus in 1904 Edward VII and Lansdowne negotiated the Entente with France, who was especially grateful for British support as her Russian ally was engaged in a desperate struggle with the Japanese at the other end of the world. The French agreed to recognize England's occupation of Egypt and the Sudan in return for an assurance that they would be allowed "a free hand" in Morocco, where intervention was becoming necessary to round off their North African possessions. Germany was at last awakened to the dangers confronting her, but her reactions produced the worst possible consequences to herself. The Kaiser, during one of his periodical cruises in the Baltic, inveigled the Tsar into signing the Treaty of Björko, providing for a Russo-German alliance against England which France was to be forced into. Nicholas's ministers promptly repudiated it. In 1905 William II, against his better judgment, was persuaded to visit Tangier and to deliver a speech there assuring the Sultan of Morocco that Germany would support his independence — a direct threat to France. The crisis which followed was settled by a conference at Algeciras, in which Germany came out second best and received only lukewarm support from her allies. France was badly scared, and made use of the Entente to sound England as to what attitude the latter would adopt in case of a new Franco-German war. The upshot was a series of secret military conversations between French and British officers in Flanders, during which joint plans were drawn up

for the repulse of a German attack which it was presumed would come through Belgium, in view of the huge fortifications France had constructed along the line of the Vosges. By agreeing to these conversations, Grey (who had become British Foreign Secretary in 1905) was really making inevitable the entry of Britain into any war in which the Dual Alliance was engaged, yet he persisted to the end in believing that "her hands were free."

The Algéciras Conference revealed to all the world the isolation of Germany. England and France had stood strongly together. Russia had backed up her ally. Italy had betrayed a friendship for France most disconcerting to Bülow and Holstein, who did not know that she had been "squared" by the recognition of her claims on Tripoli. Austria, the only ally upon which Germany could now count, had failed to give her much encouragement. And although Bülow and the Kaiser summoned up sufficient courage to give Holstein his quietus in 1905, there was no marked improvement in German foreign policy. Scared at Germany's isolation in Europe, Bülow found himself tied more closely than ever to Austria, which grew increasingly aggressive when Aehrenthal became Foreign Minister in 1906. That reckless statesman argued that, with Russia reeling under the shock of the Japanese war and internal revolution and with Germany only too ready to support Austria for fear of losing her last remaining friend, here was a splendid chance to force the issue in the Balkans. In the summer of 1908 the Young Turk revolution broke out in Constantinople, and a liberal constitution was extorted from the terrified Abdul Hamid. A few weeks later a private agreement was made between Aehrenthal and the Russian Foreign Minister Isvolsky: on the ground that a reinvigorated Turkey might endanger the interests of the two Powers, Austria was to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina and Russia was to open the Straits to the passage of her ships. To these changes the assent of the other signatories of the Berlin Treaty of 1878 would be necessary: but while Isvolsky was still sounding the Western Powers, Aehrenthal suddenly proclaimed the annexation on his own responsibility, on the excuse that the Young Turks were plotting to restore Turkish sovereignty over the provinces. Isvolsky was furious; Serbia, who hoped that one day Bosnia and Herzegovina would form part of a Great Serbia, saw her ambitions ruined and her hatred of Austria was intensified, but Russia, to whom she appealed for help, was too weak and exhausted to fight, and as Germany (whom the annexation had taken by surprise) backed Austria, Aehrenthal's coup was successful. But 1908 led straight to 1914; Serb agitation against the Dual Monarchy increased in fury and violence, Austria was encouraged in her "forward" policy, Russia was determined not to suffer a second humiliation but to draw closer to France and England, and Isvolsky, transferred from St. Petersburg to the embassy at Paris, worked grimly for revenge. The Triple Entente, assured of Italy's friendship, faced the Triple Alliance, of which only Germany and Austria counted. Meanwhile, the Kaiser had done his best to antagonize England further by the blazing indiscretion of the *Daily Telegraph* interview, and when

Bülow, having smoothed this over as best as possible, hinted to Tirpitz that the pursuance of an aggressive naval policy was intensifying English hostility, he was curtly informed that it was too late and that the full programme must be carried through. Disappointed and disillusioned, Bülow resigned the Chancellorship in 1909.

His successor was Bethmann Hollweg, an honest official who saw the storm-clouds gathering but could make no impression on the military and naval chiefs who now had the full ear of the Kaiser. The headlong rush to catastrophe continued. The second German intervention in Morocco (1911), when the *Panther* made its famous spring on Agadir, was a clumsy and provocative move; it indeed secured for Germany compensation in the Congo, but it strengthened the Entente and enabled the British Government to overcome opposition to its naval expansion programme. At the same time the two Western Powers encouraged Italy to make war on Turkey and seize Tripoli, in the hope of still further loosening the ties which bound her to the Triple Alliance. The war, which resulted in the defeat of Turkey, encouraged the Balkan Powers to join forces and sweep the common enemy out of Macedonia while he still had his hands full with Italy. The first Balkan War of 1912 ended in the total collapse of the Turks, who were rolled back to the gates of Constantinople. Then Austria stepped in and refused to allow Serbia to expand to the Adriatic; the allies quarrelled among themselves over the disposition of Macedonia, and the Second Balkan War broke out in 1913 between Bulgaria and her neighbours, ending in the former's humiliating defeat. When things had been straightened out, Turkey recovered some of her territory, Bulgaria lost some of hers, and Serbia emerged about three times her former size. Austria was irritated at Serbia's expansion, but this time Germany restrained her from acting rashly, while Britain and France held back Russia, who was also threatening to intervene. The net result was a blow to the Central Powers, whose Turkish ally had been defeated and partitioned.

The stage was now set for the final scene. All the statesmen of Europe were convinced that the conflagration was not far off. Every attempt to stop the mad race in armaments had failed. The Peace Conference called at The Hague by the Tsar in 1899 separated without any agreement being reached. A second Conference in 1907 only resulted in the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice, which no one appealed to in 1914. The attempt of England to secure some limit to naval competition was interpreted by Tirpitz as being due to fear of losing her supremacy at sea. The Kaiser, whose fleet was his favourite hobby and who watched over it with fostering care, warmly supported the fiery chief of the German Admiralty, and Bethmann's feeble protests and Metternich's despatches from London were brushed aside. The Liberal Government in England, anxious to spend money on social reforms rather than on dreadnoughts, strove to reach an agreement with Germany. Some settlement of the Bagdad Railway question was arrived at and several outstanding colonial points were amicably arranged, but on naval matters Tirpitz and the Kaiser were intransigent. They regarded

the slightest yielding as derogatory to Germany's dignity, and pointed out that not even France and Russia made any attempt to limit German land armaments. A last desperate effort was made by Lord Haldane on his visit to Berlin in 1912, but in vain, and the upshot was the secret agreement by which England undertook to police the North Sea and defend the Channel coasts and France transferred the bulk of her fleet to the Mediterranean. Everyone, believing in the inevitability of war, was preparing for "Der Tag." Austria was planning a "final reckoning" with Serbia, Russia was plotting to seize the Straits, German generals were calculating when the favourable moment might arrive at which to strike at France through Belgium, France was hopeful of recovering Alsace-Lorraine if she could be sure of England, and even in England responsible persons were publicly talking of "Copenhagening," *i.e.*, seizing or destroying the German Fleet without a declaration of war. No wonder that Colonel House, writing to Wilson from Berlin in the spring of 1914, described the situation as "militarism run stark mad." The guns were almost ready to go off by themselves. It was in this unbearably tense atmosphere that an unbalanced young Serb student fired a couple of revolver shots in a small Bosnian town that echoed round the world and cost the lives of ten million men.

The assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife was an odious crime, and Austria was well within her rights in demanding the suppression of the Pan-Slav agitation which had made it possible. But Berchtold, who had succeeded Aehrenthal as Foreign Minister in 1912, and his colleagues were resolved to use the murder as an excuse for making war on Serbia and reducing her to impotence. They realized that the very existence of the Monarchy was at stake and were in a desperate mood. War was resolved upon even if it brought in Russia, to whom Serbia would naturally appeal for support, because they knew they could count on Germany, the Kaiser, who had been deeply moved by his friend's murder, having unfortunately given *carte blanche* to Austria on July 5th. The ultimatum of July 23rd was deliberately framed so as to render acceptance impossible and hostilities inevitable. The German "blank cheque" to Austria may be condemned as rash and foolish, but Berlin undoubtedly believed at first that the Austro-Serbian issue could be localized because Russia was too weak to fight and would climb down as she had done in 1908. But Great Powers cannot afford to suffer repeated humiliations. As the Kaiser encouraged Austria, so Poincaré in St. Petersburg encouraged Russia, and the two Eastern Powers were virtually set at each other's throats. Grey's efforts in England were rendered fruitless. A proposal for direct conversations between Austria and Russia came to nothing, an Italian suggestion that the Powers should advise Serbia to submit to the demands of Vienna passed unheeded, and the plan of a European Conference was rejected by Germany, who had unpleasant memories of Algeciras. When after a sharp warning from Grey on July 28th, Germany began to understand that a general war was threatened, and that Russia would probably fight after all, attempts were made to put the brake on Austria. It was too late :

war was declared on Serbia on the same day. This moved Russia to decide on partial mobilization, *i.e.*, mobilization against Austria but not against Germany. Once the army machine was set in motion, however, the generals began to take command and the civil authority was reduced to nullity. In St. Petersburg the military chiefs declared that partial mobilization was no good : if it had to be followed by general mobilization, the utmost confusion would be created and their plans would be completely deranged. On July 30th the Tsar was forced by their protests to declare general mobilization. But this directly threatened Germany, and the next day an ultimatum from Berlin demanded its withdrawal. German declarations of war upon Russia and upon her French ally followed as a matter of course. The British Cabinet, uncertain to the last of public support, promised, in accordance with the secret naval agreement of 1912, to defend the French Channel coasts against attack by the German fleet, but when the Germans invaded Belgium on August 3rd it found a pretext for intervention which Parliament and the nation would accept. On August 4th Britain declared war on Germany, nominally to defend the neutrality of Belgium, but actually because her moral obligations to France were so strong that an evasion of her responsibilities would have left her friendless and isolated and exposed to the contempt of the world. The long-dreaded and long-awaited Armageddon had come at last. The lights of peace, of security, and perhaps even of happiness, went out all over Europe.

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CHAPTER III. ARMAGEDDON AND AFTER

I. THE CLIMAX OF NATIONALISM

THE World War was the nemesis of nationalism. It did not issue out of theological strife like the religious wars of the 16th century, it was not fought to preserve the balance of power against an overwhelmingly strong State like the wars of the grand alliances against Louis XIV, it was not a dynastic conflict over a province or a duchy in 18th-century style, it was not fought in defence of some political principle, least of all of democracy, for the two liberal parliamentary States of the West fought in alliance with the Tsarist despotism and an early defeat of Germany might well have led to the establishment of a Russian hegemony over Europe. It was a democratic war, enthusiastically supported by the masses, in which every people believed they were struggling desperately for the preservation of their nation as a political and cultural entity. The Serbs might with justice fear annihilation at the hands of Austria. The Austrians feared that the triumph of Pan-Slavism meant the destruction of their empire. The Russians feared that the two Teutonic Powers were bent on the conquest of the Slav world. The Germans feared that double attack upon them by France and Russia would rob them of their hard-won unity and disrupt the Reich: even the Socialists voted the war credits in the Reichstag in the firm belief that their country was menaced on all sides by implacable foes. The French feared that their German enemies intended to complete the work begun in 1870. The British feared that the growing German fleet would wrest from them the command of the seas and hold their island empire at its mercy. The circle of fear extended right around Europe. Fearing itself beset by vengeful foes, every nation plunged panic-stricken into war.

The War itself may be best described as the siege of Germany, whose position was highly vulnerable. Placed in the heart of Europe, threatened by attack from both east and west, the Germans understood that salvation depended on speed leading to an early victory. Their Austrian partner was a liability rather than an asset from the military point of view, Russia had inexhaustible reserves of man-power, and the British navy would be able to enforce a stringent blockade and cut off their food supplies from abroad. The Schlieffen plan, elaborated ten years earlier, envisaged the quick defeat of France before Britain had time to come to her assistance and before Russia, whose poor communications made mobilization a slow process, was ready to put her huge armies in the field. As the highly fortified line of the Vosges would not permit of a quick break-through, it was resolved to turn the French flank by striking through Belgium at the weakly-defended north-eastern frontier. At first, the plan worked according to schedule. The German armies marched rapidly through Belgium; at Mons they brushed aside the

small British expeditionary force which had been hastily thrown across the Channel, and by the beginning of September they were at Meaux, almost within sight of Paris. At this critical moment, the Russians having mobilized more rapidly than had been expected, invaded East Prussia and created a panic in Berlin; the commanders in the West were ordered to despatch as many men as they could spare to the eastern front; the right wing under Von Kluck having thus lost four divisions, in its haste to reach Paris separated itself from the main armies, and the French and British forces under Joffre and Galliéni seized their chance to push through the gap. After a stubborn engagement, Von Kluck was forced to retreat. The Germans retired in good order to the line of the Aisne, but the battle of the Marne had saved Paris, ruined the Schlieffen plan, and dissipated Berlin's hope of a quick victory. A German attempt to break through to the sea in the north and seize the Channel ports in order to prevent Britain sending reinforcements to France was frustrated, and a position of stalemate was reached on the Western front. The invaders dug themselves in trenches along a line stretching from Switzerland to the North Sea, and for four long years resisted all efforts to dislodge them. Here were to rage some of the bloodiest battles in history; military reputations won and lost, and hundreds of thousands of lives sacrificed for the sake of a few square miles of desolate waste. Except for a costly and unsuccessful attempt to take the great fortress of Verdun in 1916, the Germans remained on the defensive in the west until the launching of their last great offensive in the spring of 1918.

Very different were conditions on the Eastern front. The Russian invasion of East Prussia, though it saved the situation for the Allies in the West and enabled them to win the battle of the Marne, was speedily brought to a standstill: the Tsar's armies got entangled in the marshy country round the Masurian Lakes, and at Tannenberg they encountered a crushing defeat. The Germans, having thus triumphantly freed their own soil from the invaders, came to the assistance of their hard-pressed Austrian ally, and the Russians were driven relentlessly back through Poland. In November 1914 Turkey entered the war on the side of her German friends, thus enormously increasing Russia's difficulties. The British now resolved to send a naval expedition to the Dardanelles to force the Straits, take Constantinople, catch the Central Powers in the rear by a drive up the Danube, encourage Rumania and the Balkan States to join the Allies, and bring direct assistance in men and equipment to Russia, whose backward industrial development had led to a lamentable deficiency in guns and ammunition. The plan was brilliantly conceived but poorly executed. An attempt to open the Straits by means of the fleet alone failed after five battleships had been put out of action by unsuspected mines: when troops were landed on the Gallipoli peninsula a few months later, the Turks, knowing now what was afoot, had had time to put the forts in a state of defence and make full preparation for resisting the invasion. The attackers, who were small in numbers (the French having refused to allow a depletion of the Allied forces on the Western front for an expedition in which they had comparatively little

interest), withdrew in the winter of 1915-16 after having vainly struggled for eight months against heavy odds.

The failure of the Dardenelles campaign left Russia isolated and exposed to the combined pressure of Germans, Austrians and Turks. Her supplies were running short; many of her trenches were manned by soldiers armed only with sticks, her railway system was disorganized, her losses were enormous, and growing war-weariness paved the way for revolution. In the spring of 1915 Mackensen, the most consistently successful general of the war, descended into Galicia, drove the Russians in headlong flight beyond Warsaw, and carried the front almost as far as Riga in the north and Dvinsk in the south. Bulgaria was encouraged to throw in her lot with the Central Powers and avenge her defeat in the Second Balkan War. Serbia was now ringed with foes. While the Bulgarians attacked her from the east, the German-Austrian armies poured across the Danube and within a month had overrun the whole country, the battered remnants of the Serbian army making a terrible winter retreat across the Albanian mountains till they reached the Adriatic coast and were rescued by the Allied fleets. In 1916, while the Germans were striving desperately to take Verdun and were losing thousands of men in the fearful "blood-bath" of the Somme, Russia nerved herself to a last effort, and opened an offensive in Galicia whose initial successes decided Rumania to join her in the hope of getting Transylvania. The result was a lamentable *débâcle*. Mackensen appeared on the scene once more: the Russian advance was halted, the Bulgarians attacked Rumania across the Dobruja, one Austro-German army advanced from Transylvania and another moved up over the Danube from the south. Before the end of the year Bucharest had fallen and the oil and grain of Rumania had become the spoil of the invader. The Central Powers now controlled a solid block of territory stretching from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf.

While the War in the West had become one of attrition, and that in the East was a series of German victories, at sea the Allies maintained their supremacy. The British fleet had swept German commerce from the seas, transported troops to France and Belgium and the Near East, protected the shipping of the Allied Powers, blockaded Germany and cut off her supplies of food and raw material from abroad, and enabled the German colonies in Africa and the Pacific to be conquered at leisure. It did not succeed, however, in catching and destroying the enemy fleet: the Germans, having no desire to risk their inferior navy against England's, resorted to laying mines all around the North Sea, thus compelling their opponents to keep their distance. On the one occasion when the rival fleets engaged in battle (1916), the Germans displayed clever seamanship and accurate gunnery; they inflicted heavy losses on the British, and then escaped back home in the night. Jellicoe was severely blamed for letting them go by those who had expected a second Trafalgar, but caution was imperative, and as Churchill remarks, he was the only man on the Allied side who could have lost the war in a single afternoon. The British, because of their great superiority in ships, could afford to

lose more than the Germans, and Jutland at least had the effect of keeping the High Seas fleet bottled up in Kiel, from which it only steamed out to surrender.

Yet in 1917 the advantage seemed to lie with the Central Powers. Serbia and Rumania were conquered, Russia was tottering to collapse, Britain and France had made huge sacrifices in vain endeavours to force the impregnable "Hindenburg line" and their reserves of man-power were seriously depleted, the submarine was playing havoc with British shipping and endangering the food-supply, Italy who had joined the Allies in 1915 in the hope of winning back her "unredeemed" territories from Austria, was almost knocked out by the crushing disaster of Caporetto. Germany, one might have supposed, was about to win a tremendous victory almost single-handed against a world in arms. But her people were feeling the pinch of hunger, the grip of the blockade was remorseless, her Austrian ally was breaking under the strain, and her working-men, after the Russian Revolution of March 1917, could no longer be persuaded that they were fighting the Tsarist despotism. Most decisive of all, the United States had joined the anti-German coalition and was transforming the war from a mere clash of national rivalries and selfish ambitions into a crusade for the defence of liberal democracy.

No one in 1914 would have suspected that within three years of the outbreak of the war, America would return to the Europe she had contemptuously abandoned in 1776. True to her isolationist traditions and still cherishing Washington's valedictory warning to beware of European entanglements, she applauded Wilson's advice to remain "neutral in thought as well as in deed." But it was not easy to avoid taking sides, or to escape controversy with the belligerents. Disputes soon arose with Britain over the perennial problems of neutral rights, the blockade and the right of search. The British, not content with the definition of "contraband" as contained in the Declaration of London of 1909, proceeded to add numerous articles to the banned list of their own authority, to stop and search ships suspected of carrying these articles, and even to seize the cargoes of ships bound for neutral ports on the plea that the goods were intended to be retransported to Germany, which in many cases was doubtless true. Germany's only means of retaliation, her own navy being too weak to break the blockade, was to use her submarines to sink all shipping found within British waters. This infuriated American opinion far more than British violations of the freedom of the seas: after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, Germany was cajoled into promising not to torpedo ships without warning. But by 1917 Tirpitz was convinced that the only hope of a quick victory lay in unrestricted submarine warfare, which would cut off Britain's food supplies and starve her into surrender. This decision brought the final breach with America. Although Wilson had been re-elected president in November 1916 on the slogan "He kept us out of war," in February 1917 he broke off relations with Germany and in April asked Congress for a declaration of war. American opinion had by this swung definitely against Germany. The skilful propaganda of the Allies had convinced Wilson and his people that the victory of

German "militarism" would mean the end of democratic freedom in the Old World and perhaps also in the New; the tactless and even barbarous acts of Germany, such as the burning of Louvain and the use of poison gas, had outraged American liberal feeling, and the influence of the great banking houses of Wall Street, which had lent vast sums of money to the Allies and had no desire to see them lost, no doubt played a part in the final decision that the great Republic of the West should intervene "to make the world safe for democracy." Fortunately, the Americans were ignorant as yet of the secret treaties.

The entry of the United States was hailed with enthusiasm by the hard-pressed Allies, who were, however, fully aware that many months must elapse before she could render effective military aid. Her small army had to be augmented, trained and equipped; and Germany was hopeful, now that revolution had knocked Russia out of the war and broken down the Eastern front, of striking a decisive blow against Britain and France before a single American soldier landed in Europe. The Central Powers knew they could not hold out much longer. Food was running short, although they had obtained possession of the grain lands of Rumania and the Ukraine; the racialist agitation in the Hapsburg Empire, particularly among the Czechs, was threatening the break-up of Austria; Turkish resistance was weakening, and the British, having enlisted the aid of the Arabs, were overrunning the outlying provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the Bolshevik call to the proletariat of the world to rise in revolt and end "the capitalist-imperialist war" was not without effect on the half-starved Germans: and the submarine campaign, thanks to the convoy system and the depth bomb, was obviously failing. But the efforts of the Emperor Karl of Austria and of Pope Benedict XV to negotiate a "peace without victory" were unsuccessful; even Wilson now held that Germany must be crushed completely.

For Germany it was a race between victory and revolution. Having imposed a severe peace on the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 and transferred thousands of men and guns from the Russian to the Western front, she launched her last offensive against the Anglo-French armies, which were at first driven back in disorder. By July the German drive had reached the Marne and they were almost as close to Paris as they had been in 1914. But this was the limit of the advance. American troops were pouring into France; the Allied forces had been placed under the supreme command of Foch, who at the end of July opened his offensive and steadily pushed back the German lines. Meanwhile Germany's allies were falling out of the struggle one by one. Bulgaria surrendered in September; Turkey sued for peace in October after Allenby had taken Damascus and cut the Bagdad Railway, and early in November an Italian offensive on the Piave against the exhausted and war-weary Austrians brought the Hapsburg Empire crashing in ruins. Germany held out courageously, though in October she began negotiations with Wilson for an armistice. Her achievement had been magnificent; for four years she had held the world at bay, and in the last

months she struggled as valiantly as the French under Napoleon when facing the Allied invasion in 1814. But her people were physically incapable of bearing further sacrifices, and in November, deserted by her allies and with the home front collapsing into revolution, surrender was inevitable. The Kaiser had fled to Holland and a Republic had been proclaimed in Berlin when on November 11th the Armistice was signed in the railway carriage at Compiègne, Wilson's Fourteen Points being accepted with some modifications as the basis of agreement. The German troops, tired and hungry, marched home in order and discipline, to be received as heroes by the Berlin crowds. They had been defeated, but assuredly not disgraced. The "big show" was over.

Peace came to a sorely-stricken Europe. Ten million men were dead, millions more maimed, blinded, gassed or shattered in health, countless houses empty and desolate, whole populations starving (for the blockade was continued for several months after the Armistice, for fear lest Germany should resume the war), revolutions and social upheavals threatened everywhere, civil wars raging in many countries, and the wealth of generations destroyed in the most horrible conflict of recorded history. The cracks in the much-vaunted civilization of Europe had been fully exposed. The coloured man no longer feared his white masters: they were obviously common clay. The optimism of the liberal 19th century was badly shaken: for this was the culmination of the age of progress, science and democracy! Yet many still hoped, for from across the Atlantic had come the voice of the Messiah of a new world order.

In the winter of 1918-19 the hopes of a wrecked world were pinned on one man: Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924), the last great prophet of liberalism. This college professor turned politician was sprung from Scottish Presbyterian stock, and the spirit of the stern, narrow Bible-reading Covenanters of 17th-century Scotland lived on in him. He had studied the science of politics and had convinced himself that the root cause of war was the fact that, while in all civilized communities every citizen is bound by the laws of his State and can be punished for violation of them, in international relations no law, or at least law in a very attenuated form, exists. The solution of the problem was to establish the rule of law *as between nations*. A code of international morals must be drawn up, accepted and enforced by necessary sanctions. Such was the origin of the Wilsonian League of Nations, a moribund Liberalism's last gift to the world. It was a secularized version of the medieval *Respublica Christiana*, which had accepted, often reluctantly, the authority of the Papacy in the moral sphere. Since the break-down of the medieval order, many systems for ensuring perpetual peace among the nations had been promoted by statesmen and philosophers. A chance, which might never recur, of realizing this long-cherished ideal, was given to Wilson in 1918, and he took it.

Much depended on the character of the prophet himself. Wilson's idealism was unquestioned: he believed with almost fanatical conviction that he was set to right the wrongs of the world and that his Fourteen

Points were the tables of the law of the new dispensation¹. But his learning was academic and his knowledge of men limited; with no experience of high diplomacy, he was unskilled in negotiation; without a first-hand understanding of European affairs, the impartiality on which he prided himself could not be brought into play—one cannot be impartial without a full comprehension of the facts. He never understood the tremendous force of 20th-century Nationalism; with a touching faith in the goodness of human nature that Rousseau might have envied, he spoke of the peoples as unselfish, altruistic and internationally-minded, and he appealed to a world opinion which did not exist. He thought himself free from prejudice, but Allied propaganda had done its work, and in the feverish atmosphere of the Paris of 1919 it was impossible for him to be fair to Germany. He was repudiated by the peoples in whom he trusted, even by his own. His ideal was a noble one, there was nobility in the man himself, but he was one of history's sublime failures.

Three men were responsible for the Treaty of Versailles: Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George. Wilson wanted a settlement based on the principle of "national self-determination" with the League of Nations to guarantee the future peace of the world. Clemenceau, a hard-bitten old cynic with an intense and narrow patriotism, was animated only by love of France and hatred of Germany: he wanted security for his country and a continuation of the alliance with the Anglo-Saxon Powers which alone had made possible the defeat of Germany. Lloyd George, a shrewd politician and a demagogic orator, was prepared to be lenient to the vanquished foe, for with the surrender of the German Fleet all danger to British security had disappeared, but he was hampered by rash election promises to hang the Kaiser and "squeeze Germany till the pips squeaked." The kings and statesmen at Vienna in 1814 were able to work in aristocratic calm and discuss each problem on its merits behind closed doors: the democratic politicians at Paris in 1919 were subjected to a barrage of newspaper propaganda and were uneasily conscious of the presence of a critical electorate at home which would throw them out of office if they abated one jot of the national claims.

When the Peace Conference opened in Paris in January, 1919, Europe was apparently dissolving into anarchy. Civil war was raging in Russia between Whites and Reds. In Germany a sad, disillusioned and benumbed people found themselves saddled with a Republic which nobody wanted and for which its very founders had little enthusiasm: gloomy prophets wondered whether it would fall to a Monarchist reaction, a military dictatorship or Communist revolution. The collapse of the three great military monarchies had led to the emergence of a dozen warring nationalities in Central Europe all struggling for territory and

¹ The Fourteen Points, enunciated in a message to Congress in January 1918, were briefly as follows: 1, open diplomacy; 2, freedom of the seas; 3, universal free trade; 4, disarmament; 5, impartial adjustment of colonial claims; 6, non-interference with Russia; 7, evacuation of Belgium; 8, restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France; 9, readjustment of Italy's frontiers; 10, autonomy to the peoples of Austria-Hungary; 11, restoration of Serbia and Rumania, with access to the sea for the former; 12, autonomy to the peoples of the Turkish Empire; 13, an independent Poland with access to the sea; and 14, League of Nations.

independence. Poles and Czechs were at each other's throats, Hungary threatened to go Bolshevik, Italians and Serbs eyed one another angrily across Fiume and Dalmatia. Unrest was spreading through the Mohammedan world, which was gravely perturbed by the defeat and partition of the Ottoman Empire, and nationalist uprisings in India and Egypt were imperilling all Britain's gains in the Near East. It behoved the peace makers to hasten their labours, but even so seven months elapsed since the Armistice before the Treaty was ready.

That the Treaty of Versailles dealt harshly with Germany cannot be denied. The loss of Alsace-Lorraine came as no surprise, but the creation of the Polish Corridor which split Germany in two and the separation from the Reich of the thoroughly German cities of Danzig and Memel were bitterly resented as a dismemberment of the country. The reduction of the German army to 100,000 men, the forcible demolition of fortifications and the destruction of equipment, were perhaps necessary precautions, but no one could have expected that a proud nation of 70 millions, dangerously situated in the heart of a hostile Europe, would be content with this position of inferiority. The loss of the entire colonial empire was not unexpected, but it could not be contended that "an impartial consideration of colonial claims," as demanded by Wilson's Fifth Point, was undertaken in 1919. The Allied veto on the Anschluss between Germany and Austria, desired by both parties, was a gross violation of the principle of national self-determination, though it was understandable that France should view with alarm the creation of a Greater Germany stretching from the North Sea to the Brenner. For the huge reparations bill of £6,000,000,000 the peace-makers of Versailles cannot be held responsible, for the sum was fixed by a special Allied commission in 1921. But Wilson and his colleagues were guilty of intruding a false moral note into the Treaty and of compelling a proud people to acknowledge their full and exclusive responsibility for bringing about the war. Ignoring Burke's warning, the Allies drew up an indictment against a whole nation; they continued to treat Germany as a pariah long after peace had been made, and excluded her from the League of Nations till 1926. France in 1814, after having kept Europe in a turmoil for twenty-two years, was never treated thus. German hatred of the "Diktat" of Versailles (for they denied that it was a treaty in the strict sense of the word) was probably due more to the war-guilt clause than to all the territorial, military and financial clauses put together.

In Eastern Europe the Wilsonian principle of self-determination (the 20th-century counterpart of Metternich's principle of legitimacy) produced a rampant nationalism worse than the old. The "universal" empires of Austria, Turkey and Russia had disappeared, and the Slavonic peoples who had for centuries been the subjects of these States, suddenly attained full nationhood. The Germans deeply resented this resurgence of "Slav barbarism," which their ancestors had overcome in the name of Teutonic civilization. The restoration of Poland, however, which was due to Wilson's strong sympathies for a severely tried people and to France's desire to find a substitute for her lost Russian ally against

Germany, must be regarded as a just reparation for the wrong of the Partitions, and the new Republic earned the gratitude of conservative Europe when in 1920 she drove back the Bolshevik armies from the gates of Warsaw. A curious patchwork State—an Austria-Hungary in miniature—was carved out of the northern provinces of the defunct Hapsburg Empire, composed of radical, anti-clerical and industrialized Czechs full of memories of John Huss and the battle of the White Mountain, conservative and Catholic Slovak peasants, and sullen minorities of Germans and Magyars resentful of having been reduced from mastery to dependence. Rumania doubled her size by acquiring the long-coveted Transylvania, the Banat of Temesvar and Bessarabia. Serbia grew into Yugoslavia by absorbing the Catholic Croats and Slovenes, who soon displayed a manifest irritation at being ruled by their Orthodox and culturally inferior Serb kinsmen. Hungary was punished territorially worse than Germany; the Treaty of Trianon (1920) left her a small inland State cut off from the sea, and three millions of her people under alien rule. The Magyars suffered severely for their long oppression of their Slav neighbours. The expansion of Serbia along the Adriatic coast roused the jealousy of Italy, who failed to secure in full the gains promised her in the secret Treaty of London (1915) and left the Peace Conference in disgust. Dalmatia, which she claimed apparently as the heir of the old Venetian Republic, went to Yugoslavia, and it was only D'Annunzio's filibustering raid on Fiume which saved that city for the Italians.

Wilson accepted the settlement of 1919 with a heavy heart. Of the famous Fourteen Points, several were completely ignored, others were modified out of all recognition. Of the freedom of the seas nothing more was heard. Universal free trade had less chance of being adopted than in the days of Cobden; the new or enlarged States of Eastern Europe, far from organizing customs unions, tried to attain economic self-sufficiency by shutting out their neighbours' goods, and the currency dislocations that followed the attempts to collect war debts and reparations plunged the greater part of the Continent in ruin. Disarmament remained a pious aspiration: the Anglo-American guarantee treaty promising assistance to France in the event of future German aggression lapsed with the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the Versailles Treaty, and the French, feeling themselves betrayed and deserted, feverishly built up a military machine which they hoped would be strong enough to deal with a resurgent Germany. Yet at least two dreams of the liberal democrats had been fulfilled: the freeing of nearly all the "subject" peoples from foreign rule, and the creation of a permanent international Parliament at Geneva. If these were blessings, they were not unmixed. The first resulted, in Lloyd George's telling phrase, in "the Balkanization of Europe": it multiplied frontiers, tariff barriers, and racial animosities, and produced a more violent nationalism than the Continent had yet known. The League of Nations was repudiated by Wilson's own people and turned by the French into a kind of anti-German coalition, so that Germany was persuaded that the system of

Geneva was intended only to perpetuate the injustices of Versailles and bind the Reich in chains.

The most extraordinary result of the World War was the disappearance of the old system of Great European Powers, leaving behind only the World Powers of Britain, the United States, Russia, France and Japan, and the appearance of a double threat to the security of Western civilization: Communist revolution and the revolt of the coloured peoples against the white. The two were linked together. The Bolsheviks were not committed to upholding the supremacy of the whites, even of the white worker; all was grist that came to their mill, their vigorous propaganda urged Chinese and Indians, Arabs and negroes, to throw off the yoke of the "capitalist exploiters", and while their avowed motive was the liberation of the proletariat by means of the world revolution, they may have been subconsciously prompted by a desire to extend Russian influence in Asia and by the traditional anti-Westernism of Moscow. The Germans indeed insisted that Russia had fallen back into Asiatic barbarism (despite the fact that Lenin and his followers based their creed on the economic materialism of Western socialism), and that the Reich was again, as in the Middle Ages, the true frontier of Europe against "Asia." Yet although the fear of a Bolshevik conquest of Europe was so strong in 1919 as to lead to direct Allied intervention in the Russian civil war on the side of the Whites, and although the victory of the Poles on the Vistula in 1920 was believed to have prevented a communist victory on the Rhine, it is doubtful if the strongly-entrenched bourgeoisie of Western Europe were in serious danger. Bolshevism won in Russia an easy victory over a decadent, semi-feudal society of nobles and peasants; to destroy the highly-complex mechanism of Western capitalist civilization was a much tougher problem. Moreover, national patriotism was a much stronger sentiment than proletarian internationalism, as was proved by the success of the counter-revolutionary movement of fascism.

Much more serious was the rising of the non-European world against white commercial imperialism. Even before the War the East had stirred in her sleep. The Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and the Revolution of 1912 heralded the awakening of China, while the Swaraj movement in India, the Young Turk *coup d'état* in Constantinople in 1908, and the resistance of the Senussi in Tripoli to Italian domination after 1911, were ominous warnings to the White Powers. The war gave the East her great chance. Japan found herself temporarily freed from European interference in the Pacific: having seized the German naval base of Kiau-chau in Shantung, she took no further active part in the war, and the Twenty-one Demands she presented to China in 1915 indicated her intention to be mistress of the Far East. India loyally supported Britain in the hope of receiving self-government as her reward. The Arabs joined the Allies against the Turks, expecting that the abolition of the decadent Ottoman rule would leave the field clear for the establishment of a great Arab Empire in the old centres of Islam. All were disappointed. Japan was confronted in the Pacific by what, after the Washington

Conference of 1921, was virtually an Anglo-American alliance: she therefore bided her time, and from 1931 onwards began to strengthen her position on the Asiatic mainland at the expense of China, her ultimate intention being to close the "open door" and oust the White Powers from the Chinese market. In India the unhappy "Amritsar massacre" of 1919 infuriated Hindu and Muslim alike, and Gandhi's policy of "civil disobedience" was a protest against government by bayonets and the reluctance of Britain to grant her great Oriental empire more than a modicum of Home Rule. The Arab world was incensed to discover that Britain and France had coolly annexed the outlying provinces of the old Turkish Empire and disguised them as "mandates," and when Jewish immigrants began to pour into Palestine, in pursuance of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, Arab wrath overflowed. The Mandatory Powers were threatened by a general revolt of the Muslim world, whose enthusiasm had been kindled by Turkey's successful resistance under Mustafa Kemal to the peace settlement, culminating in the expulsion of the Greeks from Asia Minor in 1922. But though Egypt in 1922 and Irak in 1932 were granted a nominal independence, the Suez Canal in the one case and the Mosul oil-fields in the other precluded the British from abandoning all their commitments in those countries, nor could they abandon their Jewish protégées in Palestine to the vengeance of the Arabs. A clash between Western and Eastern Nationalism seemed impending, for the worship of the Nation as a spiritual as well as a political entity had spread round the globe. "All have to find a way," says Hans Kohn, "to subordinate national interest, in which the will to live and the lust for power have become sovereign and overweening to the discipline of humanity and of the spirit, which alone can give life a meaning and save from chaos this age of unexampled portent and promise."¹

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¹ *Western Civilization in the Near East* (1936), p. 304.

2. DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

Although, since the French Revolution, Europe had lived in the midst of perpetual political upheaval, no violent change of government excited such surprise and alarm as the Russian Revolution of 1917, which marked the triumph of Marxian communism in a great empire covering one-sixth of the world's surface. The victory of the organized proletariat brought near to fulfilment Marx's prophecy of the downfall of a corrupt and decadent bourgeois capitalism and the inauguration of the classless society where social justice was a reality at last. During the anarchy and confusion that followed the collapse of the great military empires, Bolshevism threatened to engulf all Europe, and the propertied classes of the industrial cities of the West were haunted by the spectre of the red terror which in Russia had destroyed Tsar and noble, priest and capitalist, and had conferred political and economic power upon the urban workers, the privileged aristocracy of the new Soviet State.

The extraordinarily complete victory of Revolutionary Communism in Russia can only be explained, apart from the obvious causes such as the corruption and incompetence of the Tsardom and the war weariness of the masses, by the peculiar religious psychology of the Russian people and their belief in their messianic mission to reform a rotten world. Ever since the fall of Constantinople and the Byzantine Empire in 1453 left Moscow the centre of Orthodox Christianity, Russia had believed that she, and she alone, had remained pure and undefiled while the rest of Christendom had fallen away into heresy and schism. Moscow was to be the Third Rome, as Constantinople had been the second, the depository of the true faith whose mission it was to rescue the outside world from the errors in which it was sunk. The bitter controversies provoked by the reforms of the Patriarch Nikon in the 17th century arose from the conviction that the changes he proposed in the services and liturgy were a betrayal of the Orthodox Empire, a tarnishing of the primitive purity of the Russian Church, which alone had preserved throughout the ages the original teaching of Christ. The Old Believers seceded rather than accept them; they left a Church corrupted (they alleged) by heterodox novelties, and departed into the wilderness, convinced that their small body was the sole remnant of the orthodox faith in a world that had gone astray. In their eyes the reign of Antichrist had come, and this assurance was deepened when Peter the Great (1689-1725) began to force upon his country the civilization of the heretic West—a sure sign that Satanic darkness had descended upon Holy Russia.

The secession of the Old Believers had the effect of producing among a small but influential section of the Russian people a hatred of contemporary civilization. The present world was corrupt and decadent: they could only hope for a future millennium when Christ and his saints should return to destroy the forces of evil. This tradition of opposition to the established order descended to the "intelligentsia"

of the 19th century, who have been aptly described as "intellectual schismatics" standing in the same relation to the social and political régime of their day as the Old Believers stood in relation to the Church as reformed by Nikon. The upper classes had already been unsettled by the free-thinking philosophy of the Enlightenment, which they had absorbed during the 18th century after Peter the Great had thrown open Russia to Western influences, but the educated Russian of the 19th century was revolted by the sordid materialism of the bourgeois civilization of the West. There grew up among the intelligentsia a divorce from contemporary life, a realization of the gulf that separates ruler and people, a firm faith in a millennium, a peculiar asceticism and a demand for social justice. A deep compassion for human suffering and an intense indignation that such suffering should exist is the constant theme of 19th century Russian literature, as, for example, the novels of Dostoevsky, who himself experienced the horrors of the Siberian prisons. The passionate religious and messianic conviction, which is so marked a characteristic of the Russian people, was diverted into a non-religious, even an anti-religious channel, in the effort to solve the social problems that were beginning to attract universal attention. In the political sphere, the fleeting Liberalism of Alexander I was succeeded, after the Polish rising of 1831, by the harsh reactionary rule of Nicholas I, which widened the breach between the intellectual malcontents and the established order. Bielinsky, who launched nihilism in the 1840's, forswore his early adherence to the philosophy of the German Idealists and became a passionate devotee of an abstract "Humanity" and hater of social injustice. He renounced belief in God, because to admit His existence would make Him the author of evil and the creator of a suffering world, and the tradition of "religious atheism", the fervent belief in a social millennium and of a Kingdom of God upon earth without God, was by him handed down to the communists of the 20th century.

The rise of socialism in Western Europe, the 1848 revolutions, and the humiliation of Russia's defeat in the Crimean War, produced a ferment among the Russian intelligentsia, especially the university students. Nihilism was the Russian edition of Western revolutionary socialism, dreamy and melancholy but terribly sincere and realistic; it proclaimed its opposition to religion, family life and private property, and demanded a sweeping transformation of society, a second Petrine revolution. Its hatred of Christianity arose from the indifference displayed by the State-bound Orthodox Church towards social betterment, but nihilism itself, like its successor communism, possessed many of the attributes of a religion—an intense, unshakable faith and an extraordinary capacity for self-sacrifice. It recognized workmen and peasants as the only true men, and its vigorous propaganda won over many conscience-stricken nobles like Tolstoy, who were prepared to give up their fine houses and fine clothes and live among the masses. The messianic idea was pressed by Bakunin, who declared that Russia's mission was to illuminate the darkness of the bourgeois West and to lead the way to social revolution—convictions fully shared by the Bolsheviks of 1917.

The rapid spread of nihilism convinced the government of Alexander II of the urgency of introducing reforms that would at least satisfy moderate opinion, and the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 and the tentative experiments in local self-government bore witness to the new Liberal spirit of the Tsardom. But the extremists disdained these mild instalments; the peasantry found the abolition of serfdom a mixed blessing and were urged by agitators to seize the landlord's estates, and the Polish revolt of 1863, and indirectly, the Paris Commune of 1871, frightened the government into reaction. The nihilists were hunted down and sent to the scaffold or to Siberia. The terror was met by counter-terror, and political assassination became a common occurrence. The reforming Tsar was blown up by bombs in 1881, on the eve of making further concessions to the revolutionaries.

Henceforth a struggle to the death was waged between the revolutionary underworld, reinforced by the ruthless socialism of Marx, and the reactionary Tsardom, resolved to yield no more but to maintain every inch of its position against the enemy. Marxism appeared in Russia in the 1880's. Its anti-religious views appealed to a generation disgusted with the sterility of Orthodox Christianity. God, declared Marx, is the supporter of the rich: belief in a future life hinders the reign of social justice in this world. Heaven is the arch enemy of earth. The ascetic and humanitarian element, so prominent in nihilism, disappears completely from Marxian atheism: as Berdyaev puts it, "It was not in the name of man that Marx raised the standard of revolt, but in the name of the mightiness of a new deity, the social collectivity. He is not so much moved by pity for the suffering humiliated proletariat, longing to alleviate its sufferings and liberate it from humiliation, as by the idea of the coming might and power of the proletariat, the future Messiah destined to organise an earthly empire."¹

The prospects of Russian revolutionary socialism were vastly improved by the rapid industrialization of Russia which Count de Witte carried out in the 1890's. The creation of new industries under government supervision, the extension of the railway system, the exploitation of the mineral resources of the empire, the multiplication of factories and workshops, naturally increased the number and influence of the working classes, among whom socialist propaganda made rapid headway. The peasantry might be indifferent, but if the mass of workmen in the big towns could be organized and taught to act as a body, immense pressure could be brought to bear on the governing class. The shameful defeats of the Russian arms in the Japanese War of 1904-05, revealing as they did the gross mismanagement and rottenness of the administrative system, brought all the forces of discontent to the surface. Strikes of the now organized workmen paralysed the State, and revolutionary councils and soviets were formed in the large cities to take over power when the Tsardom collapsed. The monarchy was saved, however, largely by lavish financial support from France, which was horrified at the prospect of her ally dissolving in revolution. Terrified at the narrowness of its

¹ *The Russian Revolution* (Eng. tr. 1933), p.31.

escape, the Tsardom prepared to adopt reforms. A parliamentary constitution was proclaimed (1905) to win over the Liberal bourgeoisie, and Stolypin embarked on an ambitious scheme of agrarian reform designed to turn the peasants by instalments into small proprietors by buying out the landlords, as Gladstone had done in Ireland. The result was that much land changed hands, and the peasants were encouraged to hope that at no distant date they alone would be the owners of the soil.

The old régime survived another decade after 1906, thanks chiefly to the divisions in the ranks of its enemies. The bourgeois opposition was split into a radical and a more conservative wing; the socialists as early as 1903 had divided into mensheviks and bolsheviks. Nevertheless, everyone expected revolution sooner or later. "Bloody Sunday" of 1905 destroyed the last vestiges of proletarian hope in a reforming Tsardom; the corruption and incompetence of the bureaucracy grew worse instead of better; court scandals, of which the disreputable Rasputin was the centre, undermined respect for the monarchy, and Nicholas II himself was a mere dull nonentity, whose diary, like that of his unhappy French counterpart Louis XVI, is a record of trivialities almost incredible in the head of a vast empire. The expiring Tsardom's last chance came in 1914. The war was genuinely popular as an expression of Slav nationalism against Teutonic aggression, and at first all classes of the Russian people affirmed their loyalty to the monarchy. But it soon became clear that the administration was going to mismanage the whole business and lead Russia to humiliating defeat as it had done in 1904-05. The troops were miserably cared for; they were neither fed, clothed nor properly equipped, and when food riots broke out in Petrograd in March 1917, the army declined to fire on the populace. The Tsardom, deprived of its last support, ignominiously collapsed, and the bourgeois opposition in the Duma assumed direction of the revolution.

The eight months during which the Provisional Government held office provided eloquent proof of the failure of the bourgeois parties and the moderate socialists to grasp the significance of the situation. They hoped for a purely political revolution, ignorant of the fact that once a revolution of this sort has started, it is well nigh impossible to stop it at any given point and that it must work itself out to its final conclusion. A Liberal constitution, with a free Parliament and a guarantee of individual rights, was utterly inadequate to meet the wishes of the masses. Russia was weary of the war. The peasants wanted the land. The proletariat wanted peace and power. The complete disappearance of the old régime cut Russia adrift from her moorings. So great a breach with the past inevitably produced a temporary state of anarchy, which was ended by the seizure of power by the only party with a fixed programme and the determination to put it into effect.

The Russian Revolution, like the French, produced its Man. Lenin (1870-1924) now appears in retrospect to have been a true Russian in the direct line of descent from Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. The son of a school-inspector and of the daughter of a country squire, he grew

up dissatisfied with the existing order like most of his contemporaries, saw his elder brother executed in 1887 for a plot against Alexander III, took to agitation himself, and after suffering a short imprisonment in Siberia, fled abroad to Switzerland, where he fell in with the numerous nihilist, socialist and anarchist exiles who enjoyed the hospitality of that Republic, read Karl Marx and was converted to the socialist faith. The revolutionary outbreaks of 1905 encouraged him to return to Russia, and he was a member of the first soviet established in St. Petersburg in that year, but the failure of the movement drove him back to his Swiss lodging-houses. He was already recognized as a man of unusual type : a fanatical Marxist, hating capitalists and bourgeoisie with an almost personal antipathy, convinced of the imminent triumph of socialism, possessing an unshakable will and organizing genius, totally devoid of sentiment or mysticism, a realist withal, who knew when to strike and when to refrain, when to advance and when to retreat in order to advance again. Russia bred many revolutionaries, but only one man who knew what to do with a revolution when made. Lenin had no use either for nihilist bomb-throwers who thought vaguely that they could create a better world by blowing up Tsars and Grand Dukes, or for Liberal democrats who thought that revolutions were made with rosewater, or for Tolstoyan humanitarians who talked of brotherly love as a panacea for the world's ills, or for tepid socialists who contemplated the building of the new social order by slow and peaceful stages. Revolution was a grim and bloody affair ; it must be systematically planned and swiftly executed, and must consist in wrenching power from the possessing classes and holding the captured State against all counter-revolutionaries who will stick at nothing to recover the lost citadel. Prepare the ground carefully beforehand, never relax vigilance, and then nothing was needed except Danton's "*L'audace*".

Lenin reappeared in Petrograd a month after the fall of the Tsar and took in the situation at a glance. He saw that the masses were far more to the "left" than Kerensky's régime, that they were tired of war and wanted peace. Six months sufficed to plan the *coup d'état*, and in November 1917 Kerensky, having lost all popular support, was overthrown with ease, and for the first time in history a government based avowedly on the working classes of the towns came into power in a great empire. Lenin had foretold that the seizure of power would be a simple matter : few of his colleagues had believed him. His daring and energy had won the day : henceforth he was undisputed dictator of the proletarian State which his genius had called into being.

The Bolsheviks found themselves masters of a country in dissolution, and their early actions were mostly dictated by necessity. The trenches were deserted and the soldiers were hurrying back home ; not even Lenin could have forced them to return, so an onerous peace had to be concluded with Germany at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. The peasants were already taking possession of the land ; had the Bolsheviks interfered, they would have lost the support of the rural masses, so they reluctantly legalised this agrarian revolution. The industrialists were already

abandoning their factories to the workers : the new Soviet government merely registered the accomplished fact. Nonetheless, a social transformation unprecedented in history was being carried through : the entire hierarchy of class was inverted. The old possessing classes were stripped of their property and rights. Political power was transferred to the lowest social order—the labouring masses. The proletariat was declared dictator of the State, and the State in their name became owner of banks, mines, factories, transport and all means of production. The Church was disestablished and its treasures and estates confiscated, and the new State openly described as atheistic. Equal wages were decreed for all and were to be paid in kind in the hope that it would soon be possible to abolish all money payments. These startling changes, which seemed to consummate the era of revolution by placing the workers in the seats of the mighty, naturally met with resistance from all who stood to lose by them. The Western Powers, infuriated by the withdrawal of Russia from the war, began armed intervention under plea of reconstituting the Eastern Front. Counter-revolution raised its head : anti-Bolshevik revolts broke out in Siberia and in the Cossack country. The Soviet, like the French Jacobins of 1793, was threatened by foes within and without. It could maintain itself in power only by terror, and after an attempt to murder Lenin in July 1918, massacre and executions became the order of the day, and all known or suspected opponents of the régime were hunted down and slain.

The collapse of Central Europe at the end of the war aroused Bolshevik hopes of world revolution, and the Third International was founded in Moscow to act as a rallying centre for the forces of communism. A communist victory in Germany was particularly desired, since Russia could then obtain the manufactured goods she so badly needed in exchange for the corn which the starving Germans so badly needed. Russian industry had collapsed : the experiment of workers' control of factories had naturally failed, the intervention of State officials had little better success, and as the government, hoping to do without money, resorted to a system of gigantic inflation, the peasants refused to sell their corn for worthless paper notes and they could not be paid in manufactured goods because the output of the factories had dwindled almost to nothing. To feed the starving towns, the State was compelled to seize the grain by force, whereupon the peasants in revenge grew only enough for their own requirements. The result was a hideous famine, which, combined with the civil war, Allied intervention and the continuance of the blockade, brought civilized life in Russia almost to a standstill in 1920.

Though the country was ruined by war and revolution, famine and terrorism, the Soviet survived. It suppressed the counter-revolution, because the "Whites" foolishly talked of restoring the capitalists and landlords, and so drove both workers and peasants into the Bolshevik camp. The Western Powers gave up intervention when they found the Whites were incapable of conquering Russia, and the blockade was lifted. But the state of Russia was so appalling that even Lenin determined to abandon "War Communism", and the boldness with which

he sounded the retreat is a measure of his greatness.* The expected German revolution had not come; the middle classes of Western Europe had been shown to be too strongly entrenched to be dislodged, the soviet régimes in Hungary and Bavaria had flickered out, and fascism, which was to meet and challenge communism on its own ground, was already rearing its head in Italy. The premature attempt to establish Marxism in one fell swoop must be given up. In 1921 the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) was launched.

Briefly, this implied the limited restoration of capitalism under rigid State control. Small industrial enterprises, employing only a handful of workers, were restored to their former owners. Large concerns were grouped into trusts, run by business men, specialists and party members, over whom the State exercised a supervision similar to that of company shareholders over the board of directors. The utopian scheme of a moneyless economy was dropped, and a new gold currency introduced. The peasants were mollified by the abandonment of the old coercive measures and the substitution of a moderate tax to be paid in corn: whatever surplus was left after paying this tax could be disposed of in open market. The Soviet retained control of the banks, of large scale industries and of foreign trade, but the socialist State had openly admitted its inability to compete with the private trader, and a new bourgeois class—the “Nep-men”—began to appear. But the New Economic Policy was intended only as a temporary measure: “We must take one step backward,” said Lenin, “in order later to take two steps forward.” It served its purpose: industry slowly climbed out of the chaos in which the revolution had plunged it, and at the time of Lenin’s death in 1924 production had just got back to the pre-war level.

Lenin’s death was followed by a confused struggle for the succession between one group led by Trotsky and another led by Stalin, ending in the victory of the latter. Once firmly seated in the saddle, the grim and taciturn Georgian removed the brake which Lenin had put on in 1921 and launched in 1928 the first of the Five-Year Plans intended to speed up industrial production, collectivise agriculture, eliminate the last vestiges of bourgeois economy, educate the workers to assume control of industry themselves, free the Soviet Union from its dependence on capitalist countries for its machines and manufactured goods, and assure the permanent triumph of socialism in Russia. The idea of world revolution, energetically pressed by Trotsky, receded into the background; the communist failure in Germany in 1923 and in China in 1927 convinced Stalin that the first task was to build an impregnable socialist order in Russia as an example to the rest of the world. In technique the United States was taken as the model; admiration was expressed for the “machine-civilization” of the great bourgeois Republic, and the Communists imitated America with the same enthusiasm as Peter the Great had once imitated Western Europe. Under tremendous pressure, industry spurted ahead; huge schemes of electrification were taken in hand, foreign experts at first were cordially welcomed in, labour conscription permitted the government to announce the official abolition of

unemployment in 1930, and the whole machinery of propaganda was set in motion to persuade the workers of the dire necessity of the sacrifices they were called upon to make for the success of the Plans. The hardest hit were the peasants, whose individualist tendencies had long been repugnant to the true Marxist. They were now forced into "collective farms" and made to work under the supervision of State officials: the recalcitrant were harassed, persecuted, deported to labour camps in distant regions, or otherwise "liquidated". The peasantry put up a stiff resistance: they slaughtered their cattle and horses, hoarded their grain, and staged a kind of agricultural general strike, but this time they were beaten. The "second agrarian revolution" was carried through with remorseless brutality; the independent peasantry was rooted out, and the sullen and apathetic land-workers on the "collectives" handled the new and unfamiliar tractors and threshing machines under the watchful eye of the State overseer. The stubborn will of the peasant masses was broken at last by the invincible socialism of Stalin.

The gigantic experiment of the Five-Year Plans aroused the interest of the world, and observers from the West crowded into the cities of Soviet Russia to study at first hand a social revolution of unparalleled magnitude. They found a State which had dispensed with priests and nobles, bankers and business men, which affected to speak and act in the name of the working classes, which persecuted religion and propagated atheism, which proclaimed the complete "equality" of men and women, which glorified technique and despised the things of the spirit. Its admirers saw in it the rationally planned utopia of their dreams, where inequalities of rank and wealth were abolished, the distinction between rich and poor obliterated, where everyone laboured in the service of the community, where unemployment and financial crises were unknown, where hitherto silent and oppressed masses were conscious of a new dignity and believed that the State, once their enemy, was now their property, and would in any case disappear when the classless society of the Marxian Apocalypse came into being. But the Liberals were scandalized by the total suppression of political freedom, the party dictatorship, the censored press, the police terrorism, the forced labour, the secret trials and executions, the rejection of all criticism, the slavish adulation of the Soviet chiefs, the intellectual deadness and the absence of any real culture, while from the exiled Trotsky came the bitter complaint that Stalin was creating, not a free and Stateless communistic order, but a State socialism under which the dictatorship of the proletariat had given place to the dictatorship of an overgrown and tyrannical bureaucracy.

The Christian observer, however, was most perturbed at the ferocity of the anti-religious campaign and the "war on Heaven" waged by the Russian communists. He saw in bolshevism the final stage in the secularisation of European civilization which the Renaissance had begun four hundred years before, and he perceived that the belief that man's entire being is determined by social and economic activity was inherited by the Marxists from their bourgeois enemies. "Bolshevism," says Waldemar Gurian, "is at once the product of the bourgeois society and

the judgment upon it. It reveals the goal to which the secret philosophy of that society leads, if accepted with unflinching logic—that is, if the external sanctions which it attempts to derive from forces in themselves alien (e.g., religion) by setting apart a domain of private life, are withdrawn.”¹ Yet the atheism of the Russian communist was very different from the cold rationalism of the Western agnostic. It was early observed that communism bore many marks of a religion, that socially its appeal was similar to that of Islam in its early days, that a creed of mere economic materialism could not possibly have created the enthusiasm and sublime faith which animated the authors of the socialist State. “It is the religion of the kingdom of this world,” says Berdyaev, “the last final denial of the other world, of every kind of spirituality. That is precisely the reason why its very materialism becomes spiritual and mystic. The communist State is quite different from the ordinary lay, secularised State. It is a sacred, “theocratic” State, which takes over the functions that belong to the Church. It forms men’s souls, gives them an obligatory creed, exacts from them not only ‘what is Caesar’s’ but even ‘what is God’s.’”² The strange paradox of Russian “religious atheism” may yet issue in a Christian revival, and the “Third Christianity” which Spengler prophesied may succeed the Third International as the latter succeeded the Third Rome.

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3. THE PASSING OF LIBERALISM

The post-Renaissance history of Europe has been largely that of the emancipation of the individual from religious, political and social restraints. The Renaissance itself was a reassertion of the individual human spirit against the universalism of the Middle Ages. The Reformation was the attempt of the individual worshipper of God to find his salvation without the help of priest or sacraments. The American and French Revolutions were expressions of individualism in politics, both the Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 laying down the existence of certain natural rights possessed by every human being of which no power on earth could legitimately deprive him. The 19th century Liberals, who declaimed so fiercely against autocratic governments and authoritarian religious creeds, sought a freedom for the individual which they were assured would give to the lowliest member of society the opportunity to live "the good life" in the fullest Aristotelian sense of that term. Yet at the very moment when they seemed most assured of success, when even the unchanging East was dethroning its emperors and sultans and when the World War was destroying the last of the old absolute monarchies of Europe, a revival of authoritarian principles everywhere made its appearance.

The truth was that the coming of industrialism had deprived Liberalism of whatever chance it possessed of becoming the permanent political creed of Europe. Industrialism produced two important results, both hostile to the Liberal tradition. First, the economic enslavement of the masses and the shocking abuses of the early factory days created the socialism which in Marx's hands became the creed of the class war and the world revolution. Secondly, the individuality of the past, the luxuriant diversity of culture which had existed in pre-industrial times, gave place to the monotonous, standardized "mass civilization" of capitalist democracy, where huge multitudes of workers herded together in ill-built, overgrown towns, living the same life, reading the same literature, eating the same food, and enjoying the same amusements. With the arrival of the "mass-man", that peculiar offspring of universal suffrage and industrial capitalism, whom Ortega y Gasset well describes as "a primitive who had slipped through the wings on to the age-old stage of civilization"¹, Liberalism was doomed.

As the proletariat grew increasingly strong and articulate, Liberalism weakened and decayed. It was a definitely bourgeois creed; it promised freedom from State interference, which commended it to the manufacturer and the captain of industry, and liberty of the press and of religious worship, which won the adhesion of the intelligentsia. It secured for the middle classes preponderant power in society. It successfully combatted the old autocracies, the ancient feudal aristocracies, and the Church,

¹ *The Revolt of the Masses* (Eng. tr. 1932), p. 89.

and wherever it gained a foothold it either abolished the monarchy or reduced the king to a puppet, ousted the nobility from political life, and secularized public life by separating Church and State. It professed to be neutral towards religion and idealized the "lay" State. But it held small comfort for the starved and exploited workmen. Louis Philippe's France showed how little the Liberal State had to offer to the masses. The open rupture between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which culminated in the bloody "June days" of 1848, made socialism inevitable as an alternative creed. Thus Liberalism, besides antagonizing the adherents of the old order by its professions of democracy and equality, and the religious-minded by its anti-clericalism, added the working classes to the number of its opponents. Not until it was too late did it realize that the main problems of the modern world were not political but economic. But by that time the masses had gone over to Marxism.

A world emerging painfully from the greatest war in history was inclined to question whether either Liberalism or socialism offered a satisfactory solution of the manifold ills of society. The former had upheld in its best days a noble and manly ideal of rational freedom, but in practice it had too often led to the reign of the party boss, the professional politician and the intriguing office-seeker, and its governmental record in many European countries was a sorry story of corruption and inefficiency. The latter had been committed by Marx to a policy of revolutionary violence and terror which threatened to shatter the basis of society, and thus boded ill for the future. The socialist State was to be born in blood and tears, and the hated capitalists were to be mercilessly exterminated. The faithfulness with which this grim programme was carried out in Russia after the revolution of 1917 shocked the world. Nor had Marx and Lenin anything but contempt for parliamentary democracy, and the forcible dissolution of the Petrograd Constituent Assembly in January 1918 struck the first post-war blow against the cherished Liberal institutions of representative government and free speech.

Thus the Russian bolsheviks opened the anti-Liberal offensive, but a new movement almost immediately sprang up in Italy directed against both Liberalism and socialism and urging that class co-operation rather than the Marxian class-conflict was necessary to save society. Fascism was the creation of Benito Mussolini, who came of a poor peasant family of the Romagna, a province with a tradition of violence stretching back to the medieval condottieri and the Renaissance bravo. After a short career as a school-teacher he took to journalism and to socialist politics and became a fiery exponent of the class war and the bloody revolution. His forceful personality and vehement oratory marked him out as an agitator of dangerous importance and his fiercest attacks on the established order of society were punished by fines and imprisonment. He read fairly widely, studied Nietzsche and Sorel and was impressed by their savage contempt for bourgeois democracy, and during a short exile at Lausanne in 1904 he attended the lectures of Vilfredo Pareto, a sociologist who interpreted history as the record of the domination of successful minorities, first the priesthood, then the aristocracy, then the middle

classes, and finally a new "élite" drawn from the ranks of the proletariat. How much he learned from these teachers is uncertain, but he grew increasingly dissatisfied with the leaders of official socialism in Italy, whom he set down as futile bourgeois mediocrities. When the World War broke out in 1914, Mussolini left the socialist party, though declaring himself still a revolutionary, and worked energetically to bring Italy in on the side of the Allies. Only in stern external conflict, he believed, could the Italian nation find its soul. The war, though it destroyed the hated Hapsburgs, brought little satisfaction and increased rather than diminished the social tension. Italy's failure to obtain at the Peace Conference all that her Allies had promised her embittered the nation. The inability of the parliamentary politicians to cope with post-war problems impaired the already sinking prestige of the Liberal-democratic régime. Socialist and communist attempts, encouraged by the Russian Revolution, to seize the State by force revived class hatred and led to strikes and riots in the big industrial centres and to agitation among the poorer peasants against the wealthy landowners.

Mussolini viewed this social chaos with abhorrence and disgust. He had ceased to be a socialist: he felt that the class war was disrupting and ruining the nation. In 1919 he founded the Fascist Party, the name being derived from the "fasces" or bundle of rods carried before the ancient Roman magistrates as symbols of their authority to punish wrong-doers. Except for its demand for social unity and justice, it had no clear programme: its appeal at first was negative rather than positive, and it succeeded in being all things to all men. Its plea for national regeneration and the union of all classes round the Italian State won the sympathy of patriots disappointed with the Peace Settlement and already applauding D'Annunzio's coup in Fiume. Its stand for a Roman order and discipline in political and social life impressed the propertied classes, who were outraged at the occupation of the factories in North Italy by striking workers which a feeble government had permitted in 1920. Its parades and uniforms and patriotic idealism won over young clerks and other lower middle-class workers for whom official socialism made no provision. The government, unwilling to suppress the socialist agitation itself, left the fascists and the "reds" to fight it out in the streets. This abdication of authority spelt the end of parliamentary democracy in Italy. The strength of the fascists increased steadily, as the appeal of their movement was wider than that of their opponents who were supported only by the town workers, and in 1922 the "March on Rome" put Mussolini in power.

Mussolini did not make himself master of Italy without a struggle. His main task was to reconcile the warring social groups. The workers at first distrusted him as an apostate socialist who had betrayed the proletarian cause. The wealthy classes suspected him as an adventurer with a disconcerting revolutionary past and feared for their property. In fact, the dictator showed himself neither a reactionary nor a revolutionary. He scorned alike Liberal democracy, the invention of the capitalist middle class, and social democracy, the instrument of the

class war. Fascism, as he conceived it, was neither to preserve the unrestricted capitalism of the Liberal epoch, with its selfish individualism, greed for profits and indifference to the welfare of the workers, nor to "liquidate" the middle classes in Bolshevik fashion in the supposed interest of a single social group—the urban proletariat. It was to hold the balance, evenly and impartially, between Capital and Labour, to impose a settlement from above in the interests of social peace and justice. Trade unions and employers' associations were both abolished. A united Labour "front", consisting of representatives of masters, workers and the government, was established to supervise industry. Arbitration by special "labour courts" was made compulsory in all industrial disputes. Strikes and lock-outs were prohibited. The banks, though remaining private companies, were forced to carry out the government's financial policy. Production was treated as a public service and regularized by the State in the interests of the community. Capitalism survived and the profit-motive was still recognized, but the days of unrestrained competition were over in Italy. "Big Business," as Mussolini put it, was "bitted and bridled" by the fascist State.

Thus fascism appeared to provide a solution of the economic problem which avoided the licence of *laissez-faire* individualism and the class-dictatorship of socialism. But a further problem of vast significance remained. Could the State, omnipotent in the economic sphere, remain limited in the political sphere? Mussolini decided that it could not. The State must be totalitarian: its authority must be unlimited, and all opposition must be suppressed as treason. The civil liberties so highly prized by the Liberals disappeared. The political parties were broken up and destroyed. Parliament was practically put into commission, to be replaced later by a Chamber of Corporations, a body representing the Church, the professions, the army, the universities, employers and workers, and all indeed all national groups and institutions. The press was heavily censored and outspoken criticism severely punished. Only the Church was treated with respect by Mussolini. He reversed the anti-clerical policy of the Liberals and signed the Lateran Concordat with the Vatican in 1929 which restored the Pope's temporal power (lost in 1870) over a small portion of Rome and again allowed the clergy a share in public education. But the Church understood that the permanence of these concessions was doubtful: the totalitarian State might easily aspire to control the spiritual as well as the political life of its subjects.

The fall of Liberalism in Italy in 1922 was followed eleven years later by its overthrow in Germany, where it was a plant of much tenderer growth. The 1848 revolution, a Liberal victory in Italy, had been a Liberal defeat in Germany, and the Second Reich, created by Bismarck in 1866-71, was conservative, militarist and authoritarian. In 1918 Bismarck's incompetent successors brought it to ruin. War-weary and starving, the German masses rose in revolt against their rulers and thrust power into the hands of bewildered social democrats and bourgeois Liberals who were totally lacking in political experience and had no agreed programme of reform. They accepted office because no one else

would take the responsibility. Coming reluctantly into power at the moment when Germany was crushed and broken by defeat, they were compelled to assume the onus of signing the harsh and humiliating Treaty of Versailles and heard themselves later denounced as cowards and traitors. The socialists, who had preached Marxism for fifty years, made no attempt to transform the economic system of Germany; they did not even touch the estates of the Junkers, and they shot down the real revolutionaries (the Spartacists) in the streets. The middle-class Liberals indeed secured a freedom denied them under the Imperial régime, but they imported into Germany abstract constitutional ideas unsuited to the country and set up a Parliamentary Republic on the 19th century model which afforded only too striking a proof of the political ineptitude of the German people. The Weimar Republic of 1919-33 was a régime doomed to an early death. It was born of defeat and despair; it had no roots in the national tradition, and its own founders had no real faith in it. It was associated with the shame of Versailles, the demand for reparations, the occupation of the Ruhr, and the currency collapse of 1922-23 which ruined the middle classes. For a time Stresemann's "Locarno" policy of peace and reconciliation with Britain and France seemed likely to succeed, but its author's death in 1929, followed by fresh economic misery consequent on the world "slump", exasperated a sorely-tried people into throwing themselves at the feet of the one man who offered to lead them out of the slough of despond.

Adolf Hitler was the son of a German-Austrian customs official who was left an orphan in boyhood and whose early adult life was passed in discontented loneliness in humble and uncongenial occupations. Solitary, self-centred, neurotic, and deprived of opportunities of advancement, he drifted from Vienna to Munich, now working with labourers, now vainly striving to be a painter or an architect. On the outbreak of war he joined the army, only too eager to escape from the dull monotony of a futile existence. He proved a competent if undistinguished soldier and never rose beyond the rank of corporal. The November revolution, which found him in hospital recovering from a gas attack, seemed the end of the greatness of Germany. For the politicians of the Republic he had nothing but contempt: he felt they were dishonouring Germany instead of raising her, that the great and the heroic had gone out of German life, leaving only the cheap and the shoddy. Early in 1919 he joined one of the many small political groups which sprung up everywhere after the revolution, and discovered that he was an orator who could sway the masses. From an insignificant organization he transformed the group of which he was a member into the German National Socialist Workers' Party, a name which he probably borrowed, together with the conception of a Third Reich that should restore the glory of a Greater Germany, from Moeller van den Brück.¹ His eloquence and energy,

¹ Moeller van den Brück (1876-1925), the son of a Lutheran pastor of Solingen in Saxony wrote *Das dritte Reich* (Eng. tr. *Germany's Third Empire*, 1934), a passionate appeal for a regenerated Germany, in 1923, the year of the occupation of the Ruhr, and committed suicide in 1925, the year of Locarno.

his fierce denunciations of the "Diktat" of Versailles, his unshakable conviction that a new and better Germany could be built on the ruins of the old, captivated the younger generation, resentful of the poverty and misery of the post-war years, and by 1923 he felt strong enough to attempt a "putsch" in Munich. It failed; the nazi movement passed temporarily into eclipse, only to re-emerge a few years later when the economic crisis had stung the nation into desperation. The Parliamentary Republic had forfeited all confidence; it was only a question whether the nazis or the communists would win the race to power. But German communism was badly led and could appeal only to the town workers; the nazis, like the Italian fascists, cast their net much wider and they possessed a leader of genius. In 1933 Hitler became Chancellor of the Reich.

Within a few weeks of his accession to power Hitler was more the master of Germany than ever Bismarck had been. The discredited political parties vanished at a wave of his hand, German Marxism was destroyed at a blow, and the sovereign states of the Reich submitted without a murmur to the abrogation of the rights and privileges they had forced Bismarck to preserve in 1871. The totalitarian system was established throughout Germany with Teutonic thoroughness, and was reinforced by the peculiar theory of "racial purity" which the nazis inherited from the pre-war Pan-Germans. The socialists and communists were persecuted with relentless severity because of their international affiliations and for putting class before nation. Liberal democracy was attacked as responsible for the humiliations of Versailles and the failures of the Republic. The Jews were driven out of public and professional life and segregated from "Aryan" Germans because their financial and economic power made them feared and hated and because they were regarded as "men of no country" and incapable of true patriotism. The Catholics were struck at in a new *kulturkampf* more remorseless than ever Bismarck had dared to wage, because the Catholic Centre Party had been closely associated with the socialists and bourgeois Liberals during the Weimar régime and because the Church stood in the way of the complete moral and spiritual unification of the German people which the nazis were anxious to achieve. Economically the nazis, like the Italian fascists, reduced the big capitalists to subjection, and by a wide extension of the system of State socialism that Bismarck had created, they established a control over the business and financial world almost as rigid as the most ardent Marxist could have desired. International socialism they despised and hated, but they were genuine *national* socialists.

The anti-Liberal revolutions in Italy and Germany released a flood of aggressive nationalism in these two countries whose national unification had been so long delayed. The "Versailles system" set up by the Western democracies in 1919 was an object of hatred to both. Italy resented bitterly the meagreness of the awards made to her at the Peace Conference: Germany was grimly resolved to tear up the "dictated treaty". In 1933 Hitler left the League of Nations; in 1935 he restored

conscription and created an enormous air force ; in 1936 he denounced the Locarno pacts and reoccupied the demilitarized Rhineland zone ; in 1938 he seized Austria by force and tore away the Sudetenland from Czecho-Slovakia, thereby creating a Greater Germany of 80 million people stretching from the Baltic to the Brenner. Meanwhile Mussolini, in defiance of the League's sanctions, conquered Abyssinia in 1936 and erected a powerful Italian Empire in Africa. The system of international government, planned by President Wilson in 1918 and based on a World Parliament at Geneva, collapsed in ruins, and a German attack on Poland in 1939 precipitated a Second World War.

The " Liberal experiment," as Fisher calls it, seemed to have failed. Liberalism was slain by the democratic masses which it had itself set in motion. Yet it was not the creation of radicals and demagogues and street-corner agitators, but of cultivated and broad-minded aristocrats like Mirabeau and Tocqueville and the English Whig lords, who for all their talk of freedom and natural rights still retained something of the humanist belief that the highest good is wisdom rather than liberty. But the Revolution came too swiftly, and it was impossible to dam back the democratic flood. The sole hope then lay in educating the new masters of the world. But the machine and the factory intervened ; the war of classes began, and the quiet and moderate voice of genuine Liberalism was lost in the uproar. By the 20th century the Revolution was divided against itself : the communists demanded a radical, the fascists a more limited, reorganization of society, but both fostered a social and economic (though not a political) democracy, and both appealed to Caesar. The democracy of the masses ended, as many had foretold, in the despotism of the dictator, for Ortega's " mass-man," despising ballot-boxes and party politicians, marched in uniform behind the Leader who was to him the embodiment of the State. All the immense resources of modern science and technique were utilized to create a totalitarian society terrifying in its completeness. " The State," it has been said, " is steadily annexing all the territory that was formerly the domain of individual freedom ; it has already taken more than anyone would have conceived possible a century ago. It has taken economics, it has taken science, it has taken ethics."¹ Religion alone may impose a barrier : in the words of Karl Barth, " Theology and the Church are the natural frontiers of everything—even of the Totalitarian State." But the secularization of European society has been proceeding steadily since the Renaissance ; the authority of the Church has diminished, and in Soviet Russia has been extinguished, and the new ideals of the authoritarian régimes are in danger of replacing those of Christianity.

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A Spanish thinker analyses the new "mass civilization" now coming into being.

4. TODAY AND TOMORROW

Five centuries have now passed away since the reawakening of cultural life in Italy, which we know as the Renaissance, ushered in the most brilliant and fruitful period of Western European history. Today the universal mastery in science, in thought, in art and in literature, which our Continent seemed to have attained in the 19th century, is threatened by assault from without, by disintegration from within. Faith in unlimited and uninterrupted progress is dimmed; the World War destroyed the hopes of perpetual peace and prosperity; national hates and rivalries are intensified rather than diminished, and the gloomy prophecies of "the decline of the West" are something more than the fancies of a few eccentric philosophers.

Europe had lost confidence in herself; having emancipated herself from the theological tutelage of the Middle Ages, she was unable to discover a new set of values on which to base her civilization. The deism of the 18th century, a Christianity purged of its supernatural elements, was too dry and attenuated a creed to command the adherence of the masses. Schleiermacher's attempt to interpret Christianity as a way of experience rather than as an historic faith grounded in an historical founder, met with small success. Comte's religion of Humanity died at birth. In the Darwinian age it was seriously believed that science might take the place of revealed religion, but hardly had Huxley preached his lay sermons and Renan sketched the plan of the new Scientific Church when the scientists themselves pleaded to be excused on the ground that they were no longer certain of the nature of the concepts with which they were dealing. The solid foundations on which they supposed themselves to be standing melted away. The new discoveries in physics, which followed Röntgen's "X-ray" experiments in 1895, literally dissolved matter into thin air. The atoms which the Victorian physicist, as Eddington tells us, could regard as tiny billiard balls, vanished behind "a schedule of pointer readings", for having been first reduced from "hard lumps of matter" to negative charges of electricity (electrons), they could finally be represented only as mathematical symbols. With the dissolution of the atom, the rigid barriers which had long divided the material world from the non-material began to totter; matter was becoming "spiritualized", was it possible that Spinoza was right after all and that matter and spirit were but two aspects of the same reality? In face of these revolutionary changes, science grew more humble, confessed that it did not know what either "life" or "matter" was, admitted that it was concerned only with measurement and that what could not be measured might, nonetheless, have a real existence. Early in the 20th century, Einstein, whose "particular" and "general" theories of relativity were formulated in 1905 and 1915 respectively, dealt an even more serious blow at "classical" physics by destroying the Newtonian dogma of the absolute character of space and time,

while Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy, enunciated in 1925, introduced an alarmingly irrational element into physical science.

The failure of science to solve the riddles of the universe after virtually promising to do so, produced a feeling of disillusion and even impatience with the processes of logical reasoning. A revulsion against intellectualism made itself manifest. The "pure" reason, in Kantian phraseology, had failed: the "practical" reason, that is, moral intuition, must be brought in to fill the gap. Even so dry and cautious a rationalist as Herbert Spencer had ventured to ascend beyond logical thought to a form of indefinite consciousness: this led directly to the intuitionism of Bergson, whose philosophy of the *élan vital* the ever-active, ever-changing, developing "urge" behind the universe, was immensely popular in France in the years before the War. The "flight from reason" found expression in the Pragmatism of William James, for whom truth was simply "that which works," in the disintegration of human personality into crude (and usually sexual) impulses carried through by Freud and the psycho-analytic school, in the nightmarish art of the Cubists and Futurists, in the novels of Proust¹ and Aldous Huxley, which expose the futility and pointlessness of a world destitute of absolute values. The great problem of modern philosophy, according to Santayana, is to create and enforce a moral law without supernatural sanctions. But if reason and religion are to be rejected, nothing is left but instinct, the sexualized "dark forces" of D. H. Lawrence or the racial mysticism of "Blood and Soil" as taught in Nazi Germany.

We may, indeed, as Berdyaev believes, have reached the end of "modern history", the final stage of the revolution launched by the humanists of the quattrocento, and be entering upon the "New Middle Ages". The reorganization of society on a corporative basis, which is the essence of fascism, is in a sense a return to medieval practice, by which status rather than contract determined a man's position among his fellow-men. The medieval thinkers, so long despised and neglected, have been recently studied afresh, and the "philosophia perennis" of Aquinas is taught again in the schools of unbelieving Paris. But a complete return to the past is impossible, for history never repeats itself; and the New Middle Ages, if they come, will be very different from the Old.

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¹ "In the huge serpentine stream of *A la Recherche du Temps Perdu* one sees the final dissolution of all values, the whole world dissolving away into the marshlands of complete passivity, futility and aimlessness." (Philip Henderson, *The Novel Today*, 1936, p.75).

INDEX

A

- Abdul Hamid, 156
 Abyssinia, 187
 Aehrenthal, 156, 158
 Africa, South
 Germans in 1884, 147
 Gold Rush, 147
 Imperialism in, 145 *et seq.*
 International Association for Exploration
 and Civilisation of, 146
 Matabele War, 147
 Agadir Crisis, 157
 Aix-la-Chappelle, Inter. Congress of 1818,
 21, 67
 Albigenian Crusade, 37
 Alexander I, 92, 133, 173
 Alexander II, 174
 Alexander III, 176
 Alexander, Tsar,
 " " and Holy Alliance, 21 *et seq.*
 " " " Revolution, 24
 Alfieri, Dramas of, 87
 Algeciras Conference, 156
 Algeciras Crisis, 155
 American Civil War of 1861, 67, 95
 Ampère, 116
 Amritsar Massacre 1919, 171
 Amsterdam, Bank of, 66
 Anarchism, Modern, 133, 135/6
 Anarchists, 134
 Andrewes, 32
 "Anti-Church," Creation of, 17
 Aquinas, 191
 Armageddon and After, 159 *et seq.*
 Armistice, Signing of 1919, 171
 Arnold, Matthew, *Culture in Anarchy*, 70
 Assyria, Excavations in, 43
 Austen, Jane, Novels of, 40
 Austria, after Congress of Vienna, 18
 Focal Point of Anti-Rev. Movement, 19
 versus Liberalism, 17
 Austro-Hungary, Dual Monarchy of, 98

B

- Babbitt, Irvin, 102
 Babeuf, and Communism, 60/8
 Babylon, Excavations in, 43
 Bacon, English philosopher, 48, 114
 Baer, von, 118
 Bagehot, Walter, 59
 Bakewell, Stock Breeding, 49

- Bakunin, Michael, 132/3/4/5
 " " " 173
 Balfour Declaration 1917, 171
 Balkans, Nationalist Movement in, 151 *et seq.*
 " First War in, 157
 " Second War in, 157
 Balzac, Honoré de, 103 *et seq.*
 César Birotteau, 104
 Comédie Humaine, 104
 Eugénie Grandet, 104
 Recherche de L'Absolut, 104
 Les Chouans, 103
 Baring, Maurice, 111
 Barker, Ernest, 77
 Barth, Karl, 188
 Baur, 33
 Baudelaire, 107/12
 " *Fleur du Mal*, 107
 Beagle, Voyage of the, 120
 Bebel, 55, 136
 Belgium, Independence Act of, 24/5
 " Liberal Nationalism in, 24/5
 Bentham, Jeremy, 52, 70/1/2, 126
 Benedict XV, 165
 Berchtold, 158
 Berdyaev, Nicholas, 56, 73, 110, 174, 180, 191
 Bergson, 113/191
 Berlin Congress, 152
 Berry, Assassination of Duke of, 22/3
 Bethmann Hollweg, 157
 Bible, Criticism of, in Germany, 33
 Bielinsky, 173
 Big Business, Age of, 146/7
 Bismarck, 67, 82, 86, 89, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99,
 100, 126, 135, 141, 146, 150, 151, 152,
 153, 154, 185, 187
 Bjorko, 155
 Bjornson, 103, 111
 Blake, Mysticism of, 42
 Blanc, Louis, 55, 58, 61, 62, 63, 126
 Organization of Labour, 61
 Blanqui, Industrial Revolution and, 46
 Blast Furnace, Invention of, 47
 Boer War, the (1899), 154
 " Republics, 147
 Boers at Majuba Hill, 147
 Boers, Great Trek of, 1850, 147
 Boileau, 36
 Bolsheviks, 136, 170, 173, 176
 " Revolution of 1917, 55
 Bolshevism in Russia, 170
 Bonnymuir Rising, 57
 Book-keeping, Double Entry, 66
 Bopp, 43

B *continued*

- Borrow, George, 32
 Boswell, 37
 Botta, 43
 Bourbon Monarchy in France, 23 *et seq.*, 68
 Boxer Rising, 145, 170
 Bourgeoisie, XIX Century, 65 *et seq.*
 Brentano, 29, 40
 Brest-Litovsk, Peace of, 165, 176
 Brieux, 112
 Bright, 70
 British Association Founded, 115
 British Chartered Company, 147
 " People, 77
 " Commonwealth of Nations, 139
 Brook Farm Experiment, 61
 Brück, Moeller van den, 186
 Bucher, 123
 Buffon, 114/118
 Bülow, 156/7
 Burke, 19, 56, 168
 Burne-Jones, 44
 Burt, 114
 Byron, 23, 41, 42, 44, 79

C

- Calvinists, and Modern Capitalism, 66
 Campo-Formio, 19
 Canning, and Inter-Congresses, 21
 Cannynge, William, 65
 Capitalism, Developments of, 46 *et seq.*
 Caporetto, Battle of, 164
 Carbonari, The, 21, 24, 80
 Carlists in Spain, 25
 Carlsbad Decrees, The, 21
 Carlyle, 40, 42
 " Chartism, 59
 " Past and Present, 59
 Cartwright, 50
 Castlereagh, 22
 Cataline, 54
 Catherine II, Policy of, 23
 " the Great, 92
 Cato St. Conspiracy, 57
 Catullus, 113
 Cavaignac, Troops in Paris, 62
 Cavendish, 115
 Cavour, 82, 93, 94, 95
 Cervantes, 104
 Chamberlain, Joseph, 154/5
 " Houston Stewart, 84
 " Foundations of XIX Century, 84
 Champollion, 43
 Charles, Albert, 90
 " Fifth, 20
 " Tenth, Fall of, 23, 24
 Charter, The, of Restoration Govt. in France, 23 *et seq.*
 Chartism, 58 *et seq.*
 Chateaubriand, 27, 32, 41, 103
 " Genie du Christianisme, 27
 China, Invasion of, by Western Powers, 140 *et seq.*
 Japanese War with, 142

- China, Reforms in, 142
 Chansons de Geste, 37
 Chekhov, 108
 Church, Catholic Revival of XIX Century, 28 *et seq.*
 " Christian, attacked by XVIII century philosophers, 26 *et seq.*
 " New Scientific, 190
 Churchill, 163
 Cimabue, 44
 Classicism, 36 *et seq.*
 Clemenceau, 167
 Clifford, Kingdon, 123
 Clock, Invention of, 47
 Coal-mine, Basis of Machine Age, 51
 Cobbett, William, 58
 Cobden, 14, 59, 70, 73, 95, 169
 Coeur, Jacques, 65
 Coleridge, Ballads of, 39
 Commune, The, 24, 68
 Comueneros, Revolt of, 54
 Communism, 55 *et seq.*, 172
 Communist Manifesto, 55, 127 *et seq.*
 Comte, 17, 34, 60, 63, 124, 190
 " Course of Positive Philosophy, 34
 Concert of Europe, 22
 Concordat, The, 27
 Condorcet, 71
 Congress of Paris, 56, 92
 " of Vienna, 18 *et seq.*, 138
 Conservative Party, The, 69
 Constable, 44
 Convention, The, abolishes Christianity, 26 *et seq.*
 Copernicus, 114
 Corn Laws, 57
 " Repeal of, 59, 69
 Corneille, 104
 Corot, 44
 Cotton Industry in XVIII Century, 50 *et seq.*
 Cracow Republic Suppressed, 81, 90
 Credit System of Western Finance, 139/40
 Crimean War, 92
 Croce, 100
 Cromer, 148
 Crompton, 50
 Crusades, Time of, 65
 Cuivier, Georges, 115, 118

D

- D'Alembert, 56
 Dalton, John, 115 *et seq.*
 D'Annunzio, 169, 184
 Danton, 176
 Dardanelles, Naval Expedition to, 162/3
 Darwin, Charles, Evolutionary Theory of, 83, 119 *et seq.*
 " " Descent of Man, 121
 " " Origin of Species, 117 *et seq.*
 Darwin, Erasmus, 119/120
 Da Vinci, Leonardo, 118
 Dawson, 130
 Decazes, 23
 Decembrist Revolt, 18

D continued

- Declaration of Independence 1776, 182
 „ of London 1909, 164
 „ of Rights of Man 1789, 143, 182
 Deists, English, 26
 Delacroix, Landscapes of, 44
 Democracy, Nationalist, 75 *et seq.*
 Democritus, 116
 *De Quincy, 40
 *Der Tag, Preparing for, 158
 Descartes, 47, 121
 Descent into the Maelstrom, 150
 De Tocqueville, 136
 De Vigny, 40, 42
 Cinq Mars, 40
 De Wette, 33
 D'Holbach, 114
 Diamond Rush, 146
 Dickens, Charles, 58, 103, 107
 „ „ *Bleak House*, 107
 „ „ *Hard Times*, 107
 „ „ *Oliver Twist*, 58, 107
 „ „ *Pickwick*, 107
 Diderot, 34, 47, 71, 114
 Encyclopedie, 34
 Diocletian, 26
 Disraeli, 59, 69, 52
 „ *Sybil*, 59
 Divorce abolished in France, 29
 Dostoevsky, Feodor, 103, 109, 173
 „ *Crime and Punishment*, 109
 „ *House of the Dead*, 109
 Dreikaiserbund, 152
 Dreyfus Affair, 84
 Drusus, The, 144
 Dryden, 36
 Du Chaillet, 145
 Du Maistre, Joseph, 27 *et seq.*
 „ *Du Pape*,
 Dumas, Alexandre, 40, 42
 Dutch Republic, Wealth of, 52, 59, 69

E

- Eastern Front, War on, 162 *et seq.*
 Eddington, 190
 Edward VII, 155
 Eichhorn, 33
 Einstein, 190
 Electricity, Developments in, 116 *et seq.*
 Elgin, Lord, 141
 Eliot, George, 107, 108
 Empedocles, 119
 Enclosures Acts, 49
 Encyclopedists, 16, 27, 38
 Engels, Friedrich, 57, 127, 128, 134
 „ *Condition of English Working Classes*.
 Engine, First Railroad, 51
 England, Agriculture of, 48 *et seq.*
 „ Bank of, founded, 48, 66
 „ Evangelical Movement in, 31 *et seq.*
 „ In XVIII Century, 48 *et seq.*
 „ Industry in, 48 *et seq.*
 „ Rural Life in, 50 *et seq.*

- England, Trade in, 48 *et seq.*
 Entente Cordiale 1904, 144
 Estates, First and Second, 18
 Eulenberg, Philipp von, 153
 Europe, Balkanization of, 169
 „ New States of Eastern, 169
 Europeanization of World, 138
 Evolution, 118 *et seq.*
 Ewald, *History of People of Israel*, 33

F

- Factory Act, 58
 „ System
 „ „ Coming of, 51 *et seq.*
 „ „ in France, 61 *et seq.*
 „ Work in England, 53 *et seq.*
 Faraday, Michael, 117
 Farms, Collective, 179
 Fascism, 183 *et seq.*
 Fascist Party founded, 184
 Fashoda Incident, 140
 Febronianism, 28
 Federal Plan, 89
 Ferdinand, Emperor, 89
 Ferrero, 124
 Festival of the Supreme Being, 27
 Feuerbach, 34, 131
 Fichte, 34, 41, 88
 „ *Addresses to German Nation*, 88
 „ *Closed Commercial State*.
 Fielding, 31, 104
 Fisher, 188
 Flaubert, Gustave, 105
 „ „ *Madame Bovary*, 105
 „ „ *Salammbô*, 105
 Foch, 165
 Fontenelle, 114
 "Forties, The Hungry," 59
 Fourier, Charles, 55, 61 *et seq.*, 126
 Fourteen Points of Pres. Wilson, 160
 Fra Angelico, 44
 France, Russian Agreement with, 1894, 154
 „ Old Historic Provinces, 78
 „ Overthrown by Germany 1870, 99
 Francis, Emperor, 89
 Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, Assassination
 of, 158
 Franco-German War, 150 *et seq.*
 Frankfurt, Treaty of, 99
 Franklin, Benjamin, 46, 67, 116, 139
 Franz, Kaiser, 20
 Freemasons, 21
 Free Trade Period 1830—1870, 139
 Freud, 72, 106, 113, 191
 Frederick William of Prussia, 90 *et seq.*

G

- Galileo, 116
 Gall, 118
 Gallicanism, 28
 Galliene, 162 *et seq.*

G continued

- Gallipoli Landing, 162
 Galvani, 116
 Gandhi, 148, 171
 Garibaldi, Age of, 79
 Red Shirts of, 95/6
 Gas, Poison, 165
 Gaskell, Mrs., 107
 Gauguin, 102/12
 George, Henry, 56
 George III, 48
 Georgei, 81
 German Empire after 1871, 150 *et seq.*
 " Social Democratic Party in 1875, 134
 Germanic Confederation, 20
 Germany and Boers, 154
 " Beginning of Socialism in, 17
 " Foreign Policy after Bismarck, 153
 et seq.
 " National Socialists Working Party, 186
 " Treatment under Versaille Treaty, 168
 " War of Liberation 1813, 88
 Gibbon, 32, 76
 Gilbert, William, 116
 *Gioberti, 89
 *Giotto, 44
 Gladstone, 72, 95, 99, 147, 175
 Glass Lens, Invention of, 47
 Gobineau, Comte de, *Inequality of the Human Race*, 84
 Godwin, William, 56, 57
 Goethe, 15, 40, 41, 76, 78
 Wilhelm Meister, 122
 Gogol, 109
 " *The Inspector*.
 " *Dead Souls*.
 Gold Rush, The, 147
 Goncharov, Ivan, 109
 " *Oblomov*.
 Goncourt, The Brothers, 106
 Gordon's *Political Justice*, 147
 Gorki, 108
 Gosse, 112
 Great Exhibition, The, 52
 Greece, Constitutional Monarchy in, 23
 " Revolts against Turkey, 23
 " Revolution in 1820, 80
 Green, Frederick, 104
 Gregory XVI, 30
 Grey, 156, 158
 Grimm, The Brothers, 41, 43
 Guizot, 61, 90
 Gurian, Waldemar, 179

H

- Haeckel, 121, 123
 " *Riddle of the Universe*.
 Hague Peace Conference 1899, 157
 " " 1907, 157
 Haldane, Lord, 158

- Halevy, M., 31
 Hanska, Countess, 104
 Hapsburgs, defenders of European Civilization, 19 *et seq.*
 Hardenberg, Reforms of, 89
 Hardy, Thomas, 103, 108
 Hauptmann, 103, 112
 Hegel, 34, 88, 122, 123, 128, 129, 133
 Heisenberg, 191
 Heracleitus, 119
 Herder, 40, 43, 76, 87
 Hero of Alexandria, 47
 Herodotus, 145
 Hindenberg Line 164
 Hitler, Adolf, 186 *et seq.*
 Hoadley, Bishop, 31
 Hobbes, 26
 Holman Hunt, 44
 Holstein, 153, 154, 155, 156
 Holy Alliance, The, 21 *et seq.*
 Holy Roman Empire, 20
 Horace, Odes of, 36
 House, Colonel, 158
 Hugo, Victor, 38, 42, 79, 102
 " " *Cromwell*, 42
 " " *Henry III et sa Cour*, 42
 " " *Hernani*, 102
 " " *Notre Dame de Paris*, 40
 Humboldt, Alexander von, 115, 120
 Hume, 76
 Huss, John, 169
 Hutten, Ulrich von, 87
 *Hutton, James, 118
 Huxley, Aldous, 52, 102, 191
 *Huxley, T. H., 121, 123, 125, 190

I

- Ibsen, Henrik, 111 *et seq.*
 An Enemy of the People, 112
 Brand, 111
 Dolls House, A, 111, 112
 Ghosts, 112
 Hedda Gabler, 112
 Master Builder, The, 112
 Pillars of Society, 111
 Rosmersholm, 121
 Imperialism, Rise of, 83 *et seq.*
 " in Africa, 145 *et seq.*
 " Britain, 83 *et seq.*
 " France, 83 *et seq.*
 " Germany, 83 *et seq.*
 " Italy, 83 *et seq.*
 " Russia, 83 *et seq.*
 " United States, 83 *et seq.*
 Industrial Revolution, 46 *et seq.*, 136, 138
 Industrialism, Birth of Modern, 54
 Inquisition in Spain, 29
 International, First, 55, 82
 " Third, 55, 177
 " Dissolved, 131
 Inventions of XVIII Century, 47 *et seq.*
 International Working Men's Association, 133

I continued

- Isvolsky, 156
 Italy, Fall of Liberalism in, 185
 " Fascism in, 184 *et seq.*✓
 " in World War, 184
 " Revolution in, 95 *et seq.*✓
 " Young Movement in, 95 *et seq.*
 Ivan the Terrible, 175

J

- Jacobinism crushed by Monarchies, 17
 Jacobus and Religion, 26 *et seq.*
 Jacques Bonhomme, 17, 18
 Jacquerie, French, 65
 Jameson Raid, The, 147
 Japan, Invasion of, by Western Powers, 140,
 141
 " makes War on China, 142 *et seq.*
 " presents Twenty-one Demands to
 China, 170
 James, William, 191
 Jaures, 55, 136
 Java Man, 121
 Jellicoe, 163
 Jena, Disaster of, 88
 Jesuit Order restored, 29
 Jews, admitted to Stock Exchange, 66
 " Emancipated from Ghetto, 67
 " Modern Capitalism and, 66
 " Nazis and, 187
 " Re-admitted into England, 66
 Joffre, 161
 Johnson, Dr., 37, 77
 Joseph II, 24, 26, 28
 Josephism, 28
 Joule, James, 117
 Juvenal, Satires of, 36

K

- Kaiser (*see* William II).
 Kant, 34, 41, 121, 122
 Karamzin, 108
 Karl, Emperor, 165
 Kay, John, 50
 Keats, 39
 Keble, 32
 Kelvin, Lord, 117, 123
 Kennington Common Demonstration, 59
 *Kerensky, 176
 Khedive, The, 144
 *Khonates, absorbed by Russia, 145
 Kingsley and Christian Socialism, 107/8
 Kipling, 154
 Kitchener, 144
 Kohn, Hans, 171
 Königgrätz, Battle of, 98
 Kossuth, 81, 91
 Kotzebue, Murder of, 21
 Kruger, 154

L

- Labour, Government in Britain, 135
 " Movements, 135/6
 Lacordaire, 29, 30
 Laibach, Inter. Congress at, 1821, 21
 Laisser-faire, Age of, 52
 Lamarck, 115, 119
 Lamennais, 29, 30
 " launches *L'Avenir*, 30
 " publishes *Paroles d'un Croyant*, 30
 Lamertine, 42
 " *Meditations.*
 Lansdowne, 155
 Laplace, 115
 Lassalle, 126, 134
 Lateran Concordat (1929), 185
 Latitudinarian School, 31
 Laud, 32
 Lavoisier, 115, 122, 123
 Law, John, 66
 Lawrence, D. H., 102, 191
 Layard, Discoveries of, 43
 League of Nations, 166 *et seq.*
 Legrand, 115
 Lenin, 170 *et seq.*
 Leo XIII publishes *Rerum Novarum*, 63, 137
 Leopold of Belgium, 146, 148
 Leontiev, 73
 Lessing, 78, 88
 Levant, France and Britain compete for
 Control, 144
 Liberal Party, 69, 79
 " Victories 1830, 86 *et seq.*
 Liberalism, Revolutionary, 81 *et seq.*
 Liberals, Ideals of, 15 *et seq.*
 " Influence of Freemasonry on, 21
 " History of European, 16 *et seq.*
 " Romanticism of, 17 *et seq.*
 Linnaeus, 121
 Little Corporal, The, 18
 Livingstone, 146
 Livy, 43
 Lloyd George, 135, 167
 " " 1909 Budget of, 135
 Lobengula, 147
 Locarno Policy, 186
 " Pacts, 187
 Lomonosov, 108
 London, Treaty of, 169
 Loti, 112
 Louis XIV, 161
 " XVI, 175
 " XVIII, 17
 " " concedes Charter of Liberties,
 68
 " Napoleon, 62/8, 90/1
 " Philippe, 24, 68, 90 ✓
 Louvain, Burning of, 165
 Lucretius, 116
 Luddite Riots, 57
 Luneville, 19
 Lusitania, Sinking of, 164
 Lyell, Sir Charles, 118 *et seq.*
 Principles of Geology.
 Lytton, Bulwer, 42

M

- Macaulay, 52
 Mackensen, 163
 Machiavelli,
 Machine, Age, 45 *et seq.*
 „ Coming of, 45
 „ Definition of, 46
 Maelstrom, Descent into, 150 *et seq.*
 Malthus on Population, 120, 129
 March on Rome 1922, 184
 Marchand, 144
 Marco Polo, 139
 Marne, Battle of, 162
 Maronites, 144
 Marschallaise, The, 78
 Marx, Karl, 17, 34, 55, 57, 63, 68, 82, 124,
 126, 129, 136, 137, 139, 172, 174, 176,
 182, 183
Das Kapital, 55
Materialist Theory of History, 139
 Materialism, Scientific, 114 *et seq.*
 Maurice, 63
 Maupassant, 107, 113
 Maximilian, Emperor, 87
 Maxwell, Clerk, 117
 Mazzini, 18, 79, 81, 82, 89, 91, 133
 Media, 87
 Mehmet Ali, 143
 *Mensheviks, The, 136
 *Merimee, 40, 42
 „ *Chronique du Regne de Charles IX*,
 40
 Methodist Movement, 31
 Metternich, 17, 19 *et seq.*, 21, 29, 81, 86, 89,
 90, 127, 135, 152, 157, 158
 Mettrie, La, 34, 114
 Michelet, 30, 42
 Miguelists in Spain, 25
 Mikardo, 141
 Mills, The, 126
 „ James, 71, 72
 „ John Stuart, 70, 71
 Millet, 44
 Milton, 37
 Minnesinger, The, 87
 Mirabeau, 188
 Model Housing Act of 1848, 59
 Mohler, 29
 „ *Symbolik*, 29
 Moleschott, 121
 Molière, 104
 Monroe Doctrine, 146, 155
 „ President, 23
 Montaigne, 26, 107
 Montalembert, 29, 30
 Montesquieu, 76
 Morse, Samuel, 116
 Mountains of the Moon, 139
 Muller, Johannes, 118
 „ Max, 77
 Mumford, 46
 Munich, Putsch, 187
 „ Catholic University of, 29
 Mussolini, Benito, 183 *et seq.*
 Mustafa Kemal, 171

- Murat, Appeals to Italian Nationalists, 18
 Muravyev, 144
 Morris, William, 73

N

- Napoleon Bonaparte, 17, 27, 43, 67, 68, 79,
 82, 87, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99, 111, 115,
 166, 143
 *Napoleon, Louis, 82
 Napoleonic Code, 43
 Nation, What constitutes a, 77 *et seq.*
 National Consciousness, 77 *et seq.*
 *National Socialists, 187
 *Nationalism, Change in Character of, 82
et seq.
 Climax of, 161 *et seq.*
 German, 82 *et seq.*
 Irish, 80, 81
 Rise of, 75 *et seq.*
 World-wide, 84
 Naturalists, The, 106 *et seq.*
 ✓Navarino, Battle of, 23
 Nazi Movement, 187 *et seq.*
 Neanderthal Man, 121
 Netherlands, as Barrier v. French Aggres-
 sion, 18
 Newcomen, John, 47
 New Lanark, Model for Industry, 57 *et seq.*
 Newman, Secession to Rome, 32
 Newton, 47, 48, 114, 116, 119, 122
 Nicholas, Grand Duke, 57
 „ Tsar, 81, 90, 92
 „ I, 173
 „ II, 175
 Niebelungenleid, 87
 *Niebuhr, 33, 43
 Nietzsche, 112, 113, 124, 132, 183
 Nihilism, 173, 174
 Nikon, Patriarch, 172, 173
 Nordau, Max, 112
 North West Passage found, 139
 Novel, Development of the, 103 *et seq.*
 „ Revival of Romantic, 39 *et seq.*
 Noyes, Alfred, 124

O

- O'Connell, Daniel, 80
 Ogilvie, 56
 Olmutz, Agreement of, 91, 96
 "Opium War" in China, 140
 Orsini, 94
 Ortega y Gasset, 182, 188
 Owen, Sir Richard, 121
 „ Robert, 55, 56, 57 *et seq.*
 „ *A new view of Society*, 58, 61 *et seq.*
 Oxford Movement, The, 32 *et seq.*

P

- Paine, Thomas, 56
Rights of Man, 56
 Paléy, 31

P continued

- Palmerston, 24, 92, 93, 95, 140, 141
 Palmes, 29
 Pan-Slavism, Spread of, 151 *et seq.*
Panther, The, 157
 Pareto, Vilfredo, 188
 Pasteur, 118
 Pater, Walter, 36, 111
 Patriotism of Conquistadors, 76
 " Early Tribes, 75
 " French Peasants, 76
 " London Mob, 76
 " Machiavelli, 76
 Paulinists, 33
 Paulus, 33
 Peace Conference, 167 *et seq.*
 Peasants, Revolt of, 54, 65
 War in Germany, 54
 Peel, Sir Robert, 59, 69 *et seq.*
 Pellontier, 135
 Pendennis, Major, 69
 Pendjeh " Incident," 140
 People's Charter, 58
 Permanent Court of International Justice, 157
 Perry, Commodore, 141
 Persia, Spheres of Influence in, 144
 Peter the Great, 144, 151, 172, 175, 178
 Peterloo Massacre, 57
 Petrinists, The, 33
 Petronius, 113
 Phalanges, Groups, 61
 Philosophers, XVIII Century and Old
 Regime, 26 *et seq.*
 Piltown Man, 121
 Pindar, Odes of, 36
 Pinero, 103
 Pius VII and Concordat, 27
 " IX, Reforms of, 89, 95
 Syllabus of Errors, 95
 Plato, his Theory of State, 88
 Poe, 112
 Poincare, 158
 Poland, after Congress of Vienna, 18
 " Partitions of, 78
 Poles, Proclaim Freedom, 24
 Polignac, 24
 Poor Law of 1834, 58
 Pope, 36
 Positivism, 34
 Power Loom, Coming of, 49
 Pressing, 19
 Pre-Raphaelites, The, 44
 Priestley, 108, 115
 Printing Press, Invention of, 47
 Proletariat, Dictatorship of the, 172 *et seq.*
 Proudhon, 105, 133, 134
 Proust, 191
 Prussia, 37
 " Compensation for help against
 Napoleon, 18
 Prussian, Constitution of, 19

Q

Quinet, 30

R

- Rabelais, 107
 Race and Nation, 75 *et seq.*
 Racine, 36
 Radcliffe, Mrs., 40
 Radetsky, 90
 Radicals, The Philosophical, 72
 Railways, Introduction of, 51 *et seq.*
 Rasputin, 175
 Reade, 107
 Realism, 45
 " Ousts Romance, 102 *et seq.*
 Realpolitik, 141
 Reason, Age of, 15
 " Triumph of, in Notre Dame, 27
 Reform Act of 1832, 25, 58, 69
 " Second (1867), 95
 Reformation, 182
 Reich, The Second, 185
 Reinsurance Treaty, 152, 153
 Religion, New State in France, 27
 Religious Revival, 26 *et seq.*
 " " in England, 30
 " Tests abolished at Oxford and
 Cambridge, 72
 Renaissance, Post-, of Europe, 182, 190
 Renan, 34, 77, 190, 112
 Renan, *Avenir de la Science*, 124
 Republic, The Second, 68
 " The Third, 68
 Respublica Christiana, 166
 Reuss, 33
 Revolution, Aftermath of, 15 *et seq.*
 " French, 15 *et seq.*
 " French 1912, 170
 " in Naples 1820, 22
 " in Piedmont, 22
 " London Plot, 22
 " in Spain, 22
 Rhodes, Cecil, 146, 147
 Ricardo, 128, 129
 Richelieu, 23, 27
 Richter, Jean Paul, Romances of, 40
 *Risorgimento, The Italian, 79, 133
 *Robespierre, 27
 Romance, Heyday of, 36 *et seq.*
 " and Realism, 102 *et seq.*
 Romanticism, First Appearance of, 36 *et seq.*
 " Developments of, 102 *et seq.*
 " French, 41 *et seq.*
 " in Germany, 40 *et seq.*
 " Law and, 43
 " and Art, 43
 " XIX Century, 36 *et seq.*
 Romantics, The, 23
 " English, 39 *et seq.*
 " Revival of, 27
 Romances, 124
 Röntgen, 125
 Roön, 96/98
 Rosetta Stone, Discovery of, 43
 Ross, 139
 Rossetti, 44
 Rothschilds, Financial Dictatorship of, 67
 Rousseau, Sentimentalism of, 16, 27

R continued

- Rousseau, and Romantic Revival, 36, 38,
 39 *et seq.*, 107, 110, 112, 167
 " *Confessions*, 44
 " *La Nouvelle Heloise*, 102
 Rousseauists, 27
 Rule Britannia, 76
 Ruskin, 73
 Russell, Bertrand, 72
 Russia and Poland under Congress of
 Vienna, 18
 " as Imperialist Power, 145, 174
 " Church in, 172 *et seq.*
 " New Economic Party in 1921, 178
 " Penetration of Asia by, 144
 " Revolution in 1917, 164, 172, 175

S

- Saint-Simon, 55, 56, 60, 61 *et seq.*
 " *New Christianity*, 60
 St. Pierre, Abbé de, 34, 47
 Sainte Beuve, 41
 Saintsbury, 112
 Salisbury, Lord, 144
 Sand, George, 105
 San Stefano—Treaty of, 152
 Sardinia, 18
 Savigny, 43
 Schlegel, The Brothers, 39 *et seq.*
 " *Aesthetic Letters*, 102
 Schelling, 34, 41
 Schiller, 78
 Schleider, 118
 Schleiermacher, 190
 Schlieffen Plan, 161, 162
 Schonbrunn, 19
 Schopenhauer, 112, 113
 Schwann, 118
 Schwarzenberg, 90, 92
 Science in XVIII Century, 114 *et seq.*
 " in XIX and XX Centuries, 190/1
 " in France, 115 *et seq.*
 " Growth of, in XIX Century, 114 *et seq.*
 " War and, 138
 Scott, Sir Walter, Novels of, 33, 38, 40, 41
 42, 103, 107
 Scillière, *Le Mal Romantique*, 102
 *Semitism-Anti, 84
 *Senussi, Rising of, 170
 *Shakespeare in XVIII Century, 36, 104
Midsummer Night's Dream, 108
 Shaw, 103, 112
 Shelley, 39, 42, 44, 57
 " *Prometheus Unbound*.
 Shiites, Persian, 143
 Shogun, The, 141
 Siccardi Laws, 1855, 94
 Sicily, Constitution abolished, 19
 Sismondi in England, 57, 60
 Smiles, Samuel, 73
 Smollet, 31

- Smith, Adam, 48, 52, 67, 70, 71, 128, 129
Wealth of Nations, 48
 Social Democrats in Germany, 134 *et seq.*
 " " Russia, 136
 Socialism, in France, 59 *et seq.*
 " Marx and New, 126 *et seq.*
 " Moderate, in Europe, 1880, 134,
 135
 " Origins of, 56 *et seq.*
 Socialist Movement, First, 55 *et seq.*
 Society for Propagation of Christian Faith
 founded, 29
 Sombart, 47, 66
 Sorel, 183
 Soviet State, 172 *et seq.*
 Spanish Constitution Abolished, 1819
 Spartacus, 54
 Speke, 145
 Spence, 56
 Spencer, Herbert, 120, 123, 132, 137, 191
 Spengler, 147, 148
 Spinning Devices, 50 *et seq.*
 Spinoza, 130, 190
 Stael, Mme. de, 98, 40
 " *De l'Allemagne*, 40
 Stalin, 178, 179
 Stanley, 146, 147
 Steam Engine, The Newcomen, 47
 " Locomotive, 51
 Steering-rudder, The, 47
 Stein, Reforms of, 89
 Stendhal, 102
 Stephenson, Locomotive, 51 *et seq.*
 Stevenson, 103
 Stolypin, 175
 Strauss, 33
 " *Life of Jesus*, 33
 Strikes, 54
 Sudermann, 112
 Sue, Eugene, 105
 Sultan of Morocco, 155
 Sun Yat Sen, 143
 " *Mysteries of Paris*, 105
 Surtees, Novels of, 69
 Swaraj, Rising of, 170
 Sweden, helps against Naples, 18
 Syndicalism, 135 *et seq.*
 Syndicalists, 134
 Synod of Pistoia, 28

T

- Taine, 106
 " Celebrated Dictums of, 20
 Talleyrand, 42
 Tannenberg, Battle of, 162
 Tennyson, 112
 Theophilanthropy, 27
 Thierry, 42
 Thiers, 24
 Tieck, 39, 40
 " *Kaiser Oktavianus*, 39
 Tirpitz, von, 154, 157
 Tocqueville, 188

T *continued*

- Today and Tomorrow, 190 *et seq.*
 Tolpuddle Labourers, 58
 Tolstoy, Leo, 103/8/10
 " *Anna Karenina*, 111
 " *Childhood and Youth*, 111
 " *My Confessions*, 111
 " *War and Peace*, 110
 Tories, Renaming of, 69
 Tory Government in England after
 revolution, 19
 Totalitarianism in Germany, 187
 Toynbee, 84
 Tractarians, 32
 Trade Unions, 54, 135
 Traino, Treaty of 1920, 169
 Transcendental Idealists, 34
 Treitschke, 73
 Triple Alliance, 156
 " Entente, 156
 Troeltsch, 47
 Trollope, Novels of, 60
 Troppan, Congress at 1822, 21 *et seq.*
 Trotsky, 132, 170
 Troubadours, Songs of, 37
 Tupper, Martin, 73
 Turgeniev, 108, 109
 " *Fathers and Sons*, 109
 " *Smoke*, 109
 " *Virgin Soil*, 109
 Turk, Revolution of Young, 156, 170
 Turner, Landscapes of, 44
 Tyndall, 123

U

- Ultramontanism, 28 *et seq.*
 Underground Movements, 21
 University of London founded 1825, 72
 United States declares war on Germany
 1917, 164 *et seq.*
 Urecht-Rastadt settlement of 1713-1714
 21

V

- Verdun, Assault on, 162/3
 Verlaine, 192/113
 Verona, Inter. Congress at, 21
 Versailles, Treaty of, 167 *et seq.*
 186
 Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia, 95
 Victoria, Queen, 52
 Villele, 23
 Virchow, 121
 Vogt, 123
 Volta, 116
 Voltaire, 26, 28, 76, 112, 114
 " and Shakespeare, 36
 Voltarians and Church, 38

- Von Arnim, 41
 Von Kluck, 161
 Von Moltke, 98

W

- Walpole, Horace, 40
 Castle of Otranto, 40
 Washington, 164
 Conference 1921, 170/171
 Watt, and Steam Engine, 46 *et seq.*
 Waves, Hertzian, 117
 " Röntgen, 117
 Weber, Max, 47, 66
 Weill, 38
 Weimar Republic, 1919, 186
 Weltpolitik, 138 *et seq.*
 Western Front, War on, 161 *et seq.*
 Wesley, John, 31 *et seq.*
 Whigs, Anti-clerical policy of, 32
 " Erastian, 32
 " Tories change to, 59
 Whitefield, 31
 Whitehead, 46, 124
 Whitney, Eli, 50
 Wilberforce, Bishop, 31, 121
 Wilde, Oscar, 44, 102/5/12/13
 William II, Emperor of Germany, 153 *et seq.*
 Wilson, President, 158, 164 *et seq.* 188
 Winckelmann, 88
 Windischagratz, 90/1
 Windmill, Invention of, 47
 Witte, Count de, 174
 Wohler, 118
 Worcester, Marquis of, 47
 Wordsworth, 37, 112
 " Ballads of, 39, 44
 World War of 1914, 159 *et seq.*
 " Results, 170
 World War II, 188

X

- X-rays, 190
 " Discovery of, 125

Y

- Young, Arthur, on Farming, 50

Z

- Zionism, 84
 Zola, 103, *et seq.* 124
 " *Germinal*, 106
 " *La Débâcle*, 106
 " *Le Docteur Pascal*, 106
 " *Les Fortunes de Rougon*, 106
 " *La Terre*, 106
 Zollverein, 89

